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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CUSTODIAL AND 
SUPPORT PARENTAGE BY CONSENT 
JEFFREY A. PARNESS* 
ABSTRACT  
Prompted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws through its Uniform Parentage Acts, and by the American 
Law Institute through its Family Dissolution Principles and its 
Restatement Draft on Children and the Law, recently U.S. state 
legislators and judges have spurred a revolution in parentage laws. In 
particular, lawmakers have expanded parental custody opportunities 
and parental support obligations for those without biological (actual 
or presumed) or formal adoptive ties by recognizing ever-increasing 
forms of legal parentage by consent. Lawmakers have revolutionized 
parentage in some startling ways, as by deeming women to be parents 
under written paternity laws (including laws on marital paternity 
presumptions and on voluntary paternity acknowledgements). 
Unfortunately, U.S. state lawmakers have not always acted in ways 
compatible with constitutional (federal and state) constraints. This 
article is the first to review comprehensively the constitutional issues 
arising from the new U.S. state laws on parentage by consent, 
including residency/hold out parentage; spousal parentage; de facto 
parentage; voluntary acknowledgment parentage; and assisted 
reproduction parentage. These issues most often arise when forms of 
“presumed consent” are employed, meaning there is neither earlier 
actual nor apparent consent to justify impositions of shared (if not 
eliminated) child custody upon expecting or existing legal parents or 
to justify impositions of child support upon those then nonparents who 
object. Presumed consent, unlike “common authority” in Fourth 
Amendment search cases, should not generally operate in parentage 
by consent settings.  If it does operate, public awareness should be 
enhanced by education initiatives so that important Due Process 
interests are not lost without at least some prior notice of the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In July 2017, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) approved and recommended for enactment in all U.S. states a 
revised Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).1 This act follows the 1973 and 2000, as 
 
 
1. The Act is available on the NCCUSL website. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2017), https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/final-act-with-comments-
61?CommunityKey=c4f37d2d-4d20-4be0-8256-22dd73af068f&tab=librarydocuments. A review of the 
2017 UPA, its predecessors, and its goals is provided by its Reporter in Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing 
Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 597–99 (2018) [hereinafter Joslin]. 
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amended in 2002, UPAs which have been widely followed.2 All three UPAs recognize 
several childcare parentage forms that are dependent upon neither biological ties 
nor formal adoptions. Childcare parentage under the UPAs can prompt nonfinancial 
interests, as with child custody or visitation [herein custodial parent], and/or 
financial obligations, as with child support [herein support parent].  
The American Law Institute (ALI) supports similar forms of childcare 
parentage. In its 2000 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations (2000 ALI Principles), the ALI recognizes estoppel parentage and 
de facto parentage.3 The ALI is now undertaking a new Restatement of the Law on 
Children and the Law, where, through its March 2019 Draft, it recognizes "de facto” 
parentage (2019 ALI Parental Authority Draft).4 
Childcare parentage laws independent of biology and formal adoption are 
chiefly dependent upon varying forms of consent.5 Consents involve those who are 
then nonparents [herein putative parents] and those who are then either expecting 
or existing legal parents. Expecting legal parents include those who will very likely 
be vested with “care, custody, and control” interests in later-born children whose 
births are then reasonably anticipated (whether or not there are pregnancies at the 
time), or in living children to be placed with them for formal adoption.6 Existing 
 
 
2. NCCUSL tracks state governmental uses of its varying UPAs, with the results summarized 
on its website.  
3. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AM. LAW INST. § 
2.03(1)(a)-(c) (2000) (in the chapter on allocating custodial and decision making responsibility for 
children, there are recognized parents by estoppel and de facto parents, who must have lived with the 
child; there were also recognized legal parents) and § 3.02(1)(a), (c) (in the chapter on child support, 
there are also recognized legal parents). See also id. at § 3.02(1)(b) (a parent for child support purposes 
also includes a person "required by state law to support a child despite termination of the person's 
parental rights"). 
4. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2019) (in the chapter on Parental Authority and Responsibilities, within Topic 8 on Decisions About A 
Child's Associations). Under the ALI’s “Handbook for ALI Reporters,” as recognized in the Parental 
Authority Draft, the four steps in preparing a Restatement are: ascertain “the majority rule,” ascertain 
“trends in the law,” determine what specific rule “leads to more coherence in the law,” and “ascertain 
the relative desirability of competing rules.” On the continuing debate over whether ALI Restatements 
should only state “what the law is,” and how that position has been rejected, see Richard L. Revesz, The 
Debate Over the Role of Restatements, 41 A.L.I. REP. 3, at 1, 4–5 (2019). 
5. I have earlier recognized that there can be "functional parenthood" as well as "contractual 
parentage" outside of biology and formal adoption. Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare 
Parents, 90 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 965, 986―989 (2016) [hereinafter Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents]. 
Herein I only review the constitutional issues arising from expanding recognitions of parentage by 
consent, though I recognize that there are similar issues with functional parenthood and that the divide 
between the two parentage forms is not easily drawn. It is reasonable to view yet another form of 
parentage outside of biology and formal adoption. Presumed parentage laws sometimes recognize 
parenthood in one who neither consents to nor functions as a parent, as with certain types of 
residency/hold out or spousal parents. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) 
(a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child whom he receives into his home and openly holds 
out as his natural child) and § 4(a)(3) (a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he marries 
the child's mother after the child's birth and promises in writing to support the child). 
6. Law reforms supporting all expecting parents, including those who give birth, are suggested 
in Jessica Clarke, Pregnant People?, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 173 (2019).  
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legal parents include those who have already been vested with “care, custody, and 
control” interests in living children.  
Avenues to parentage by consent include certain forms of spousal parentage; 
voluntary acknowledgment parentage (VAPs); residency/ hold out parentage; de 
facto parentage; and assisted reproduction parentage. Consent may be written or 
oral; express or implied; revocable or irrevocable; entered preconception, 
postconception but prebirth, or postbirth; and effective to prompt parentage 
immediately (as with VAPs) or only after other conditions for legal parentage are 
met (as with de facto parentage).   
Expansions of childcare parentage by consent in U.S. states will likely 
continue.7  Such expansions raise significant federal (and state8) constitutional 
issues.9  This paper argues that some expansions of parentage by consent prompt 
undue infringements on the federal Due Process child custody rights of expecting 
and/or existing legal parents. While some infringements do not fully eliminate the 
custodial interests of expecting or existing parents, they still diminish those 
interests by recognizing that child custody must now be shared. Other 
infringements eliminate altogether the custodial interests of expecting or existing 
legal parents. Particularly problematic forms of parentage by consent negatively 
impacting the custodial interests of expecting and existing legal parents involve 
what can be called “innocent losses” and/or “agent waivers” of Due Process 
interests.   
Innocent losses of Due Process child custody interests can involve actions by 
an expecting or existing legal parent that lead to the diminution of that parent’s 
and a second legal parent’s Due Process custodial interests. Here, there can be lost 
interests by a second parent, who, while aware of the relevant actions, could not 
control them and did much to assume/preserve his/her full custodial interests. 
Innocent losses, for example, arise when an expecting or existing legal parent 
 
 
7. There is some resistance to these likely state law developments. See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-
Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 119 (2018) (urging that the relationship between 
prospective parents should be a factor in determining legal parentage; that legal parentage should 
usually be determined at-birth; and that at-birth legal parentage determinations—whether children are 
born of sex or assisted reproduction—should be all-inclusive and permanent). There have also been calls 
for the U.S. Supreme Court to “offer more guidance on how states may define constitutional 
parenthood.” Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2018) (urging 
the Supreme Court to provide “a more contemporary definition―one that, at a minimum, both 
recognizes and protects the rights of intentional parents”) [hereinafter Constitutional Parenthood].  
8. Of course, state constitutional law protections related to legal parentage can only reach 
beyond federal constitutional protections. See, e.g., Hodes & Nauser, MDS, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461 
(Kan. 2019) (right to abortion under the Kansas Constitution’s Bill of Rights).  
9. In focusing on the federal (and some state) constitutional issues arising for parents by 
consent in both custody and support contexts, this article does not address any nonconstitutional or 
public policy issues on such parentage. It also does not address issues involving others who are impacted 
by the emerging laws on parent by consent, including donors in assisted reproduction settings and 
siblings and other family members in all parent by consent settings. On such issues, see Jill Hasday, 
Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897 (2012) (need for more focus in law on the importance of children’s 
relationships with their siblings). See also Naomi Cahn, The New “Art” of Family: Connecting Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies & Identity Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1443 (opining that assurances of 
anonymity to donors involved in assisted reproduction are "questionable" and that there should be 
some rights for donor-conceived offspring to learn the identity of their donor(s)). 
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invites a nonparent into his/her home and allows that nonparent to hold 
himself/herself out as the child’s third parent, at times where the child may only 
have two parents under law. 
 Innocent losses of Due Process child custody interests can also involve actions 
by an expecting or existing legal parent, prompting losses for both that parent and 
a second parent, where the second parent was unaware of the relevant actions. 
Here, awareness and protective legal processes were available to the second 
parent. Such innocent losses can arise, for example, when an existing legal parent 
places a child for adoption shortly after birth, where the second legal parent suffers 
custodial interest losses where he/she did not know, but could have become aware, 
of the pregnancy, or where he/she had available a process to protect custodial 
interests, like a putative parent registry, which were unknown and thus not 
employed.  
Agent waivers of Due Process child custody interests involve actions by an 
expecting or existing legal parent leading to custodial interest losses (whole or 
partial) incurred by another expecting or existing legal parent who is unaware of, 
and could not reasonably have known of, the relevant actions, and thus could not 
have employed any protective process. Here, the principals had no idea about their 
agents’ actions. They had not, expressly or implicitly, delegated authority to waive 
their child custody interests. Agent waivers arise, for example, when one custodial 
parent allows a nonparent to sign a voluntary acknowledgment of parentage 
without the knowledge or support of the second custodial parent whose Due 
Process custody interests are nevertheless negatively impacted, and perhaps 
wholly eliminated.   
In recognizing a parent by consent under law for child custody purposes, there 
can arise simultaneously both an innocent loss and an agent waiver of parental 
custody interests. Consider a scenario where one of two existing legal parents 
shares a residence with his/her child and with a nonparent who assumes familial 
responsibilities while acting in a parental-like way. Some U.S. state laws allow such 
a nonparent later on, as when the one parent and the nonparent are no longer 
romantic partners, to be judicially designated a parent by consent on equal footing 
with any existing legal parent. The residential parent will incur an innocent loss of 
custodial interests when he/she had no understanding of U.S. state residency/hold 
out parentage laws. The nonresidential parent will effectively have his/her child 
custody interests negatively impacted solely due to the residential parent’s acts, 
even where the nonresidential parent did not know, and could not have known, of 
the residency/hold out acts. The nonresidential parent’s loss, as will be seen, might 
be justified as that parent and the residential parent shared “common authority” 
regarding childcare.  
This paper further argues that some expansions of parentage by consent 
prompt undue infringements on the substantive Due Process rights of newly-named 
parents by consent who can then be pursued for child support. Although the rights 
of newly-named child support parents are less constitutionally protected than the 
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child custody rights of expecting or existing child custody parents,10 their Due 
Process interests nevertheless are sometimes infringed by judicial child support 
orders.  
The paper first explores child custody and support parentage by consent in 
the UPAs, ALI pronouncements, and current U.S. state laws, where there are no 
biological or formal adoption ties. In focusing on “consent” to parentage, it shuns 
the often-used label “intended” parent. It recognizes that when the term consent 
(or intent if you wish) is used, in certain instances custodial parentage arises for one 
then a nonparent without the actual or apparent consent to (or intent about) such 
instances. It also recognizes that sometimes support parentage arises for one then 
a nonparent without actual or apparent consent to (or intent about) such instances. 
Here, the consent is akin to the ALI's recognition of a "presumed consent" in the 
intentional tort setting wherein public policy justifications deem actual or apparent 
consent to harmful acts to be irrelevant when the one harmed seeks redress, but is 
denied due to consent.11 
Upon review of parentage by consent in UPA, ALI and state law 
pronouncements, the paper then explores how U.S. Supreme Court precedents 
protect constitutional Due Process interests in and outside of childcare. It follows 
with an exploration of the Due Process constitutional limits on expanding childcare 
parentage by consent for either custody or support purposes.12 It urges reforms to 
 
 
10. The paper does not address all imaginable Due Process interests arising in parentage by 
consent cases. For example, it does not cover any undue constitutional infringements on the interests 
of those beyond expecting, existing, and putative alleged parents that are prompted by childcare 
parentage forms independent of biological ties and formal adoptions. Consider, e.g., the impact on the 
current intimate family members of a nonparent who is now found responsible for child support for a 
child outside the intimate family. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rushing, 127 N.E.3d 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) 
(former husband responsible for child support for two children born into his earlier marriage, where his 
ex-wife has "sole" custody, with visitation for him; his level of support must be assessed utilizing "the 
joint income" of him and his current wife, with whom he lived with an adopted child and a stepchild). 
The paper does not address certain instances where constitutions might protect those nonparents who 
earlier agreed to share, with existing legal parents, custody of children with whom they have no 
biological or formal adoptive ties, but who are later denied the custodial benefits of their pacts. See, e.g., 
Sheardown v. Guastella, 920 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018) (pre-pregnancy assisted reproduction 
agreement did not prompt custodial parentage for birth mother’s same sex partner because there were 
no biological or formal adoptive ties), appeal denied, 905 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. 2018). The paper also does 
not address certain instances where constitutions might protect those who earlier agreed to forfeit 
custody of children with whom there are some biological ties, but who later seek to undo their pacts, as 
with assisted reproduction sperm donors and surrogates. 
11. See infra notes 24–26. 
12. U.S. state laws on childcare parentage by consent prompt additional constitutional issues. 
For example, there are federalism issues which are often overlooked. Interstate relations are implicated 
when consents to parentage occur in one state and are used in childcare parentage cases in a different 
state. The 2017 and 2000 UPAs simply declare that state courts always apply their own state’s laws on 
parentage adjudications regardless of the child’s place of birth or the child’s past or present residence.  
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 105 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) [hereinafter 2017 UPA]; 2000 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 
103 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000 (amended 2002)) [hereinafter 2000 UPA].  Elsewhere I have argued that 
the application of forum state parentage laws in parentage by consent settings sometimes undermines 
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parentage by consent laws in order to protect better the rights of expecting and 
existing child custody parents and the rights of putative child support parents.13 
II. CUSTODIAL PARENTAGE BY CONSENT UNDER THE UPAS AND U.S. STATE LAWS 
The UPAs have always recognized some forms of custodial parentage that are 
independent of biological ties and formal adoptions.14 Under all three UPAs 
custodial parentage by consent can arise under standards involving earlier actions 
of expecting or existing legal parents and of nonparents. Such standards encompass 
certain marital births; certain VAPs; residency/hold out parentage; de facto 
parentage; and certain assisted reproduction births. At times the consent of an 
expecting or existing legal parent to legal parentage in one who is then a nonparent 
is crucial. At other times, the consent of one who is then a nonparent is key. Certain 
standards require multiple consents, as with a consent by either a current expecting 
or existing legal parent and a consent by one who is then a nonparent.  
Consents to custodial parentage under law can arise at a precise point in time, 
or can arise only upon a finding of certain conditions occurring at no precise point 
 
 
Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L. REV. 325 (2019) [hereinafter Faithful Parents]. As well, 
there are equal protection issues which are less frequently overlooked. Equality issues arise, for 
example, when men and women are treated differently with insufficient reasons, as in marital or 
residency/hold out parentage presumption laws that only expressly recognize the male spouses of birth 
mothers, as in Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005) (residency/hold out parentage) and 
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006) (spousal parentage). Consider, as well, cases 
where men who desire to rear their biological children, but are treated differently for insufficient 
reasons, as in adoption notice laws distinguishing between unwed biological fathers who are and are 
not unilaterally precluded from assuming legal parentage. See, e.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 
1238 (Cal. 1992) (absent finding of unfitness, an unwed biological father cannot be precluded from his 
child’s adoption proceeding when he demonstrated timely action to assume parental responsibilities, 
but was unilaterally precluded by the birth mother). On equality concerns with certain state parentage 
laws, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Marriage Equality, Parentage (In)Equality, 32 Wis. J. L. Gender & Society 
179 (2017) [hereinafter Marriage Equality].  
13. The paper does not support a return to childcare parentage laws (or either child custody 
or child support laws) founded only on biological ties or formal adoptions. Compare, e.g., Stone v. 
Thompson, 833 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 2019) (in eliminating the institution of common-law marriage 
prospectively, court establishes a bright-line test due, in part, to the benefits of standardized formal 
marriage requirements such as predictability, judicial economy, and upholding the salutary purposes of 
the statutes on marriage; the fact that common-law marriage requirements are a "mystery to most;" 
and the fact that mutual assent is required of those seeking "to obtain a lawful license" to marry). The 
paper also does not address the possible autonomous rights of children in family integrity. See, e.g., 
Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523 (2019). 
14. Granted, the attributes attending custodial parentage are difficult to discern. See, e.g., 
Dara E. Purvis, The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 541, 594―95 (2019) 
(finding U.S. Supreme Court decisions recognize that the attributes include transmitting values, 
establishing a private home, and raising children) [hereinafter Purvis]; see also David D. Meyer, Family 
Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 844 (1999) (finding 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions recognize that the attributes include “the right to know one’s child and to 
be known by one’s child, to be involved in the child’s life, and to play a meaningful role in influencing 
the child’s upbringing”) [hereinafter Meyer].  
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in time. Immediate custodial parentage in a nonparent arises when an expecting or 
existing legal parent executes a VAP with the nonparent (though VAPs, once 
executed, can be rescinded or challenged later). Conditional custodial parentage 
arises in de facto parent settings where an existing legal parent earlier agrees to 
coparent his/her child with a nonparent and then the nonparent actually coparents 
and develops a parental-like relationship with the child over time.  
Agreements as to future childcare parentage may be written, as with VAPs, or 
oral, as with joint parenting pacts. They may be express or implied. Further, 
parentage by consent under law need not involve actual consents. Parental status 
sometimes arises due to parental-like acts by some nonparents who do not even 
anticipate possible legal parenthood for child support purposes. And parentage by 
consent need not involve actual consents by an expecting or existing legal parent 
to legal parenthood in one then a nonparent who will later share custodial parent 
status.  
How might consent to parent, or consent to custodial parentage status in 
another, or consent to support parentage, arise where there is no actual consent? 
Consider the ALI approaches, in its 2019 Draft of a Restatement on Intentional 
Torts, to consent to specific intentional torts.15 The ALI approaches to consent, a 
defense to an intentional tort claim, are germane since in both the tort and 
parentage settings, there is conduct deemed consensual that can then prompt 
adverse legal consequences.16  
The ALI on torts generally recognizes that an actor should not be liable to 
another for otherwise tortious intentional conduct17 if the actor “gives legally 
effective consent to that conduct." Categories of effective consent include actual 
consent, apparent consent, and presumed consent.18   
Legally effective consent by one otherwise wronged by an intentional 
tortfeasor per the ALI includes "actual consent."19 This encompasses consent to 
conduct where a person is "willing for that conduct to occur," with willingness 
either "express or . . . inferred from the facts,"20 as long as the conduct "is not 
substantially different in nature from the conduct that the person is willing to 
permit."21   
 
 
15. ALI Restatement of the Law on Intentional Torts to Persons, Tentative Draft Number 3, 
scheduled for presentation on September 20, 2019 [hereinafter 2019 ALI INTENTIONAL TORTS DRAFT]. On 
the goals of a Restatement, see supra note 4.  
16. For a different view of consent in parentage by consent settings (described as “de facto” 
parenthood), see Gregg Strauss, What Role Remains for De Facto Parenthood?, 46 FLA. ST. L. REV. 909 
(2019) (upon deeming consent “a notoriously slippery concept,” involving “moral magic,” Professor 
Strauss focuses on “performative consent” and “subjective” consent involving an “intentional mental 
state”).  
17. On intent by a tortfeasor, the ALI generally suggests, at least for the tort of battery, that a 
tort is intended where the actor intends to cause “a contact” with another, or where the actor’s intent 
constitutes “transferred intent.” 2019 ALI Intentional Torts Draft, supra note 15, at § 1 ("transferred 
intent" is defined as under § 11 (not yet available)). 
18. Id. at § 12. 
19. Id. at § 12(a). 
20. Id. at § 13(a). 
21. Id. at § 14(a). 
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Legally effective consent by one otherwise wronged per the ALI also includes 
"apparent consent."22 This encompasses intentional acts undertaken with a 
reasonable belief that the person acted upon, due to his/her conduct, "actually 
consents to the conduct."23   
Finally, and most problematically,24 legally effective consent by one who is 
otherwise wronged per the ALI includes "presumed consent."25 This encompasses 
intentional acts by an actor who "is justified in engaging" in the acts without the 
"actual consent" or the "apparent consent" of the person acted upon.26 Thus, the 
presumed consent by the one who is harmed by an otherwise intentional tort does 
not depend upon the acts of the one who is harmed.27 So, for example, in the 
custodial parentage setting, a nonresidential custodial parent may be harmed due 
to the diminishment, if not elimination, of custodial interests resulting from the 
intentional acts of a nonparent in childcaring, with a residential custodial parent, 
for a child under circumstances where justifications are found later for deeming the 
nonparent also to be a custodial parent.28   
A review of varying forms of child custody parentage by consent in the UPAs, 
the ALI parentage guidelines, and U.S. state laws follows. It reveals how earlier 
consents in varying forms by expecting or existing custodial legal parents can lead 
to later child custody parentage in nonparents over the current objections of the 
expecting or existing parents. In the following section, the UPAs, the ALI, and U.S. 
state laws on child support parentage are reviewed, revealing how earlier consents 
in varying forms by nonparents can lead to later child support parentage over the 
current objections of the one-time, but now obliged, nonparents. In both child 
custody and support settings, parentage by consent can arise, as in the ALI Torts 
Draft, through presumed consent, meaning there is no inquiry into the conduct of 
the one adversely impacted, be it an expecting or existing legal parent whose child 
 
 
22. 2019 ALI Intentional Torts Draft, supra note 15, at § 12(b). 
23. Id. at § 16(a). 
24. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (waiver is a "vague term used 
for a variety of purposes, good and bad . . . . In any normal sense . . . it connotes some kind of voluntary 
knowing relinquishment of a right."). 
25. 2019 ALI Intentional Torts Draft, supra note 15, at § 12(c). 
26. Id. at § 16(b). 
27. The ALI similarly recognizes certain consents by those who have not acted in any “actual” 
or “apparent” ways in its Restatement of Contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 1981) (noting that quasi-contracts, unlike implied contracts, “are not based on the apparent 
intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises;” rather, 
quasi-contracts “are obligations created by law for reasons of justice,” as with one spouse’s duty to pay 
for “necessary clothing and supplies” purchased by the other spouse where the spouses are separated 
and the obligated spouse must pay though that spouse directed the seller not to furnish such clothing 
and supplies).  
28. Of course, all forms of consent recognized by the ALI in intentional tort settings need not 
operate in a single U.S. state. See, e.g., Kruger v. Hamm, No. 2018-CA-000553-ME, 2019 WL 2063922 
(Ky. Ct. App. May 10, 2019) (upon reviewing Kentucky precedents on nonbiological and nonadoptive 
parentage for one then a nonparent arising from the acts of an existing legal parent, the court finds 
Kentucky law requires the “equivalent to an express waiver” of “superior” custodial rights by the existing 
legal parents).  
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custody interests are diminished (if not eliminated) or a nonparent whose assets 
are diminished for child support purposes.   
A. Spousal Parentage 
All UPAs recognize custodial parentage by consent in spouses. The 1973 UPA 
deems “a man is presumed a natural father of a child if . . .  he and the child’s mother 
are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, 
or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated.”29  So, a man's marriage to a 
pregnant or nonpregnant woman prompts custodial parentage in the man for a 
child born or conceived during the marriage, whether or not the man is a biological 
parent. For children born into marriage via “artificial insemination” utilizing the 
semen not donated by the husbands, there are additional requirements for male 
spousal parentage, including that the husband “consent” and that there be 
“supervision of a licensed physician.”30 
The 2000 UPA, as amended in 2002, similarly recognizes presumptive male 
spousal parentage for children born of sex31 and nonpresumptive spousal and 
nonspousal male parentage via consent to “assisted reproduction.”32 Further, it 
recognizes nonpresumptive spousal as well as nonspousal male and female 
parentage via a “validated” gestational mother “agreement.”33  No actual biological 
ties are required in many instances of spousal parentage. 
The marital parent presumption in the 2000 UPA expressly applies to a man 
married to the mother when “the child is born,” or who was married to the mother 
as long as the child is born “within 300 days after the marriage is terminated.”34 As 
to a child born to a married mother via assisted reproduction, a husband is a parent 
if he “provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction” per the UPA 
requisites.35 Within 2 years of birth, the husband may dispute paternity if he did not 
provide sperm or consent.36 However, if the husband did not provide sperm and did 
not consent, he may pursue “at any time” an adjudication of nonpaternity where 
 
 
29. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) [hereinafter 1973 UPA]. The 1973 
UPA also recognizes male parentage presumptions in certain men who married or attempted to marry 
the natural mothers before or after the births. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(2)-(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) 
[hereinafter 2017 UPA]. 
30. 1973 UPA § 5 (other forms of artificial insemination, raising “complex and serious legal 
problems,” are not dealt with, as was noted in the earlier Section 5 Comment). Failure to follow Section 
5 mandates may nevertheless prompt a marital parentage presumption under Section 4 for a child born 
of artificial insemination. See, e.g., 1973 UPA § 4(a)(1) (husband is presumed natural father of a child 
born to his wife “during the marriage”).  
31. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000 (amended in 2002)) [hereinafter 2000 
UPA]. 
32. 2000 UPA §§ 703–705. 
33. Id. at § 201(b)(6). 
34. 2000 UPA § 204(a)(1)–(2). As with the 1973 UPA, there is also a marital parentage 
presumption for a man who attempted to marry the birth mother before the child’s birth and the child 
is born “during the invalid marriage,” or within 300 days after its termination, 2000 UPA § 204(a)(3), as 
well as for a man who married or tried to marry the mother “after the birth of the child” and who 
“voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child,” 2000 UPA § 204(a)(4). 
35. 2000 UPA §§ 703–04.  
36. Id. at § 705(a). 
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he and the mother “have not cohabited since the probable time of assisted 
reproduction” and he “never openly held out the child as his own.”37 As to a child 
born to a gestational carrier where there is a validated agreement, a man and 
woman are parents38 unless the agreement is terminated.39 
The 2017 UPA also recognizes spousal parentage presumptions.  They apply 
to both male and female spouses40 who are married to the birth mothers at the 
time of birth; married to the birth mothers within 300 days of the marriage’s 
termination; or married to the birth mothers after the child’s birth as long as the 
spouses “asserted parentage.”41  Such presumptive parentage does not, and should 
generally not, arise for those marrying expecting or existing legal fathers. Here, the 
typical bar on three legal parents is implicated since there is also another expecting 
or existing legal parent, a birth mother whose constitutional custodial interests are 
fundamental. Spousal presumptive parentage does not arise where births occur 
through assisted reproduction.42 
Nonpresumptive parentage under the 2017 UPA attaches to consenting 
individuals who agree with birth mothers on joint future parentage where the 
mothers give birth via “assisted reproduction.”43 Further, nonpresumptive 
parentage also attaches to married spouses, unmarried couples, “or one or more 
intended parents” where there are either gestational or genetic surrogacy 
agreements.44 
In each UPA, marital-like acts can also prompt spousal parentage. Attempts to 
marry which do not result in actual marriages can trigger parentage in the would-
be spouse. For example, under the 2017 UPA there is presumed parentage in a 
person who married the birth mother after the birth of the child, even if the 
marriage “is or could be declared invalid.”45  No UPA explicitly addresses the 
application of the spousal parentage norms to those in common law marriages.46 
 
 
37. Id. at § 705(b). 
38. Id. at § 801(b). 
39. Id. at § 806. 
40. 2017 UPA, supra note 29, at § 204(a) (“an individual is a presumed parent”). To date, only 
a few states recognize marital parentage in the female spouse of a birth mother for a child born of sex. 
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.A.115(1)(a) and 15C VT. STAT. § 401(a)(1). 
41. 2017 UPA, supra note 29, at § 204(a)(1). 
42. Id. at § 701.  
43. Id. at § 703 (consent by an “individual,” with the consent requisites in Section 704). 
44. Id. at § 801(3). See also 2017 UPA §§ 802–07 (comparable requirements for each form of 
agreement, with additional special rules for gestational surrogacy pacts, at Sections 808–12, and for 
genetic surrogacy pacts, at Sections 813–818). 
45. Id. at § 204(a)(1)(C) (assuming the person is “in a record filed” with the state agency 
maintaining birth records or is named on the child’s birth certificate). See also 1973 UPA § 4(a)(3) 
(similar) and 2000 UPA § 204(a)(4) (similar). State laws include 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.. 46/204(a)(3) and Cal. 
Fam. Code Ann. § 7611(b). 
46. See, e.g., Valentine v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 1130441 (Pa. Super. Mar. 12, 2019) (while state law 
barred common law marriages entered into after January, 2005, court applies the earlier common law 
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So, varying forms of conduct can prompt custodial parentage in spouses, 
where at times there is no explicit consent to childcare ahead of time and where 
explicit consent is unlikely, as when a wife’s extramarital affair prompts for her a 
pregnancy, birth, and custodial parentage, and for her spouse a comparable 
custodial parentage, with his or her “willingness” for such parentage “inferred” 
from the fact of marriage.  
Current state laws generally reflect the policies of the UPAs on custodial 
parentage for spouses of legal parents, though all states do not comparably 
implement these policies. For example, spousal parentage can arise from a 
marriage in existence at the time of birth or at the time of conception, or from a 
marriage in existence sometime during pregnancy though not at conception or 
birth.47   
Spousal parentage, as a form of parentage by consent for those without 
biological or formal adoption ties, is grounded in the inferred consents to share 
custody that inheres in actual or purported marriages between expecting or 
existing legal parents and their actual or would-be spouses. Consents arise when 
the marriage ceremony occurs or is attempted. Consents to parentage encompass 
future children, whether or not now conceived, as well as some current living 
children. While such consents are undertaken comparably by actual or prospective 
birth mothers and their spouses, the circumstances allowing later spousal 
parentage disestablishments might vary, as, for example, where only one of the 
spouses knows of an existing pregnancy at the time of marriage.  
Variations in spousal parentage disestablishments should arise when state 
public policies differ on the import of biological ties for an alleged legal parent who 
is not the birth mother. Biological ties are less, or not, important when marriage, as 
in Obergefell where opportunities for same sex marriages were deemed 
constitutionally demanded, is viewed as “the basis for an expanding list of 
governmental rights, benefits and responsibilities,” including child custody and 
 
 
marriage norms to conduct before 2005 since the bar was not made retroactive); In re Marriage of 
Hogsett & Neale, 2018 WL 6564880 (Col. App. VI 2018) (Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) 
[hereinafter Obergefell] applied retroactively to give same-sex couple right to prove common law 
marriage for purposes of a dissolution proceeding) [hereinafter Hogsett], cert. gr., 2019 WL 4751467; 
and Gill v. Nostrand, 206 A.3d 869 (D.C. App. 2019) (common law marriage doctrine applied in case 
involving alimony and marital property). 
47. See, e.g., 2017 UPA, at § 204(a)(1)(A) (except in surrogacy settings, “an individual is 
presumed to be a parent of a child if… the individual and the woman who gave birth to the child are 
married to each other and the child is born during the marriage.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20 (1988) (child 
"born in wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-814(a)(1) 
(2017) (marriage "at any time in the ten months [ ] preceding the birth"); and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
722.1433(e) (West 2015) (marriage at time of conception or birth). And see State v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224 
(Wyo. 2001) (two spousal parents as birth mother was married twice during pregnancy; first husband 
was presumed spousal parent as child was born within 300 days of his divorce, while second husband 
was presumed spousal parent as he was married to birth mother at the time of birth); and Ex Parte 
Kimbrell, 180 So. 3d 30 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (child born to woman and her supposed second husband, 
though there was no divorce from her first husband; both men were presumed spousal parents).  
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support.48 Thus in Vermont, biological ties are less important as a presumed parent 
is a person who is married to the birth mother at the time of the birth of a child 
born of consensual sex, where an alleged unwed genetic father may challenge the 
presumption within two years of discovering "the potential genetic parentage," but 
where the court may not disestablish the presumed parentage.49 By contrast, 
biological ties are not important where a child is born of consensual sex into a 
marriage where the nonbirth spouse is not a genetic parent, but is a presumed 
parent whose child custody parentage presumption may not be overcome at all by 
a person (like an alleged genetic father) outside the marriage.50 
Spousal parentage by consent involves a very different inferred consent when 
there are common law marriages.  Here, there is no actual or attempted ceremony.  
Rather, a marriage is judicially recognized only after there is sufficient proof of an 
earlier marital-like relationship which usually is not be deemed to have arisen on a 
particular date, as does a formal marriage. While the UPAs and written state laws 
do not expressly address custodial interests in common law spouses of birth 
mothers, seemingly such a spouse can attempt to pursue custody by proving a 
common law marriage existed at the time of conception, pregnancy or birth 
(depending on the state law) so that the child can be deemed born into a marriage. 
B. Voluntary Parentage Acknowledgment 
All UPAs recognize custodial parentage in those who have undertaken a 
voluntary parentage acknowledgment. Unlike spousal parentage, with VAPs there 
are clearly actual consents to parentage by those then either expecting or existing 
legal parents and by those then nonparents who may have no biological or marital 
ties.  
The 1973 UPA recognizes “a man is presumed to be the natural father of a 
child,” thus prompting  custodial parentage, if “he acknowledges his paternity in a 
writing” filed with the state which is not disputed by the birth mother “within a 
reasonable time after being informed.”51 Rebuttal of such a presumption occurs 
only with “clear and convincing evidence of no biological ties” and “a court decree 
 
 
48. Obergefell v. Hodges, 575 U.S. 644 (2015); See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, ¶¶ 
11, 13 (Ariz. 2017) (marital paternity presumption applies to female spouse of birth mother; Arizona 
spousal parentage presumption statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 25-814(A)(1), does not specifically reference any 
likelihood of biological ties in the spouse, but rather addresses the spouse's rights and responsibilities). 
49. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §§ 401(a)(1), 402(b)(2) (2019). 
50. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (federal constitution does not bar a 
marital parentage presumption law where the presumption cannot be rebutted by an unwed genetic 
parent); Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (marital presumption not rebuttable by genetic 
father where marriage is intact). Cf. B.S. v. T.M., 782 A.2d 1031 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (no irrebuttable 
marital parent presumption here as marriage was not intact at relevant times).  While an unwed 
biological father may not himself be able to petition for an adjudication of custodial  parentage, he may 
still be able to be pursued, as by state welfare officials seeking welfare payment reimbursements, for an 
adjudication of child support parentage, especially when a cuckolded husband is disestablished as a 
presumed parent. See, e.g., Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
51. 1973 UPA § 4(a)(5).  
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establishing paternity of the child by another man.”52 
The 2000 UPA, recognizes no custodial parentage presumption for a male VAP 
signor. 53 It does recognize the birth mother and “a man claiming to be the genetic 
father of the child may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to establish 
the man’s paternity.” 54 The 2000 UPA declares a VAP can be rescinded within 60 
days of its effective date by a “signatory.” 55 Thereafter, a signatory can commence 
a court case to “challenge” the VAP, but only on “the basis of fraud, duress, or 
material mistake of fact” within two years of the VAP filing.56 
The 2017 UPA also recognizes that VAPs prompt nonmarital parent-child 
relationships without a presumption. 57 Parentage establishments can be 
undertaken by an expanded field of VAP signatories, including those who claim to 
be “an alleged genetic father” of the child born of sex;58 a presumed parent (man 
or woman) due to an alleged or actual marriage; a presumed parent due to a 
holding out of the child as one’s own while residing in the same household with the 
child “for the first two years of the life of the child;”59 and, an intended parent (man 
or woman) in a nonsurrogacy, assisted reproduction setting. 60 Further, VAPs may 
be undertaken “before or after the birth of the child”. 61  
As with the 2000 UPA, signatories may rescind within 60 days.62 Challenges 
may proceed thereafter, “but no later than two years after the effective date” and 
“only on the basis of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.”63 While 
nonsignatory VAP challenges may be pursued within “two years after the effective 
date of the acknowledgement”, such challenges usually will only be sustained when 
a judge finds the child’s “best interest” is served.64 Nonsignatory challengers are 
limited. Those with standing include the child; a parent under the 2017 UPA; “an 
individual whose parentage is to be adjudicated;” an adoption agency; and a child 
support, or other authorized, governmental agency. 65 
The explicit recognition in the 2017 UPA that VAPs may be undertaken by 
those with no biological ties to the children whom they acknowledge is new, and 
 
 
52. Id. § 4(b).  
53. 2000 UPA at § § 4(b). 
54. Id. § 301. The accompanying Comment indicates that “a sworn assertion of genetic 
parentage of the child” is needed though not “explicitly” required by federal welfare subsidy statutes 
that often prompt state VAP laws, a federal statutory “omission” that is corrected in the 2000 UPA. The 
Comment also recognizes a male sperm donor may undertake a VAP in an assisted reproduction setting 
where his “partner” is the birth mother. Id. § 301.  
55. Id. § 307. 
56. Id. § 308(a). 
57. 2017 UPA § 201(5). Some marital parentage presumptions, including marriages occurring 
after birth, can be prompted by parentage assertions in records filed with the state. 2017 UPA § 
204(a)(c)(i).  
58. Id. § 301.  
59. Id. §§ 301, 204(a). 
60. Id. §§ 301, 703. 
61. Id. § 304(c). 
62. 2000 UPA § 308(a)(I) (within two months of their effective dates).  
63. Id. § 309 (a).  
64. Id. §§ 309(b), 610(b)(1)–(2).  
65. 2017 UPA §§ 610(b), 602. Thus, the parents or siblings of an alleged biological father of a 
child born of consensual sex seemingly cannot challenge a VAP. 
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revolutionary.  The 2017 UPA allows circumvention of formal adoption laws and the 
safeguards they provide for children, including background checks and best interest 
findings. A Comment in the 2000 UPA laments that the federal statutes guiding 
state VAP laws do not expressly “require that a man acknowledging paternity must 
assert genetic paternity;” further, it indicates the 2000 UPA was “designed to 
prevent circumvention of adoption laws by requiring a sworn statement of genetic 
parentage of the child.”66 In 2017, the UPA policy on VAPs thus changes 
dramatically. 
So, a VAP can prompt custodial parentage in one then a nonparent through 
consents by an expecting or existing legal parent and by the nonparent. The 
consents will be “actual” as there is an “express” willingness for shared parental 
authority.  
Many current state laws reflect the policies of the UPAs on VAPs. Only a few 
states to date have extended VAP authority to a same-sex female couple where a 
child is born of consensual sex.67 VAP opportunities are not, and could not be, 
extended to a same-sex male couple where one of the men conceived a child born 
of sex. In this setting, the birth mother is a parent and no states, as yet, recognize  
VAPs for third parents.68  
State VAP statutes today only sometimes involve parentage presumptions.   
With or without presumptions,69 VAP statutes typically recognize that signed and 
state-filed parentage declarations establish custodial parentage for signors who are 
not birth mothers. Sometimes VAPs operate without alleged biological ties. They 
always operate without formal adoptions.  
State VAP establishment laws vary significantly. They differ on whether there 
needs to be an express requirement of possible biological ties by a signing male. As 
well, state VAP laws vary in their disestablishment standards, though all norms, due 
to federal welfare subsidy mandates, must conform to the federal Social Security 
 
 
66. 2000 UPA § 301 cmt.  
67. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C §§ 301(a)(4), 401(a)(1) (person married to birth mother at 
time child is born can undertake voluntary parentage acknowledgment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
26.26A.200 (West 2019) (birth mother and “presumed parent” may sign acknowledgment; presumed 
parent includes the spouse of birth mother under § 26.26A.115(1)(a)(i)); On the need for allowing VAPs 
for same-sex female couples, see, e.g., Jessica Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary 
Acknowledgments of Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (2018) (same-
sex female couples who conceive children using donated sperm). On the problems with two women 
VAPs for children born of consensual sex, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Unnatural Voluntary Acknowledgments 
Under the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 50 UNIV. OF TOL. L. REV. 25 (2018) [hereinafter Unnatural VAPs].  
68. In California there can be three parents under law. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (2020). But one 
such parent cannot be a parent via a VAP. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7612(c), 7611 (2020) (voluntary 
parentage acknowledgment does not prompt presumed parentage).   
69. State voluntary acknowledgment statutes are reviewed in Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary 
Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 53 (2010) [hereinafter For Those Not John Edwards] and Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, 
Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal 
Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 479 (2005) [hereinafter Cacioppo]. 
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Act.70   
VAP statutes most often are employed by birth mothers and unwed men who 
seek to establish legal paternity.71 VAPs are typically distinguished from birth 
certificate recognitions of childcare parents encompassing those married to birth 
mothers, who frequently are presumed parents, but who never undertake VAPs. 72 
VAP parents who reside and hold out children as their own also differ from 
residency/ hold out parents who never undertake VAPs,73 a VAP is more difficult to 
challenge than is a residency/hold out parentage.  
In Alaska and Nevada, the VAP forms do not speak to biological ties.  The 
signing man indicates only that he is the “father.”74  In Wyoming and Washington, 
there is no explicit requirement that the signing man affirm a belief in biological 
ties, though the signor elsewhere is referred to as the “natural father.”75 In 
Vermont, a woman residing with a birth mother for the first two years of a child’s 
life is eligible to sign a VAP.76 
In only some states can VAPs can be filed prior to birth.77  And only in some 
states must information as to any completed genetic testing be submitted; may 
forms be used by residents for out-of-state births; are witnesses or notaries 
needed; and must forms require parental or guardian consent when the signing 
mothers are young.78   
Further, notwithstanding any statutorily-designated “conclusive” status, VAPs 
usually may be rescinded by signatories within sixty days.79  After sixty days, 
however, VAPs may only be challenged in court on the basis of fraud, duress or 
material mistake of fact, in states participating in federal welfare subsidy programs.  
These standards are required by the federal Social Security Act.80  Yet, state cases 
reflect significant interstate variations in the guidelines for such VAP challenges, 
 
 
70. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
93, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Disestablishment (i.e., rescissions and 
challenges) norms are reviewed in Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part I. Disestablishing the 
Paternity of Non-Marital Children, 44–53, 82–90 (2003) (including table citing all statutes).  
71. But see In re Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d. 677 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. N.Y. 2009) (suggesting woman 
whose ova was used by her partner to bear a child born of assisted reproduction might employ the 
voluntary acknowledgment process). 
72. See, e.g., Castillo v. Lazo, 386 P.3d 839 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (birth certificate naming 
husband is not “equivalent” to a VAP).  
73. See, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. 15C, §§ 301(a)(4), 401(a)(4) (a presumed holdout/residency parent 
may, but need not, sign a VAP).  
74. Alaska Bureau of Vital Stat., Form No. 06-5376 VS Form 16, Affidavit of Paternity (rev. Jan. 
2009) and Nevada Declaration of Paternity, Nevada Vital Records, Form No. NSPO, Declaration of 
Paternity (rev. July 2008) (these and later cited VAP forms were collected for Those Not John Edwards, 
and are on file with the author). 
75. Vital Records Servs., State of Wyoming, Affidavit Acknowledging Paternity and Washington 
Paternity Affidavit, Ctr. For Health Stat., Wash. Dep’t. of Health, Form No. DOH/CHS 021 (rev. Sept. 
2007). See Cacioppo, supra note 69, at 489–91. 
76. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 301(a)(4) (2018); § 401(a)(4).  
77. See, e.g., Texas Acknowledgment of Paternity, Vital Stat. Unit, Texas Dep’t of State Health 
Servs., Form No. VS-159-1M (rev. Sept. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 304(b) (West 2018).  
78. Parness et al., supra note 69, at 63–87 
79. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2014). 
80. Id. at § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii). At least one state statute combines its norms on disestablishing 
presumed marital paternity and its norms on challenging VAPs. ALA. CODE § 26-17-608(a)(1) (2008).  
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with no Congressional or federal court movement, as yet, to unify state VAP 
challenge standards.81 
Beyond the definitions of fraud, duress, and mistake, there are other 
differences in current U.S.  state VAP challenge laws.  For example, there are varied 
time limits on VAP challenges.  Even with fraud, duress or mistake, challenges must 
be commenced per written law within a year in Massachusetts,82 within two years 
in Delaware,83 and within four years in Texas.84  In Utah, a statutory challenge may 
be made “at any time” on the ground of fraud or duress, but only within four years 
for material mistake of fact.85  Where there are no written time limits, (often quite 
broad) trial court discretion reigns.86 Further, there are interstate differences in 
whether a successfully challenged VAP eliminates past child support arrearages.87   
Importantly, particularly for nonsigning biological fathers of children born of 
consensual sex, U.S. state laws vary on circumstances beyond fraud, duress and 
mistake available to challenge VAPs. Consider challenges by nonsigning biological 
fathers who did not know that other men, or women in some states, were signing 
VAPs alongside birth mothers, and who did not know of, and did not reasonably 
foresee, their “potential parentage” for some time. In Vermont, such a father may 
challenge VAPs within two years after discovery of his “potential parentage,” as in 
cases where there was “concealment” of the pregnancy and/or birth though there 
was no fraud, duress, or mistake.88 Elsewhere, “concealment” of a pregnancy 
and/or of a live birth by the birth mother (and, at times, others) may not extend the 
time for a biological father to challenge a VAP, as where there operate strict repose 
periods.89 
Further, again particularly important for nonsigning biological fathers (and 
their family members), U.S. state laws vary on the nonsignatories with standing to 
 
 
81. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe, Reforming the Processes for Challenging 
Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (2017) [hereinafter Reforming VAPs]. 
82. MASS. GEN. LAWS § 209C(11)(a) (2018). See also Kansas ex rel. Secretary of Department for 
Children and Families v. Smith, 392 P.3d 68 (Kan. 2017) (one year (after birth) limit on signatory 
challenges applied though there were found technical violations (e.g., no proper notarizations) of the 
statute).  
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 7-308(a)(2).  See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(a)(2); Paul v. 
Williamson, 322 P.3d 1070 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) (employing Oklahoma two-year limit against alleged 
biological father per OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700-609(B) (West 2006)); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:406 (2016) 
(two-year prescriptive period previously imposed for revocation of authentic acts of acknowledgement 
was repealed in 2016).  
84. TEX. CODE ANN. § 160.308(1). 
85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–15–307 (2008). 
86. See, e.g., Matter of Neal, 184 A.3d 90 (N.H. 2018) (sustainable exercise of trial court 
discretion where a 2009 VAP was challenged by male signatory in 2015 after a 2012 paternity test 
revealed that he was not the biological father; challenge brought in November, 2015, after child contact 
was cut off in March, 2014).  
87. See, e.g., Adler v. Dormio, 872 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (reviewing Michigan laws 
on when responsibility for arrearages may be eliminated).  
88. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(b). 
89. See, e.g., Parness et al., supra note 69, at 198–200 (also noting that VAP challenges within 
the relevant time limits may be foreclosed by laches or estoppel). 
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challenge VAPs. Again in Vermont, challenges are available to “a person not a 
signatory.”90 Elsewhere, standing is far more limited, as with statutory standing 
provisions encompassing particular types of challengers, like children and 
governments.91  
C. Residency/Hold Out Parentage 
All UPAs recognize custodial parentage in some who have resided with 
children whom they held out as their own.  Residency/hold out parentage, as a form 
of parentage by consent for those without biological or formal adoption ties, can 
be grounded on the actual, apparent, or presumed consents by existing legal 
parents to share custody with their partners, their roommates, their family 
members, or others.92  Here, the consents are in some ways like the consents in 
common law marriage settings in that generally they are only recognized by the 
state after family relationships end. Of course, implied consents to marriage are in 
some important ways distinct from implied consents to dual parentage.   
The 1973 UPA itself is quite different than later UPAs on residences/hold out 
parentage.  
The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act has this parentage presumption: 
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of the child if... 
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child 
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.93 
 The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act altered the holding out parentage 
presumption. It says: 
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if: ... 
(5) for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the same 
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.94 
 The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act altered again the holding out parentage 
presumption. It says: 
(a)  An individual is presumed to be a parent of a child if: … 
 
 
90. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(b). 
91. See, e.g., Parness et al., supra note 69, at 188–94. While the 2017 UPA expressly recognizes 
a VAP may be challenged by a nonsignatory, 2017 UPA at §§ 309(b) and 610 (proceeding “brought by an 
individual other than the child”), the 2000 UPA only explicitly recognizes signatory challenges, 2000 UPA 
at § 308(a). And see 1973 UPA at §§ 4(a)(5) and 6(b) (“any interested party may sue to disestablish an 
acknowledged father). 
92. To date, there are no residency/hold out parents recognized for child custody purposes 
wherein there are consents to share custody involving expecting legal parents (i.e., pregnant women 
and those awaiting formal adoption approval) and their partners or others. Expecting parents and their 
partners or others can utilize other forms of parentage by consent (like agreements regarding assisted 
reproduction births) to attempt to prompt parentage by consent.  
93. 1973 UPA § 4(a)(4). 
94. 2000 UPA § 204(a)(5). 
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(2)  the individual resided in the same household with the child for 
the first two years of the life of the child, including periods of 
temporary absence, and openly held out the child as the 
individual’s child.95  
While expanding the VAP route to custodial parentage in 2017 by including 
women, the last two UPAs limit custodial parentage opportunities for those living 
with, and supporting, nonmarital, nonbiological, and nonadoptive children without 
VAPs or assisted reproduction pacts.96 Since 2000, an alleged residency/hold out 
parent must begin to childrear upon the child’s birth. 97 
Many current U.S. state laws reflect the policies of the UPAs on residency/ 
hold out parentage, though only a few to date have expressly extended it to same-
sex couples.98 Nevertheless, residency/ hold out parentage seems available to a 
female partner of a birth mother given equality demands.99 Residency/hold out 
parentage is generally unavailable to a male partner of a birth father where there 
is a birth mother who is a legal parent since  three parent state law policies are quite 
limited.100  
There are varying U.S. state laws reflecting the distinct UPA approaches to 
residency/hold out parentage.  In California, following the 1973 UPA, a man is 
“presumed to be the natural father of a child” if he “received the child into his home 
and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”101  There is no explicit 
 
 
95. 2017 UPA § 204(a)(2). 
96. Id. 
97. 2000 UPA § 204(a)(5). 
98. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401 (a)(4)(b) (2018)  (“person,” not man); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.26A.115(1)(b) (“individual,” not man). Cf.   Marriage Equality, supra note 12, at 188–89 (on the need 
to treat equally men and women involved in same-sex residency/ hold out parentage settings).  
99. See, e.g., Elisa, 117 P.3d at 670 (finding former unwed lesbian partner a child support 
parent under California statutory law on presumed natural hold out fathers); Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 
972 (upon dissolution of civil union of lesbian couple, both women are custodial parents as statute 
making husband the presumed “natural parent” of a child born to his wife was applicable via a second 
statute saying that civil union and married couples shall have the “same” rights. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
308(4) (West 2018); § 1204(f)). Similar equality mandates operate when there is common law, rather 
than statutory, hold out parentage. See e.g., Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 
2014). See also Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their 
Children, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 212– 219 (2014) (even where statutes only explicitly recognize 
residency/hold out parentage for men, women are sometimes deemed parents under the statutes).  
100. In California, though, there can sometimes be three legal parents, including the birth 
mother, her spouse, and a residency/hold out parent. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE  § 7612(c) (West 2020) 
(three parents where recognition of only two parents “would be detrimental to the child”) with C.G. v. 
J.R., 130 So.3d 776, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (Florida law does not support enforcement of an 
agreement on sharing child custody which was entered into by the married birth mother, her spouse, 
and the biological father of a child born of sex). 
101. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2020). The presumption has been sustained when 
challenged on the ground of interfering with federal constitutional childcare interests.  See e.g., R.M. v. 
T.A., 233 Cal. App. 4th 760 (Cal. Ct. App.  2015) (preponderance of evidence norm used to establish 
presumption).  As to what constitutes receipt into the home, see In re N.V., 2014 Cal. App.  LEXIS 8870 
(Cal. App. 1st Dist, Dec. 12, 2014) (reviewing cases). 
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requirement that a man who holds out a child as “his natural child” needs to have 
any beliefs about his actual biological ties.  Thus, California cases102 have recognized 
as presumed fathers men who knew there were no biological ties, but who acted in 
the community as if there were.103  By contrast, other states recognize possible 
residency/hold out parentage only for those who help to raise children from 
birth,104 following the 2000 and 2017 UPA. 
There are other variations interstate in custodial parentage based on 
residency/hold out.  For example, some U.S. state laws do not require receipt into 
the home.105  Some U.S. state laws more explicitly require existing legal parents to 
agree to such matters as residency or hold outs by nonparents who can later morph 
into new childcare parents on equal footing with existing legal parents.106   
Importantly, as with VAPs for nonresident biological fathers of children born 
of sex, U.S. state laws vary on the circumstances allowing, and the standing 
available to present, a challenge to residency/ hold out parentage. Consider 
challenges by nonresident biological fathers who did not know, and could not 
reasonably have known, that residency/ hold out was being undertaken by a 
nonparent together with an existing legal parent (often the birth mother). In 
Vermont, such a father may challenge a hold out/residency parentage within two 
years of “discovering the potential genetic parentage” in cases where there was no 
earlier actual or reasonably assumed knowledge of the potential due to “material 
misrepresentation or concealment.”107 Elsewhere, there are different time limits,108 
 
 
102. See e.g. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 15 (Cal. 2004) (both Paul (also the husband) and Heriberto 
(also the biological father) were each judicially declared to be “presumed” California fathers because 
each had received Jesusa V. into his home and held her out as his natural child) [hereinafter Jesusa V.]. 
See also Barnes v. Cypert, No. F049259, 2006 WL 3361790 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2006) (birth mother's 
uncle is a presumed parent) and In re Jerry P., 95 Cal. App. 4th 793, 816 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (presumed 
residency/hold out parent need not have, or even claim to have, biological ties) [hereinafter Jerry P.]. 
103. How long an alleged residency/hold out parent must so act is determined on a case-by-
case basis.  See, e.g., In re J.B., 2019 WL 1451304 (Cal. Ct. App. April 2, 2019) (two day hold out is 
insufficient for presumed parent status). 
104. Compare  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (2015), § 160.205(a)(5) (man is a presumed 
father if “during the first two years of the child’s life, he continuously resided in the household in which 
the child resided and he represented to others that the child was his own”), and WASH. REV. CODE § 
26.26.116(2) (2019). 
105. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. § 9:17-43(a)(4) (2019) (either receives into his home or “provides 
support for the child”) and DEL. CODE TIT. 13, § 8-201(c) (2013) (“parental role” and “bonded and 
dependent relationship . . . that is parental in nature”). 
106. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (2020) (single parent’s “agreement” to same household 
residency for one wishing to be deemed a de facto parent) and VT. STAT. tit. 15C § 401 (a)(4) (2017) 
(presumed residency/ hold out parent if in child’s first 2 years, where “another parent” of child jointly 
held child out as presumed parent’s child). Compare N.J. STAT. § 9:17-43(a)(4)-(5), 9:17-40 (2019) (a man 
can be “presumed to be the biological father of a child on equal footing with the unwed birth mother, if 
he “openly holds out the child as his natural child” and either “receives the child into his home” or 
“provides support for the child”). 
107. VT. STAT. tit. 15C § 401(a)(4), 402(b)(2) (2017). 
108. Compare, e.g., 2017 UPA § 204(a)(2) (residence/hold out in child’s first two years) § 204(b), 
and 608(b) (presumption rebuttal usually must be presented before the child turns two) to 1970 UPA § 
4(a)(4) (residence/hold out where child is “under the age of majority”) and § 6(b) (“at any time”).  
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as well as the unavailability of “concealment” as a condition of extending the 
normal time limits for challenging hold out/residency parents.109 
D. De Facto Parentage 
The 2017 UPA, but neither of its predecessors, expressly recognizes "de facto" 
parenthood as a form of parentage by consent for those without biological or 
formal adoption ties.110 De facto parenthood is grounded in far more explicit 
agreements for shared custody between existing legal parents and nonparents than 
in any agreements leading to residency/hold out parentage.111  For de facto 
parentage, an existing legal parent must have "fostered or supported" a "bonded 
and dependent relationship" between the child and the nonparent who may 
become a de facto parent.112  The nonparent must have undertaken "full and 
permanent" parental responsibilities.113 
The 2017 UPA's de facto parentage provision is far more precise in its details 
on parental-like acts than is its provision on the two-year residency/hold out 
parentage presumption.  While both de facto parentage and residency/hold out 
parentage encompass human acts occurring at no particular time or in no particular 
place, only de facto parentage requires all of the following conditions: 
(a)  A proceeding to establish the parentage of a child under this 
section may be commenced only by an individual who: (1) is alive 
when the proceeding is commenced; and (2) claims to be a de facto 
parent of the child.  
(b)  An individual who claims to be a de facto parent of a child must 
commence a proceeding . . . (1) before the child attains 18 years of 
age; and (2) while the child is alive. . . .   
(d)  In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of an individual who 
claims to be a de facto parent of the child, if there is only one other 
 
 
109. Compare, e.g., 2017 UPA § 204(a)(2), 204(b), 608(b) (two year limit on challenging 
residency/hold out parentage of an “individual” does not operate when the individual is “not a genetic 
parent, never resided with the child, and never held out the child as the presumed parent’s child”); 2000 
UPA § 204(a)(5), 204(b), 607(b) (two year limit on actions to disprove earlier determined presumed 
residency/hold out parentage in a “man” does not operate when there was, in fact, no cohabitation or 
sexual intercourse during the probable time of conception and the presumed parent never openly held 
out the child as his own); and 1970 UPA § 4(a)(4), 6(b) (presumed residency/hold out parentage can be 
challenged “at any time”).  
110. The term "de facto" parent did not originate in the 2017 UPA.  The Comment to the Act 
indicates its de facto parentage standard was modeled on Maine and Delaware statutes.  2017 UPA § 
609 cmt. 
111. Expecting legal parents are foreclosed under the 2017 UPA from being bound to any 
agreements on de facto parentage for children to be born of sex later, as the model law requires, e.g., 
"a bonded and dependent relationship with the child."  Id. at § 609(d)(5).  Thus, the UPA does not 
recognize a possible "bonded and dependent relationship" with a fetus, a fertilized egg, or some child of 
sex yet unconceived. 
112. Id. at § 609(d)(6). 
113. Id. at § 609(d)(3). 
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individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child, the 
court shall adjudicate the individual who claims to be a de facto parent 
to be a parent of the child if the individual demonstrates by clear-and-
convincing evidence that:  
(1)  the individual resided with the child as a regular member of the 
child’s household for a significant period;  
(2)  the individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child; 
(3)  the individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of 
a parent of the child without expectation of financial benefit; 
(4)  the individual held out the child as the individual’s child; 
(5)  the individual established a bonded and dependent relationship 
with the child which is parental in nature; 
(6)  another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded 
and dependent relationship required under paragraph (5); and 
(7)  continuing the relationship between the individual and the child 
is in the best interest of the child. 
(e)  Subject to other applicable limitations in this [part], if in a 
proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of an individual who claims to 
be a de facto parent of the child, there is more than one other 
individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child and 
the court determines that the requirements of [paragraphs (1) 
through (7)] of subsection (d) are met, the court shall adjudicate 
parentage under Section 613.114 
Clearly, de facto parentage, but not residency/hold out parentage, requires 
human acts that the actor and others recognize as embodied within very positive 
parent-child relationships. 
Of particular note is the 2017 UPA requirement that an existing legal parent 
(i.e., “another parent”) “fostered or supported” the parental-like relationship 
between the child and the nonparent.115 This fostering and support seemingly can 
qualify as “actual consent” (whether “express” or “inferred”), as “apparent 
consent,” or as “presumed consent” to shared custody by the existing legal parent. 
While addressing childcare arrangements between one legal parent and a 
nonparent, there is no mention in the 2017 UPA of any conduct—consensual or 
otherwise—involving any second existing legal parent (like a VAP parent or a 
presumed spousal parent), or any expecting legal parent (like a biological father of 
a child born of sex who maintains a paternity opportunity interest). Such an 
unmentioned parent may not even know of “another” parent’s fostering and 
support. Under the UPA language, it is quite conceivable that the nonparent is later 
 
 
114. Id. at § 609(a), (b), (d), (e). 
115. Id. at § 609(d)(6). 
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deemed a de facto parent concurrent with the (effective) termination of the 
unaware second legal or existing parent’s custodial parentage interests.116  
Also of note is the 2017 UPA provision that a proceeding to establish de facto 
parentage may be commenced only by a living individual claiming to a de facto 
parent.117 Thus, upon a breakup of a family relationship between an individual and 
an existing legal parent and his or her child, the parent or the child may not proceed 
to establish de facto parentage for child support purposes. By contrast, an existing 
legal parent and/or the child (and others, like a child-support agency) may pursue 
an alleged residency/hold out parent for support.118 The differences in the standing 
norms present significant Equal Protection and public policy concerns.119 
On challenges to earlier determined de facto parentage, the 2017 UPA is 
relatively silent. It does provide, however, that a child is not bound by an earlier de 
facto parentage finding unless “the child was a party or was represented” in the 
earlier proceeding.120 Further, it recognizes that a party with standing “to 
adjudicate parentage”121 may not challenge an earlier de facto parentage finding if 
 
 
116. 2017 UPA § 613 (where there is no state law recognition of the possibility of three or more 
custodial parents, a court must "adjudicate parentage in the best interest of the child," with guiding 
factors enumerated). In the 2017 UPA, there is provided no express and significant mechanism for a 
second existing legal, or an expecting legal parent, to challenge a petition to establish de facto 
parentage. See, e.g., 2017 UPA, at § 609(e) (beyond the birth or adoptive parent, if there is another 
individual “who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child” for whom an alleged de facto parent 
seeks parental status, that individual’s interests must be adjudicated. Yet how would a court learn of 
this individual? And is it reasonable to assume that such an individual would likely know of the de facto 
parent petition and thus be able to intervene?  
In Vermont, which substantially enacted the 2017 UPA, an alleged de facto parent’s petition to 
adjudicate his/her “claim to parentage” is to be determined by “clear and convincing evidence,” with no 
explicit statutory mention of the participatory rights of a nonresidential person with “a claim to 
parentage.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(1), (b) (2020). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §§ 501(b), 
206(a)(6) (2020) (in considering claims of de facto parentage, courts must consider the “likelihood” of 
“harm to the child”). Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2020) (de facto parent norms, wherein 
there is not any presumed parentage if the norms are met) and Id. at § 8-609(b) (adjudicated father may 
be challenged no later than two years after the adjudication). While findings of de facto parentage in 
favor of petitioners can effectively terminate parentage or parental opportunity interests for many, such 
findings—unlike findings in formal adoption proceedings—need not, at least expressly under the 
statutes, be preceded by reasonable attempts to notify those whose parental interests are possibly 
terminated should the petitions be granted.  
117. 2017 UPA § 609(a). 
118. Id. at §§ 602, 204(a)(2) (residency/hold out parent) and 203 (“a parent-child relationship 
established under this [act] applies for all purposes”).  
119. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Comparable Pursuits of Hold Out and De Facto Parentage: 
Tweaking the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 31 J. OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS 157 
(2018).  
120. 2017 UPA, at § 623(b)(4).  
121. 2017 UPA, at § 602 (standing recognized for an individual [personally or through an 
authorized legal representative] “whose parentage of the child is to be adjudicated”).  
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that party was a party in the earlier proceeding or received notice of that earlier 
proceeding.122 
In Vermont, an adjudication of de facto parentage “does not disestablish the 
parentage of any other parent.”123 Such an adjudicatory proceeding may include 
judicial consideration of “a claim to parentage of the child” by another,124 though 
there is no explicit requirement that anyone with a competing claim to parentage 
be noticed.125 So, a birth mother’s husband who is not the biological father of the 
child born of sex could seek de facto parent status, to accompany his presumed 
marital parent status. He may do so to lessen—if not eliminate—any custodial 
parentage interest in the biological father of a child born sex or with the birth 
mother’s former residential, intimate partner who also childcared for a while. 
Similarly, a birth mother’s husband may also undertake a VAP. A VAP is often more 
difficult to overcome than is a spousal parent presumption.126 
Both the 2000 ALI Principles127 and the 2019 ALI Parental Authority Draft128 
also recognize forms of "de facto" parentage. Each of the forms requires both 
residence and consent by an existing legal parent.  
The 2000 ALI Principles recognize a "parent by estoppel," who is an individual 
who lived with the child for at least two years, with “a reasonable, good-faith belief" 
of biological ties and who continued to accept the responsibilities of fatherhood 
when the belief ended; an individual who lived with the child for at least two years 
pursuant to an agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal 
parents, both parents) and who held out parentage while accepting “full and 
 
 
122. 2017 UPA, at § 611(b) (with notice governed by § 603, which includes “an individual whose 
parentage of the child is to be adjudicated,” which seemingly could include a nonbirth mother who 
claims to be a biological parent and thus claims protected parentage opportunity interests). Of course, 
as in formal adoption proceedings, notice may never reach such a biological parent, as when notice is 
served by publication.  
123. 15C Vermont Stat. 501(c). 
124. 15C Vermont Stat. 501(b) and 206 (guidelines for “adjudicating competing claims of 
parentage”).  
125. Vermont Stat. 502(a) (petitions served on “all parents and legal guardians of the child”). 
But see Vermont Stat. 502(b) (“adverse party,” presumedly including an intervenor, may file a response 
to a petition). 
126. Post sixty day challenges to VAPs, but not to spousal parentage, at least by VAP signatories 
must be grounded on fraud, duress or material mistake of fact as well as on the lack of biological ties. 
Reforming VAPs, at 194-196. Spousal parentage sometimes can be challenged solely due to lack of 
biological ties. See, e.g., In re Waites, 152 So.3d 306 (Miss. 2014).  Biological ties are less important when 
state public policies more strictly view spousal parent rights and responsibilities, as "essential attributes" 
of marriages, as per Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2599, as in McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at ¶ 11 (spousal parentage 
not dependent upon presumptive biological ties) or when state public policies more significantly 
promote the best interests of children (especially as to two parent support), as in LC v. MG, 420 P.3d 
400, 424–25 (Haw. 2018) (majority opinion on Part III B) (not allowing female spouse to rebut marital 
parentage due to spouse’s failure to consent to assisted reproduction involving her wife since the child's 
best interests require "a child have two parents to provide financial benefits") [hereinafter LC]. 
127. 2000 ALI Principles, at §§ 2.03(1)(c) and 3.02(1)(c) (requirements include residence with 
the child, as well as "the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship" unless the legal 
parent completely fails, or is unable, to perform caretaking functions"). 
128. 2019 ALI Parental Authority Draft, at § 1.82(a) (requirements include residence with the 
child, as well as establishing that "a parent consented to and fostered the formation of the parent-child 
relationship"). 
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permanent” parental responsibilities, assuming the child’s best interests are 
served; or an individual who lived with the child since birth pursuant to “a prior co-
parenting an agreement with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal 
parents, both parents), assuming the child’s best interests are served.129  
The 2000 ALI Principles recognize as a “de facto parent” one who is “other 
than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel”130 and who lived with and cared for the 
child for at least two years under an “agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-
child relationship.”131 A de facto parent, unlike a legal parent or a parent by 
estoppel, has no presumptive right to an allocation of decision-making 
responsibility for the child.132 And a de facto parent has no presumptive right of 
“access to the child’s school and health-care records to which legal parents have 
access by other law.”133 
The 2019 ALI Draft describes a de facto parent as a third party who establishes 
that he/she "lived with the child for a significant period of time;" was "in a parental 
role" long enough that he/she established "a bond and dependent relationship . . . 
parental in nature;" he/she had no "expectation of financial compensation;" and "a 
parent" consented to third party's parental-like role.134 So, the 2019 Draft, but not 
the 2000 Principles, invite a new custodial parentage designation that adversely 
impacts the custodial interests of an existing legal parent with no actual or apparent 
consent. As with intentional torts, here too the ALI supports a presumed consent 
approach.  
Before and since 2017, some U.S. states had or have statutes or common law 
precedents on nonmarital, nonbiological, and nonadoptive custodial parentage 
similar to the suggested UPA and ALI de facto parent norms. For example, before 
 
 
129. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, at §§ 2.03(1)(b)(ii), 2.03(1)(b)(iv), and 2.03(1)(b)(iii). 
130. A "legal parent" is "an individual who is defined as a parent under other state law."  2000 
ALI Principles, at § 2.03(1)(a). 
131. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, at § 2.03(1)(c)(ii). Alternatively, a de facto parent is one who is other 
than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel and who lived with and cared for the child for at least two 
years “as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions.” 
Id.  
Precedents predating the 2000 ALI Principles recognize the concept of de facto parentage in 
different settings. See, e.g., In re Kieshia E., 859 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Cal. 1993) (standing of a de facto parent 
in a juvenile delinquency proceeding); In re Dependency of J.H., 815 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Wash. 1991) (in a 
delinquency case, permissive intervention, not intervention as of right, is available to some foster 
parents claiming de facto (or psychological) parent status); and In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 254 n. 21 (Cal. 
1974) (not resolving whether a de facto parent may have the same rights of notice, hearing or counsel 
as have natural parents in Juvenile Court Law proceedings under due process or equal protection 
principles). The Reporter’s Notes to the 2000 ALI Principles observes the “law that most closely 
approximates the criteria for a ‘de facto’ parent relationship is that of Wisconsin” where “visitation (but 
not custody) may be awarded to an individual who has formed a ‘parent-like relationship’ with a child.” 
§ 2.03, at Comment c. 
132. 2000 ALI PRINCIPLES, at § 2.09(2).  
133. Id. at § 2.09(4).  
134. 2019 ALI PARENTAL AUTHORITY DRAFT, at § 1.82(a) (proof by clear and convincing evidence is 
required). 
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2017 there were quite comparable Maine135 and Delaware statutes136 and a less 
comparable Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent,137 that were utilized by the 
drafters of the 2017 UPA.138  Since 2017, a few states have statutorily recognized 
de facto parenthood under the 2017 UPA guidelines.139 
Current de facto parentage laws vary.140 In Delaware, a de facto parent can be 
judicially recognized for one who had “a parent-like relationship” with “the support 
and consent of the child’s parent;” who exercised “parental responsibility;” and 
who “acted in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a 
bonded and dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.”141  In 
Washington, a de facto parent resides with the child for a significant period; 
engages in consistent childcare; expects no financial compensation for acting in 
parental-like way; has a bonded and dependent relationship parental in nature; and 
has the support of another parent.142 
On occasion, statutes within a single U.S. state can recognize both residency/ 
hold out and de facto parents who are neither biologically-tied to, nor formal 
adopters of, children. Thus the Maine Parentage Act, effective in July, 2016, 
provides for presumed parents who resided since birth with a child for at least 2 
years and “assumed personal, financial, or custodial responsibilities,”143 as well as 
for de facto parents who, inter alia, resided with the child “for a significant period 
of time,” established with the child “a bonded and dependent relationship,” and 
“accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent . . . without expectation 
of financial compensation.”144 Similarly, there are both residency/ hold out and de 
facto parents in Delaware,145 Washington,146 and Vermont.147 
 
 
135. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891 (2016). 
136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2013). 
137. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W. 2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (parental-like relationship can 
prompt visitation rights when in child’s best interests).  
138. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT Comment to § 609 (Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs. on Unif. State Laws, 
2017). 
139. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440 (2019); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15.  
140. Many of the laws are summarized in 2019 ALI Parental Authority Draft, at § 1.82, Comment 
l. 
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-201(c) (2013) (the three factors to attain “de facto parent 
status”); See also, Id., 8-201(a–b) (2013) (applying the three factors to either a mother or father). De 
facto parents are on equal footing with biological or adoptive parents. See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 
920 (Del. 2011). But see In re Bancroft, 19 A.3d 730 (Del. Family 2010) (finding statute overbroad and 
violative of fit mother’s and father’s due process rights when the mother’s boyfriend seeks to be a third 
parent). Cf. K.A.F. v D.L.M., 96 A. 3d 975, 980 (N.J. Super, Mercer Cty. 2014) (former female domestic 
partner of birth mother has standing to seek childcare order where birth mother ceded some of her 
parental authority, but where adoptive parent had not; former partner must show “exceptional 
circumstances” per Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A. 2d 539, 558 (N.J. 2000)). 
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.440(4) (2019) (utilizing a preponderance of evidence standard). 
143. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A § 1881(3) (2016).  
144. Id. § 1891(3) (2016).  
145. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204 (a)(5) (presuming residency/hold out parent); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2013) (de facto parent).  
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.115(b) (2019) (presuming residency/hold out parent "for the first 
four years"); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.440 (2019) (de facto parent). 
147. VT. STAT. ANN tit. 15C, § 401(a)(1) (2018) (presuming residency/hold out parent after the 
first two years); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 15C, § 501(a) (2018) (de facto parent). 
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Beyond statutes, some judicial precedents recognize de facto parentage. In 
2008 the South Carolina Supreme Court,148 adopting a Wisconsin high court 
analysis, determined that a nonparent was eligible for psychological parent status 
if a four-prong test was met.  This test included the requirements that the 
petitioning prospective parent show (1) the biological or adoptive parents 
consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a 
parent-like relationship with the child; (2) the petitioner and the child lived together 
in the same household; (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by 
taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, 
including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial 
compensation; and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time 
sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship 
parental in nature.149  And in 2009, a federal appeals court150 noted that the 
Mississippi Supreme Court had long recognized that a person standing “in loco 
parentis,” meaning “one who has assumed the status and obligations of a parent 
without a formal adoption,” has the same “rights, duties and liabilities” as a natural 
parent. 
By contrast, in some U.S. states where there are no de facto parent statutes, 
courts choose not to develop precedents even where they are sympathetic to the 
pleas for establishing de facto parentage. In Illinois151 and elsewhere,152 high courts 
have refused to act because any new de facto parentage norms are the 
responsibility of state legislators. Beyond separation of power concerns, in these 
states there are expansive and detailed statutory schemes on most aspects of 
parentage, in and outside of childcare, which already balance competing individual 
and societal interests.  
Whether in statutes or precedents, de facto childcare parentage sometimes 
arises in U.S. states without the “actual consent” or “apparent consent,” per the 
2019 ALI Torts Restatement Draft, of an existing legal parent (like a VAP or spousal 
parent), as well as without the knowledge of an expecting legal parent (like an 
unwed biological father). Such de facto parentage is condoned by the 2017 UPA as 
 
 
148. Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 743–44 (S.C. 2008) (following In re Custody of H.S.H.-
K., 533 N.W. at 435-436, which set out norms for nonparent child visitation orders). See also Conover v. 
Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 446-447 (Md. 2016) (using In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. in recognizing de facto 
parent doctrine).  
149. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d at 743–44. 
150. First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 182–83 (5th Cir. 2009) (relying on, inter 
alia, Farve v. Medders, 128 So. 2d 877, 879 (Miss. 1961)). 
151. See, e.g., In re Parentage of Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 789, 795 (Ill. 2015) (stating that 
while there is a need for a “comprehensive solution,” it must come from the legislature). 
152. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents: 
More Principled Allocations of Powers and More Rational Distinctions, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479 (2017) 
[hereinafter More Principled Allocations]. For a forceful argument on the need for continuing the 
common law “equitable parenthood doctrine" even where there are statutes, see Jessica Feinberg, 
Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ 
Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOKLYN L. REV. 55 (2017). 
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only “another parent” needs to foster or support the de facto parent’s153 
dependent relationship, as well as the 2019 ALI Parental Authority Draft as it 
requires “a parent” to consent to the “formation of the parent-child 
relationship.”154 
E. Parentage Arising from Assisted Reproduction Births 
Parentage by consent for birth mothers and nonbirth mothers in assisted 
reproduction settings155 typically involve few instances of inferred, apparent or 
presumed consent, as express consents reign. As with VAPs, there could be, but 
there generally are no, state-required forms indicating “express” consent.  In 
California, however, in nonsurrogacy settings there are statutorily consent forms 
that may be used, but are not required.156 
i. Without Surrogate 
The 1973 UPA recognizes, but generally does not deal with, the "many 
complex and serious problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination."157  
It does, however, address "one fact situation that occurs frequently,"158 a "consent" 
by a husband to the artificial insemination of his wife with "semen donated by a 
man not her husband." Here, the husband is to be "treated in law as if he were the 
natural father" where the consent was in writing and "signed by him and his wife," 
with certification undertaken and the consent then filed by the supervising 
"licensed physician" with state governmental officials.159  No model form is 
suggested for such a consent.  The semen donor who is not the husband is to "be 
treated in law as if he were not the natural father."160 
In response to the increasing numbers of children born of assisted 
reproduction, the 2017 UPA proposes distinct articles on nonsurrogacy and 
surrogacy births. In nonsurrogacy settings, the 2017 UPA “is substantially similar” 
to the 2000 UPA, updated in 2002, with the “primary changes… intended to update 
the article so that it applies equally to same-sex couples.” 161 The 2017 UPA thus 
recognizes that a donor, in the absence of an early consent to legal parentage or of 
common residence in the first two years while holding out a child as one’s own, “is 
not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction.” 162 Such consent must 
 
 
153. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (d)(6) (Nat’l Conf. of Comm’rs. on Unif. State Laws, 2017). 
154. 2019 ALI Parental Authority Draft, at § 1.82(a)(4). 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1) (2018) (defining assisted reproductive technology). See also Jenna 
Casolo et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 313 (2019).  
156. Cal. Fam. Code § 7613.5(d) (2020) (forms on assisted reproduction pacts by two married or 
unmarried people, where signatories may or may not have used their own genetic material to prompt a 
pregnancy).  
157. 1973 UPA § 5. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at § 5(a) (all papers and records pertaining to the insemination are to be kept 
confidential, though subject to inspection pursuant to a court order "for good cause shown"). 
160. 1973 UPA § 5(b). 
161. 2017 UPA § 701 cmt..  
162. Id. at §§ 702–04.  
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be signed by the birth mother and "an individual who intends to be a parent," 
though the "record" need not be certified by a physician.163  The lack of such a 
consent does not foreclose custodial parentage for an intended parent where there 
is found clear-and-convincing evidence of an "express agreement" between the 
individual and the birth mother "entered before conception."164  As well, the lack 
of such consent does not foreclose an individual's parentage where the child was 
held out as the individual's own in the child's first two years.165  The nonparental 
status of one married to a birth mother of a child born by assisted reproduction, 
even if a gamete donor, may be established by a showing of a lack of consent and 
of no holding out of the child as one’s own. 166 
Nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction parentage for a child, including a birth 
mother and an intended parent, frequently arises from the express willingness of 
each of two people to share custodial parentage. Written preimplantation pacts can 
guide later custodial parentage disputes, though even here disputes can arise as 
when terms are ambiguous, conditions are not anticipated or circumstances 
surrounding formation and/or signing are unconscionable. Where there are no 
writings, consents can be “inferred” from findings of facts regarding, for example, 
the consequences that should follow if a “turkey baster” baby is born.167  
Assessments of intent and conscionability would be greatly facilitated if there 
were state suggested (if not, at times, state required) forms on nonsurrogacy 
assisted reproduction pacts, as there are forms on VAPs.  There are now suggested 
forms in California covering varying persons (e.g., wed and unwed) entering into 
nonsurrogacy arrangements.168 
The nonsurrogacy parentage norms in the UPAs are now reflected, to at least 
some degree, in  both U.S. state statutes169 and precedents untethered to 
 
 
163. Id. at § 704(a). The lack of a need for physician certification seemingly recognizes the 
prospect of turkey baster or other do-it-yourself forms of assisted reproduction.  
164. Id. at § 704(b)(1). 
165. Id. at § 704(b)(2). 
166. Id. at § 705. 
167. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. App. 1989) (semen donor has federal 
constitutional interests in childcare parentage where he and birth mother agreed preconception to his 
fatherhood). But see In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007) (sperm donor's paternity following a do-it-
yourself implantation and related birth is dependent upon a written agreement with birth mother, per 
statute, even if the donor notoriously or in his own writing recognized his paternity). Cf. E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 
20 A.3d 1171 (N.J. Super. 2011) (parental rights of sperm donor in a do-it-yourself assisted reproduction 
birth could not be terminated simply through a requested consent order submitted to the court by the 
birth mother and the donor; statute on doctor-assisted conception did not apply). 
168. Cal. Fam. Code § 7613.5 (2020). 
169. American state statutes include TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.7031 (2019) (fatherhood for unwed 
man, intending to be father, who provides sperm to licensed physician and consents to the use of that 
sperm for assisted reproduction by an unwed woman, where consent is in a record signed by man and 
woman and kept by the physician); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 5-C:30(I)(b) (2020) (unwed mother has sperm 
donor “identified on birth record” where “an affidavit of paternity” has been executed); DEL. CODE ANN. 
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statutes,170 with significant interstate variations.171 The 2017 UPA provisions have 
been enacted in a few states.172  
ii. With Surrogate 
As to surrogacy, the 1973 UPA is silent.173  The 2017 UPA-like the 2000 UPA, 
as amended in 2002, distinguishes between genetic (“traditional”) and gestational 
surrogacy. 174 Unlike its 2000 predecessor, the 2017 UPA does not require "all 
agreements to be validated by a court order prior to any medical procedures.175   
The 2017 UPA imposes differing requirements for the two surrogacy forms, with 
“additional safeguards or requirements on genetic surrogacy agreements,” 176 as 
only they involve a woman giving birth while “using her own gamete.” 177  The 2017 
UPA recognizes there can be "one or more intended parents."178  The common 
requirements include signatures in a record, "attested by a notarial officer or 
witnesses;" independent legal counsel for all signatories; and execution before 
 
 
tit. 13 § 8-704(a)(“Consent by a woman and a man who intends to be a parent of a child born to the 
woman by assisted reproduction must be in a record signed by the woman and the man.”); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-2-904(a) (like Delaware). See also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703(“A person who provides eggs, 
sperm, or embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section 704 [“record signed . 
. . before the placement”] . . . with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the resulting 
child”). 
170. Precedents include Shineovich & Kemp, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (to avoid 
constitutional infirmity, assisted reproduction statute as written solely for married opposite sex couple 
applied to same sex domestic partners); Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Cal. App. 2d 2014) 
(though the statute (both pre-2011 and post 2011) indicated explicitly a lack of paternity for this 
particular semen donor when his unwed partner delivered a child conceived via assisted reproduction, 
the statute on presumed parentage for one (either male or female) who receives a child into the home 
and openly holds out the child as one’s own natural child can support – in certain circumstances – legal 
paternity for the semen donor); Ramey v. Sutton, 362 P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015) (unwritten preconception 
agreement prompts in loco parentis childcare status for former lesbian partner of birth mother, though 
she contributed no genetic material); and Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E. 3d 488 (N.Y. 2016) 
(agreement between lesbian partners can prompt parentage in non-birth mother) [hereinafter Brooke 
S.B.].  
171. The laws are reviewed and critiqued in Deborah L. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of 
Families Created with Known Sperm Providers: Who's in and Who's Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41 
(2016).  
172. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701–708 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (suggested assisted reproduction 
statutes involving no surrogates), followed by Wash. Rev. Code § 26.26A.610 (2020) and Vt. Stat. Ann. 
tit. 15C § 701 (2020).   
173. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (while addressing husband-wife pacts 
on assisted reproduction where the wife bears the child and intends to parent, the Act "does not deal 
with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination").   
174. 2017 UPA § 801 cmt.. 
175. Id. at § 808 cmt.. 
176. Id. at § 801 cmt.. The common safeguards or requirements for all surrogacy pacts are found 
in id. at §§ 802–07. See also id. at §§ 808–12 (special requirements for gestational surrogacy agreements) 
and § § 813–18 (special requirements for genetic surrogacy agreements). 
177. Id. at § 801 (1). Gestational surrogacy covers births to a woman who uses “gametes that 
are not her own.” Id. at § 801 (2). The special rules for gestational surrogacy pacts are found in id. at §§ 
808–12, while the special rules for genetic surrogacy pacts are found in id. at §§ 813–818.  
178. Id. at § 801(3).  
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implantation.179  Special provisions for gestational surrogacy pacts include 
opportunity for "party" termination "before an embryo transfer" and opportunity 
for a prebirth court order declaring parentage vesting at birth.180  Special provisions 
for genetic surrogacy pacts include the general requirement that "to be 
enforceable," an agreement must be judicially validated "before assisted 
reproduction" upon a finding that "all parties entered into the agreement 
voluntarily" and understood its terms;181 that a genetic surrogate may withdraw 
consent "in a record" at any time before 72 hours after the birth;182 and that a 
genetic surrogate cannot be ordered by a court to "be impregnated, terminate or 
not terminate a pregnancy, or submit to medical procedures."183 
As with nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction parentage, in the surrogacy 
setting there is often clear evidence on consents to future custodial parentage and 
nonparentage within written preimplantation pacts. In the absence of a writing, 
consents can also be inferred regarding, again, “turkey baster” babies later born to 
alleged genetic surrogates.  
 UPA surrogacy parentage norms are now reflected both in U.S. state 
statutes184 and precedents untethered to statutes.185 Certain provisions of the 2017 
 
 
179. 2017 UPA § 803(6), (7) and (9).  
180. Id. at §§ 808(a) and 811(a).  
181. Id. at § 813(a) and (b).  
182. Id. at § 814(a)(2).  
183. Id. at § 818(b).  
184. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(b)(1) and (2) (2017) (intended parents can include 
unwed heterosexual couple where each contributes “at least one of the gametes resulting in a pre-
embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to term” and the couple has “a medical need 
for the gestational surrogacy”).  In New Hampshire, before insemination pursuant to a surrogacy 
contract that will be deemed “lawful,” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(I) (2014), a court “shall” be 
petitioned for “judicial preauthorization,” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21(I) (2014).  Requirements 
include that the “intended mother” is “psychologically unable to bear a child without risk to her health 
or to the child’s health;” the “intended father” “provided a gamete;” and either the intended mother or 
surrogate provided the ovum.  Authorization is permitted only where the “surrogacy contract is in the 
best interest of the intended child.”  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23(III)(d) (2013) (current version at N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:12 (2014)). Gestational surrogacy statutes are reviewed in Douglas Ne Jaime, The 
Nature of Parenthood, 126 Yale L.J. 2260, 2376-2381 (2017).  
185. Precedents recognizing judicial discretion to enforce surrogacy arrangements include In re 
Paternity of F.T.R., 833 N.W. 2d 634, at ¶73 (Wis. 2013)(enforcing surrogacy pact between two couples 
as long as child’s best interests were served, while urging the legislature to “consider enacting legislation 
regarding surrogacy” to insure “the courts and the parties understand the expectations and limitations 
under Wisconsin law”);  In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014)(“traditional surrogacy contracts do not 
violate public policy as a general rule” where surrogate artificially inseminated with sperm of intended 
father, who was not married to intended mother); In re Amadi, 2015 WL 1956247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2015)(gestational surrogate for married couple is placed on birth certificate, as said to be required by 
statute where intended father’s/husband’s sperm used with egg from unknown donor and intended 
mother/wife was recognized by all parties as legal mother; reiterates plea from In re Baby, infra, that 
the legislature should enact a comprehensive statutory scheme); Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 
2011) (biological father’s male domestic partner can also be intended parent of a child born to a 
gestational surrogate). Beyond enforcing a surrogacy pact in the absence of statute, an intended parent 
(also the sperm donor) who employed a gestational surrogate was allowed in one case to adopt formally 
his genetic offspring. Matter of John, 174 A.D.3d 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019). 
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UPA have been enacted in a few states.186 Elsewhere, major sections of the 2000 
UPA on surrogacy often operate.187 There are no major state required forms as with 
VAPs. Few suggested forms have yet appeared. But there are suggested forms for 
nonsuroggacy assisted reproduction births in California.188 The increased use of 
required forms, and the increased availability of suggested forms, would diminish 
significantly individual case disputes over consents to parentage or nonparentage.  
III. SUPPORT PARENTAGE BY CONSENT UNDER THE UPAS AND U.S. STATE LAWS 
The circumstances prompting custodial parentage by consent frequently also 
prompt support parentage by consent. Sometimes, however, child support 
parentage arises for one who has no, and perhaps can never realistically have, child 
custody parentage. Yet, child custody parentage nearly always prompts child 
support parentage.  
As with custodial parentage where consents can operate immediately or only 
if later conditions are met, support parentage can arise through consents that 
operate either immediately or conditionally. Support duties immediately arise from 
consents in enforceable agreements, as with premarital or midmarriage 
agreements between parents and stepparents involving future childcare.189 
Support duties arise conditionally, as where a nonparent, who agrees to cohabitate 
with an existing legal parent while promising to support his/her child, then must 
hold the child out as one’s own for some extended time while cohabiting in order 
to be responsible for future child support.190  
The UPAs have always declared in some way that its custodial parentage 
norms, once met, generally operate in other parentage contexts, including support. 
The 1973 UPA says the “parent and child relationship” arising from the Act “confers 
or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.”191 It further states that such 
a relationship, when determined by a “court judgment or order,” is “determinative 
for all purposes.”192 The 2000 UPA says that “a parent-child relationship 
established” under the Act “applies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically 
provided.”193 The 2017 UPA follows the 2000 UPA regarding the general 
applicability of its parentage norms “for all purposes.”194  
Some U.S. state laws expressly recognize this general parity between custodial 
and support parentage by consent. Thus, lawmakers in Washington and Vermont 
 
 
186. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.A.715 (2019) (gestational or genetic surrogacy 
agreement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C § 801(2018) (gestational carrier agreements).  
187. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (similar to 2000 UPA). 
188. See CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7613.5 (2020).  
189. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Prenups and Midnups, 31 GEOR. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 343, 
357–58 (2015) [hereinafter Parentage Prenups].  
190. Id. 
191. 1973 UPA § 1.  
192. Id. at § 15(a).  
193. 2000 UPA § 203. See also, id. at § 103(c) (the Act “does not create, enlarge, or diminish 
parental rights or duties under other law” of the state).  
194. 2017 UPA §§ 203 and 103(b).  
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have enacted the "for all purposes" language of the 2017 UPA.195  
However, parity between custodial and support parentage does not always 
continue. Some U.S. state laws recognize that the elimination of custodial 
parentage by consent, earlier established, does not simultaneously prompt the 
elimination of support parentage by consent. No parity here. Thus, the termination 
of custodial parentage due to child abuse, for example, does not always end 
support parentage.196 
Further, some U.S. state laws effectively recognize child support by consent in 
situations where there is not, and there never was, custodial parentage by consent. 
Again, there is no parity. Some nonparents may never be custodial parents under 
law, but nevertheless have parental or parental-like child support obligations. For 
example, occasionally there can be child support obligations for stepparents or 
grandparents who were never contemplated as custodial parents under law.197 
Thus, consents to support can arise in premarital or midmarriage pacts between 
couples where only one is a legal parent.198 As well, child support duties, shared 
with custodial parents, can be found for one-time putative parents of future 
children to be born of assisted reproduction where any custodial interests were 
lost, or never matured, before the children were born, as due to postpregnancy and 
prebirth financial support failures.199  
As with custodial parentage by consent, support parentage by consent can 
arise due to varying forms of consent, including actual (express or inferred), 
apparent and presumed. And as with custodial parentage by consent, most 
problematic is a child support obligation based on consent by a support obligor that 
is presumed, that is, where the acts of the obligor, as under the 2019 ALI Intentional 
 
 
195. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.110 (2019) ("except as otherwise provided by law"); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15C § 203 (2018) (all purposes, include "the rights and duties of parentage under the law").   
196. See, e.g., In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 n. 4 (Iowa 2011) (reviewing cases where child 
support continues past termination of parental rights).  See 2000 ALI Principles, at § 3.02(1)(b) (a child 
support parent includes a person "required by state law to support a child despite termination of the 
person's parental rights"). 
197. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-09 (2013) (former stepparent's duty to continue with child 
support after marriage dissolution if child remains part of the former stepparent's family); WIS. STAT. § 
49.90(1)(a)(2) (2020) (grandparent support when grandchild's parent is a "dependent person" under the 
age of 18); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-215(8)(B) (West 2015) (court may order "relatives to contribute 
to . . . support" for a child who is a ward of the state).  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness and Matthew Timko, 
De Facto Parent and Nonparent Child Support Orders, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 769 (2018).  
198. See, e.g., Parentage Prenups, supra note 189 at 357–8.  See also 2000 ALI Principles, at § 
3.03(1) ("parental support obligation" of "a person who may not be the child's parent under state law 
where prior affirmative conduct estops a denial of the obligation"); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-03.2-09 
(West 2013) (term in premarital or marital agreement is not enforceable if it "adversely affects a child's 
right to support," though a term positively affecting a child's right to support "is not binding on the 
court"). 
199. See, e.g., 2017 UPA § 707 (an individual who consents to assisted reproduction "may 
withdraw consent any time before a transfer that results in a pregnancy;" seemingly, an individual who 
fails to support postpregnancy though contractually obligated may lose custodial, but not support, 
parental status).  On prebirth pregnancy support failures leading to termination of parental rights where 
there was no contractual duty, see, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Pregnant Dads: The Crimes and Other 
Misconduct of Expectant Fathers, 72 OR. L. REV. 901 (1993).   
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Torts Draft, are not considered at all because others are “justified in engaging” in 
child support pursuits.  
U.S. state laws sometimes can justify support pursuits against spousal parents 
who have no biological ties to children born into marriage; who in no way 
consented (i.e., neither actually or apparently) to the extramarital affairs (or the 
artificial insemination) of their spouses; who never acted in parental-like ways with 
the children; and, who objected to support assessments as soon as they learned of, 
or suspected, the lack of biological ties. Child support pursuits are justified because 
the children are needy, resulting in the inability of the spousal parents to rebut, or 
otherwise shed, their spousal parent status. These laws are longstanding, are 
supported by a significant public policy, and operate only with the support obligor’s 
consent, albeit a consent to marry one who may commit adultery or employ 
assisted reproduction and therefrom deliver a child into the marriage.  
Comparably, support pursuits against VAP parents are justified though the 
nonbirth parents who acknowledge their parentage have no biological ties, have 
not acted in parental-like ways, and have timely objected to support assessments 
upon learning of the lack of ties, even where the VAP parents have been prompted 
to sign due to the maternal deceptions and/or their own (understandable) mistakes 
of fact.200 While VAPs are far more recent than spousal parentage presumptions, 
here the obligor did consent to sign and thereby to support a child even if later 
shown to lack biological ties. Less sympathy, for me, for the VAP signor than for the 
cuckolded husband, as the VAP signor usually could have secured DNA testing 
before or shortly after signing, while the husband usually could not have stopped 
the extramarital affair.  
IV. LOST DUE PROCESS INTERESTS GENERALLY 
Whether by actual, apparent, or presumed consent, governmental expansions 
of legal parentage by consent for child custody and/or child support purposes are 
subject to federal (and sometimes additional state)201 constitutional limits. Limits 
disallow custodial and support parentage expansions which (unduly) burden the 
Due Process interests of expecting, existing or putative parents.   
The Due Process limits on expanding parentage by consent might be 
 
 
200. VAPs are sometimes not subject to challenge 60 days after signing even where there were 
clearly mistakes of fact regarding biological ties by the birth and/or nonbirth parent, and at times even 
where a nonbirth parent signs in relevance on deceit by the birth mother (and perhaps others). See, e.g., 
Reforming VAPs, at 185–203 (reviewing variations in VAP challenge laws nationally).  
201. See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (putative unwed biological 
father of a child born into an intact marriage has an Iowa Due Process interest in challenging husband's 
legal paternity); In Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994) (similar ruling regarding Texas 
"due course of law" guarantee).  Such rulings are quite distinct from what federal Due Process requires 
for governmental protections of comparable putative unwed fathers. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 
129-130 (protection, if any, left to state lawmakers). 
Comparably, nonparentage federal constitutional interests may have extended protections 
beyond any afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment through independent interpretations of state 
constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Ingram, 914 N.W. 2d 794, 820-821 (Iowa 2018) (privacy interests in 
governmental property searches); La Keith Faulkner and Christopher R. Green, State Constitutional 
Disagreement With the Supreme Court: The Fourth Amendment, __ Miss. L.J. __ (forthcoming).  
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significantly guided, if not fully directed, by established federal constitutional limits 
on Due Process infringements operating outside of parentage. Little guidance, 
beyond persuasive authority, will be provided, however, by these established 
precedents if the federal constitutional limits on parentage by consent simply 
incorporate state law policies. This is possible because of the general deference 
recognized for U.S. state laws on the initial establishment and later 
disestablishment of federal constitutional childcare parentage.202 To date, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized the dominant, though not exclusive, roles of state 
legislatures and courts in defining who are and who continue to be childcare 
parents.  
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court has not yielded wholly to state policies. Rather, 
the Court recognizes the value in some national uniformity.  For example, there are 
nationwide procedural Due Process precedents on the right to counsel and on the 
burden of proof in proceedings involving the termination of existing parental 
custody rights (if not parental support duties).203  As well, federal constitutional 
guidelines operate for notice and participation rights for unwed biological fathers 
in formal adoption proceedings involving children born of consensual sex with 
unwed mothers where the fathers, yet to possess “care, custody, and control” 
interests in their children,  nevertheless have federal constitutional opportunity 
interests in securing such rights.204 
 
 
202. See, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) ("in the vast majority of cases, state law 
determines the final outcome" when resolving "the legal problems arising from the parent-child 
relationship"). See generally, Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 St. John’s L. 
Rev. at 972–76, where I conclude some interstate variations on federal constitutional childcare 
rightsholders are problematic, id. at 989–92. 
Childcare parentage norms are more likely guided by federal statutes for children born overseas 
to U.S. citizens, children born to nonU.S. citizens in the U.S., and children born in the U.S. to Native 
Americans. See, e.g., Carlie Smith, Comment, Establishing Paternity Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 
2018 BYU L. Rev. 1451 (state laws vary on what qualifies under the Act as an acknowledgment or 
establishment of paternity by an unwed biological father).   
203. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. Of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) 
(sometimes indigent parents must be appointed counsel); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) 
(clear and convincing evidence standard must be employed). Distinguished commentators have recently 
urged additional nationwide norms emanating from U.S. Supreme Court precedents are needed. See, 
e.g., Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 Iowa Law Rev., 1483 (2018) (U.S. SUPREME COURT 
SHOULD OFFER MORE GUIDANCE ON HOW STATES MAY DEFINE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PARENTHOOD); Joanna L. 
Grossman, Constitutional Parentage, 32 Const. Comment. 307, 339 (2017) (federal constitutional 
“parentage law is still in a state of relative chaos”). Congressional actions to unify the norms have been 
resisted. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 St. John’s L. Rev. 965, 
994 (“nationalization” of parentage norms “outside of federal constitutional judicial precedents 
seemingly is foreclosed by the Article I and other limits on congressional authority, as well as by the 
related Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states,”).  
204. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262–63. The vesting of such rights, generally prompts for fathers “the right 
to veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding.” Id. at 266. As the biological 
father in Lehr had failed to seize this interest in a timely fashion, though his opportunity to do so was 
“adequately protected,” Id. at 262-263, the court did not elaborate on how his notice and participation 
rights would compare to the notice and participation rights of existing legal parents, like most birth 
mothers who secure “care, custody, and control” parentage interests automatically at birth.  
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Thus, there are and will continue to be some minimally-required Due Process 
national norms on U.S. state law policies applicable to childcare parentage by 
consent.205  U.S. Supreme Court norms should be expanded to recognize and 
protect better the interests of expecting, existing and putative parents.  Necessary 
safeguards should be guided, but only somewhat, by the established precedents on 
generally protecting "life, liberty and property" interests. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
has noted, waiver/consent analyses applicable to lost Due Process interests differ 
depending upon the nature of the particular interest.206 Thus, interests involving 
the rights to counsel and to guilty pleas in criminal cases are approached differently 
than the right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures.207  
Current precedents on losses of nonparentage Due Process interests provide 
alternate approaches to new Due Process norms in parentage settings. One 
approach requires knowing, informed and voluntary individual consent when that 
individual's interests are impacted. A quite different approach allows an individual’s 
interests to be impacted by his/her own involuntary acts, or even solely by the acts 
of others.208  The following materials review how these quite varied approaches to 
Due Process protections operate for hearing opportunities in litigation (civil and 
criminal), for privacy interests in governmental searches, and for formal adoptions. 
In the following section, these approaches will be explored in settings where the 
Due Process interests of expecting legal parents, existing legal parents, and/or 
putative parents are now negatively, and often wrongly, impacted by parentage by 
consent laws. 
A. Jury Trial Rights 
The federal laws on losses of federal constitutional criminal and civil jury trial 
rights in the federal district courts demonstrate the variations in the justifications 
for Due Process infringements.  Procedural laws significantly insure criminal jury 
trial waivers are actually consensual, that is, they are informed, voluntary, and 
undertaken only by the rightsholders. By contrast, civil jury trial waivers can be far 
less voluntary, as when prompted solely by the careless conduct of agents of the 
rightsholders, usually lawyers.   
 
 
205. Of course, in any state there can be additional state Due Process norms applicable to 
parentage by consent.  See, e.g., In Interest of M.D., 921 N.W.2d 229 (Iowa 2019) (violation where 
incarcerated parent involved in parental rights termination proceeding could only give testimony by 
telephone). 
206. Waiver/consent analyses do not come into play when Due Process interests prompt 
"constitutional command" to the courts to act in certain ways.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Garcia, 936 F.3d 1128, 
1141 (10th Cir. 2019). 
207. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246 (1973). On the need for a reconsideration of 
the Bustamonte waiver/consent analysis, see Susan A. Bandes, Police Accountability and the Problem of 
Regulating Consent Searches, 2018 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1759, 1766 (2018).   
208. Whether voluntary or involuntary, and regardless of the level of Due Process protection, 
certain acts may not prompt lost Due Process interests even where claims of protection are not properly 
made, as when there is "plain error."  See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 103(e) (court can take notice of "plain error" 
even if claim of error "was not properly preserved"); In re J.P., 125 Ill. App. Ct. 1229, (2019) (guidelines 
on employing "plain error doctrine" in reviewing on appeal "unpreserved claims of error" occurring in 
the trial court). 
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Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 11 speaks to criminal jury trial waivers when 
pleas are taken. The rule seeks to insure actual consent by the rightsholder, the 
criminally accused. The rule provides that before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, “the court must address the defendant personally in open court… and 
determine that the defendant understands… the right to a jury trial.”209 The plea 
may only be accepted if the court determines “that the plea is voluntary and did 
not result from force, threats or promises (other than promises in a plea 
agreement).”210 As well, any judgment entered on a plea is contingent on a finding 
that “there is a factual basis for the plea.”211 State criminal procedure laws are 
similar,212 often deemed to embody the requisites of the federal constitutional 
criminal jury trial right.213  It should be noted that there are some nonconstitutional 
requirements on criminal guilty plea colloquies prompting conflicting 
precedents.214 
Where a criminal case is not resolved by a plea and will be tried in a federal 
district court, if “the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury 
unless… the defendant waives a jury trial right in writing… the government 
 
 
209. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(B)(1)(C); Compare People v. Bracey, 213 N.E.2d 265, 270 (2004) (jury trial 
waiver is valid if made by criminal defense counsel in open court in the defendant's presence, without 
any objection by the defendant). 
210. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(B)(2). A written waiver by one criminally accused may, by itself, be 
insufficient to constitute a voluntary waiver.  See, e.g., People v. Johnson, Ill. App. Ct. 162517, ¶16 
(2019).  
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(B)(3). This is not to say that in practice, federal criminal case pleas are 
usually taken fairly. See, e.g., Julian A. Cook III, Federal Guilty Pleas:  Inequities, Indigence, and the Rule 
11 Process, 60 B.C.L. Rev. 1073, 1074 (2019) (explaining “why expediency and facial compliance with 
Rule 11 (as opposed to searching inquiries regarding a defendant’s knowledge and coercive influences) 
characterize federal-court procedure,” while discussing how the shortfalls affect federal defendants 
generally, and the indigent and minorities in particular and proposing reforms). On the need for more 
U.S. Supreme Court guidance on how plea-deals should be construed when disputes arise, see Colin 
Miller, Plea Agreements as Constitutional Contracts, 97 N.C.L. Rev. 31 (2018) (urging a need to 
incorporate into Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).  
212. See, e.g., ARIZ. C.P.R. 17.3; COLO. C.P.R. 11(B). But see People v. Burge, 2019 Ill. App. Ct. 
170399, ¶25 (2019) (Criminal Procedure Code has separate, “directory,” provisions on criminal pleas “at 
arraignment” that differ from the rule provisions on postarraignment pleas, though the statute may 
violate separation of powers principles by intruding on Supreme Court rulemaking).  
213. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 431 P.3d 1274, 1286-89 (Haw. 2018).  
214. See, e.g., State v. Hagan, 126 N.E.3d 1214, 1220-21 (Ohio CT. App.) (2019) (conflict over 
whether a trial court must specifically notify a criminal defendant of the community notification 
requirements attending a guilty plea to certain sex offender crimes).See also, United States v. Yansane, 
370 F. Supp. 3d 580, 589–90 (D. Md. 2019); United States v. Lisle, 2019 WL 2648771, 4 (D. Me. 2019) 
(each recognizing open question on the requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 357 (2010) on 
trial judges speaking to the immigration consequences of criminal guilty pleas that are direct rather than 
collateral).  Colloquy failures will be nonconsequential in harmless error settings. See, e.g., United States 
v. Zacahua, 940 F. Supp. 3d 342 (7th Cir. 2019).   
Relatedly, there are ongoing disputes on when a criminal defense counsel's failure to notify a 
defendant of a plea's immigration consequences render the counsel's representation ineffective.  See, 
e.g., State v. Romero, 129 N.E.3d 404 (Ohio 2019).  Similar disputes exist regarding a criminal 
prosecutor's duty to reveal exculpatory evidence during the pretrial plea bargaining process.  See, e.g., 
Burley v. Baltimore Police Dept., 2019 WL 4325295, at 29-33 (D. Md. 2019). 
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consents… and… the court approves.”215 
Federal Civil Procedure Rule (FRCP) 38 speaks very differently about jury trial 
waivers. The rule requires a timely written jury trial demand, whose absence can 
prompt a waiver by a party.216 One prominent federal civil practice treatise 
concludes that "it is clear that the test of waiver that is applied to other 
constitutional rights, that there must have been 'an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege,' is not applicable to this right to trial by 
jury."217 While civil jury trial waivers may be overlooked upon request per district 
court discretion under FRCP 39(b), there is sometimes no abuse of discretion in 
failing to overlook a waiver founded on counsel's inadvertence.218  State civil 
procedure laws are similar.219 So, where lawyers represent civil litigants, the failures 
by lawyers to undertake effective jury trial demands prompt client Due Process jury 
trial right losses. There are no in-court hearings or writing requirements seeking to 
insure the losses are knowing and voluntary, either on the part of the lawyers or 
their clients.220  
B. Hearing Opportunities Beyond Jury Trial Rights 
Federal constitutional hearing opportunities beyond jury trial rights in both 
criminal and civil actions can be lost by unintentional conduct. Such conduct 
includes procedural law violations like deficient or untimely requests to be heard.  
The constitutional hearing opportunities of those criminally accused, whether 
in federal or state trial courts, traditionally have been more protected, as very 
significant life, liberty and property interests are often at stake. Thus, before a guilty 
plea can prompt a federal court judgment embodying a conviction, district judges 
must personally address the criminally accused and be assured that there are 
voluntary and informed waivers of such hearing opportunities as “the right at trial 
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses… to testify and present evidence, 
 
 
215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(A). Again, state rules are often similar. See, e.g., ME. R. CRIM. P. 23(A); W. 
VA. R. CRIM. P. 23(A). Of course, criminal defense counsel can impact negatively a defendant's exercise of 
the jury trial right, as by conceding during closing statement the defendant's guilt on some counts. See, 
e.g., People v. Burns, 38 Cal. App. 5th 776 (2019). 
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(B); (D).  
217. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 9 FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CIVIL 2321 (3d ed. 2018 
update) (though noting "there is a presumption against waiver of jury trial"). 
218. See, e.g., BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A. v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 168, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(collecting cases). 
219. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1105(A) (2015) (untimely civil jury trial demand by 
either a plaintiff or a defendant prompts a jury trial right waiver); CAL. CIV. P. 631(F) (civil jury trial waiver 
by, e.g., by failing to timely pay the required nonrefundable fee or by failing to announce that a jury is 
required at the time the cause is first set for trial should the cause be set upon notice or stipulation); 
and FLA. CIV. P. 1.430(D) (civil jury trial right waived if not properly demanded).  
220. Case precedents are more reluctant to find waivers, however, where actions by lawyers 
were inadvertent or where the litigants are proceeding pro se.  See, e.g., Solis v. County of L.A., 514 F. 
3d 946, 956 n.12 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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and to compel the attendance of witnesses.”221 Judges will reject proposed plea 
agreements where there were no such knowing and voluntary waivers.222  Similar 
protections are generally afforded in state criminal cases.223 
Notwithstanding significant protections in guilty plea proceedings involving 
constitutional hearing opportunities beyond jury trials held by the criminally 
accused, similar protections may not be afforded when a criminal case proceeds to 
trial. Then, explicit consents to waivers by the accused are not usually needed, and 
the hearing opportunities of the accused can be lost or diminished through actions 
by their counsel that are not explicit waivers.  Thus, as for the accused's right to a 
speedy trial, the protection can be lost due to "delay caused by defendant's 
counsel,"224 though this "general rule attributing to the defendant delay caused by 
. . . counsel is not absolute."225 Attribution of counsel's actions to a criminal 
defendant seemingly is more likely when the defendant, through counsel, attempts 
"to evade the consequences of an unsuccessful tactical decision."226 While state 
laws can provide the criminally accused with greater hearing opportunities than are 
 
 
221. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(B)(1)(E). On the rationales for requiring such colloquies, see, e.g., United 
States v. Shorty, 741 F.3d 961, 966 (9th Cir. 2013). The attributes of the colloquies between trial judges 
and criminal defendants regarding constitutional right waivers can differ depending upon the right. See, 
e.g., Tatum v. Foster, 847 F.3d 459, 466 (7th Cir. 2017) (difference between competency to stand trial 
and self-representation colloquy); People v. Johnson, 2019 Ill. App. Ct. 162517 (2019) (colloquy regarding 
trial waiver though defendant had signed a jury trial waiver form); and Dunn v. State, 434 P.3d 1, ¶¶8-
12 (Okl. 2018) (due process right to be present at evidentiary hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea 
cannot be waived by counsel alone).   
Certain hearing opportunities for the criminally accused may be waived by counsel acting 
"without indication of particular consent from" the client, but perhaps only in settings involving tactical 
decisions.  See, e.g., Gonzalez. v. Unites States, 553 U.S. 242, 248–51 (2008) (these hearing opportunities 
include having a federal district judge, not a magistrate judge, preside over voir dire and jury selection; 
what arguments to pursue; what evidentiary objections to raise; and what agreements to conclude 
regarding the admission of evidence). 
222. See, e.g., Unites States v. Soon Dong Han, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting 
proposed plea). 
223. See, e.g., ARIZ. C.P.R. 17.2(a)(3) (court must address criminal defendant in determining “the 
defendant understands… the constitutional rights that the defendant foregoes by pleading guilty”); ARK. 
C.P.R. 24.4; But see, Unites States. v. Desotell, 929 F.3d 821, 827 (7th Cir.) (2019) (circuit split on a 
criminal defense lawyer’s ability to waive a defendant’s objection to a search by not raising the issue in 
an opening brief during an appeal).   
224. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91 (2009). 
225. Id. at 94 (delay resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public defender system will not 
be charged to the defendant).  See also, Mathewson v. State, 438 P.3d 189, 209–12 (Wyo. 2019) 
(reviewing and applying speedy trial right guidelines set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 30–33 
(1972)). 
226. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203 (1995) (quoting United States v. Coonan, 
938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir. 1991) where a criminal defendant could not complain on appeal about the 
admission into evidence of testimony to which there was no objection per FRE 103(a)). See also, People 
v. Massey, 436 Ill. App. 3d 803, 809 (2019) (ineffective assistance of criminal trial counsel means 
“performance was objectively unreasonable” and caused a “different” outcome; great deference to 
counsel’s strategic decisions, with counsel’s acts strongly presumed to be reasonable); People v. Walker, 
433 Ill. App. 3d 97, 102 (2019) (a decision by criminal defense counsel on sharing/discussing items 
received in discovery “is a matter of trial strategy” entitled to “strong presumption” of attorney 
competence).  
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afforded under the federal constitution,227 here too hearing opportunity losses can 
arise through counsel's actions. 
By contrast, the constitutional hearing opportunities of civil litigants, whether 
in federal or state trial courts, are less protected.228 For example, civil litigants can 
lose hearing opportunities on their claims where their attorneys have settled the 
claims without client consultations, perhaps even over their clients' express 
rejections of the offers to which the clients are then bound. Losses can arise due to 
the apparent229 or presumed230 attorney settlement authority which may not then 
be able to be overcome.231Lost hearing opportunities also can result from other 
attorney conduct involving, for example, pleading232 or discovery233 failures. 
The constitutional hearing opportunities of certain civil litigants are 
heightened when more significant life, liberty or property interests are at stake. 
More significant interests are recognized in proceedings involving involuntary civil 
commitment (e.g., as with a sexual predator), punitive damage assessments,234 
child guardianships,235 and termination of parental rights.236 Here, hearing 
opportunities for civil litigants are more difficult to lose. Yet the protections against 
such losses typically are not as strong as certain of the hearing opportunity 
 
 
227. See, e.g., State v. Vincenty, 202 A.3d 1273, 1278 (N.J. 2019) (common law privilege against 
self-incrimination affords greater protection than does the federal constitution); State v. Shaw, 237, 246 
N.J. 588 (2019) (N.J. constitution is more protective than federal constitution “when it comes to consent 
searches”).  
228. Some civil litigants, like those facing involuntary civil commitments or terminations of 
parental rights, do have greater procedural Due Process rights than most other civil litigants. On 
involuntary civil commitments of sexually dangerous persons, see 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/3.01 
(West 2017) 
(proof beyond a reasonable doubt) and 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/5 (West 2017) (rights to 
counsel and jury trial), reviewed in People v. Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d 318 (2001). On parental rights 
terminations, see,  J.B. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 170 So. 3d 780, 791 (Fla. 2015) (parents 
have right to effective counsel when state seeks to terminate their parental rights).  
229. See, e.g., Robertson v. Alling, 351 P.3d 352, 356 (Ariz. 2015) (citing ALI Restatement of the 
Law Third, The Law Governing Lawyers, at § 27); Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 A.2d 787, 789 (Pa. 2005) 
(apparent authority recognized even where settling attorney commits fraud). 
230. See, e.g., In re Artha Mgmt, Inc., 91 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1996). 
231. See, e.g., Brewer v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (Ill. 1995) 
(presumption of attorney's in-court settlement authority rebutted by client's and attorney's affidavits); 
Condon and Cook, LLC v. Mavrakis, 69 N.E.3d 274, 85-86 (2016 IL 151923) (no overcoming presumed in-
court attorney settlement authority where client ratified attorney's acts). 
232. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted).  But see, FED. R. CIV. P. 11(C)(4) (sanction is “limited to what suffices to deter repetition of 
the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarity situated”).  
233. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (sanction for signing failure by attorney regarding discovery 
"request, response or objection" can be imposed on "the party on whose behalf the signer was acting"). 
 
234. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (federal Due Process 
limits on punitive damage awards).  
235. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.E.V., 226 N.J. 90, 114 (2016) (need for colloquy with parent 
who wants self-representation) [hereinafter J.E.V.].  
236 . ee, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 456 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (federal Due Process requires clear 
and convincing evidence before any termination of parental rights through a court judgment).  
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protections afforded the criminally accused.237 
Civil litigants can lose other civil case hearing opportunities, sometimes before 
their civil actions are commenced. For example, if a party is incarcerated, that party 
has no constitutional right to be made available in person in order to testify in a 
pending civil action.238 Further, future civil litigants can lose in advance their jury 
trial rights,239 as well as their Due Process protections afforded nonresidents, under 
choice of law or personal jurisdiction norms.240 
C. Privacy Interests in Property Searches by Government 
Federal constitutional privacy interests involving governmental property 
searches can be lost through earlier consent. Often, such consent is undertaken by 
the one whose property is then sought to be searched.241 At times, as with a 
probationer (like one involved in home detention), consent may be given in advance 
of any governmental search.242  
Yet an earlier consent by one occupant to a governmental search of physical 
premises whose occupancy is shared by two people with similar privacy interests 
can effectively negate the nonconsenting co-occupant's privacy interests in, and 
Fourth Amendment objections to, the search.243 The rationales behind broad 
consensual search cases might support allowing one custodial parent to consent to 
a privacy infringement on a second legal parent's "care, custody and control" 
 
 
237. See, e.g., J.E.V., 226 N.J. at 114 (colloquy with parent who wants self-representation “need 
not be as comprehensive as the colloquy mandated when a criminal defendant seeks to proceed 
unrepresented”); In re K.C., 2019 WL 1766072 (W. Va. 2019) (factors used in determining whether 
incarcerated parent has a right to attend a parental rights termination proceeding in person) 
238. See, e.g., Myers v. Emke, 476 N.W.2d 84, 85 (Iowa 1991) (noting inmate could supply his 
testimony by deposition) and Clements v. Moncrief, 549 So.2d 479, 481 (Ala. 1989) (similar) and Curtiss 
v. Curtiss, 886 N.W.2d 565, 568 (N.D. 2016) (prisoners have "diminished constitutional protections, but 
they maintain a due process right to reasonable access to the courts"). Compare, Hazelett v. Hazelett, 
119 N.E. 3d 153, 161 (Ind. App. 2019) (father’s absence due to military service could not be considered 
a factor in awarding mother sole legal custody of child).  
239. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act of 1947, 9 U.S.C.A. § 9.  
240. See, e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (choice of law clause); Carnival 
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (forum selection clause).  
241. While consent may seemingly be given, nevertheless it can be deemed involuntary under 
certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(circumstances include “(1) whether defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officers have 
their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings have been given; (4) whether the defendant was told 
he has a right not to consent; and (5) whether defendant was told a search warrant could be obtained”).  
242. See, e.g., McElroy v. State, 133 N.E.3d 201, 206 (Ind. App. 2019).  
243. The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that while a criminally accused needs to waive 
personally, via a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision, constitutional rights promoting a fair trial, 
a waiver of the constitutional right involving a governmental search or seizure can be undertaken 
differently, and with lesser protections, since Fourth Amendment rights are not indispensable to 
obtaining a fair trial.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 238.    
Of course, additional constitutional privacy protections can arise under state constitutions.  See, 
e.g., Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (applying Privacy Initiative of state constitution to 
nongovernmental searches). 
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interests in a child by facilitating a nonparent's relationship with the child, leading 
to a diminution (or elimination) of the existing second parent’s childcare rights. 
Such rights can be negatively impacted not only due to the nonparent acquiring 
custodial parent status, but also due to nonparent (like grandparent or stepparent) 
acquiring child visitation interests later recognized over the current objections of 
the two custodial parents. 
An effective consent to a premises search impacting Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests in the premises for one who did not actually consent to the search, 
was recognized in 2014 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fernandez v. California.244 
There, Walter Fernandez told police officers who had come to his apartment, then 
also occupied by Roxanne Rojas, that they didn't "have any right to come in."245  
Fernandez was arrested shortly thereafter at the apartment for attacking both 
Rojas and Abel Lopez, whose attack in the neighborhood prompted the visit to the 
apartment.246 About an hour later, the arresting detective returned to the 
apartment where Rojas then gave "oral and written consent" to a search of the 
apartment.247 The search led to evidence which was used in obtaining a criminal 
conviction of Fernandez, who had sought evidence suppression on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.248 The Court sustained the search since "a person who shares 
a residence with others assumes the risk that anyone of them may admit 
visitors."249 It did recognize that any consent by Rojas to a search would not bind 
Fernandez if he was present at the apartment and then objected to any police 
search.250 Yet, as Rojas was the sole occupant present when consent from Rojas was 
sought, the Court found that by recognizing her consent could bind all occupants, 
her "rights" would be respected as would "her independence."251   
"Common authority" between Fernandez and Rojas over the apartment 
 
 
244. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 307 (2014). 
245. Id. at 296–97. 
246. Id. at 295–97. 
247. Id. at 296. Where consents are not truly voluntary, evidence obtained during the search 
will be barred from trial under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Pagán-González v. Moreno, 919 F.3d 
582, 86–87 (1st Cir. 2019) (deception vitiates voluntariness of consent to search) [hereinafter Moreno]. 
On promoting more truly voluntary consents to searches, see, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, “Police 
Accountability and the Problem of Regulating Consent Searches,” 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1759.  
248. Id. at 297. Had the search been undertaken by a tribal officer that involved property on a 
reservation, likely there would be a similar bar. See, e.g., United States v. Cooley, 919 F.3d 1135, (9th 
Cir. 2019)(Indian Civil Rights Act, the Fourth Amendment counterpart, operates). 
249. Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 301 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006).  Even one 
who does not share a residence may consent to a warrantless search of the residence where the fruits 
of the search are admissible as evidence, as long as there was apparent authority to consent.  See, e.g., 
Moore v. Andreno, 505 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2007). 
The assumption of risk analysis has also been used to validate governmental access to much, but 
not all (e.g., cell site location information), of an individual’s digital records held by third parties (like 
phone companies). For a criticism of this third party doctrine in Fourth Amendment cases, see, e.g., Laura 
K. Donohue, Functional Equivalence and Residual Rights Post-Carpenter: Framing a Test Consistent with 
Precedent and Original Meaning, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347.  
250. Id. (citing Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23). 
251. Id. at 307.  For Rojas, a warrantless search pursuant to only her consent would also avoid a 
"delay" caused by the time necessary to obtain a warrant; dispel more quickly police "suspicion" 
regarding her possible role in the crimes committed by Fernandez; and allow speedy police removal of 
any "dangerous contraband" found in the residence.  Id. at 307. 
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allowed Rojas to consent to a police search while Fernandez was away, even if 
Fernandez was only away because of a police arrest.252 Common authority was said 
by the court to be shared by those described alternately as "occupants," "residents" 
and "tenants."253 Earlier precedents found shared authority over premises arises 
when two people possess "common authority over or other sufficient relationship 
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."254 The same approach has been 
employed to justify searches of other property, including a residential home, 255 a 
computer hard drive,256 and a duffel bag,257 based on a single person's consent 
where there was common authority over the  property.  Of course, consents to 
property searches may not justify searches extending beyond reasonable limits.258  
These precedents on consents have not yet been generally extended to 
consents involving non property in which there are shared privacy interests, like the 
 
 
252. Id.  At times, at least for me, “common authority” cases are difficult to distinguish from 
“apparent authority” cases, as in United States. v. Amratiel, 622 F.3d 914, 916–17 (8th Cir. 2010). And 
see United States v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2016) (“when an individual possesses only 
apparent authority, rather than actual, common authority, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the 
police officer’s entry is ‘based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of entry, 
reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact do not do so.’”) and 
United States v. Jackson, 598 F. Supp. 3d 340, 348–49 (7th Cir. 2010) (mother’s apparent authority to 
consent to search of her adult child’s computer case). 
253. Fernandez, 571 U.S. at 294 n.1(citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).  
254. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.  See also id. at 171 n.7 ("mutual use of property by persons 
generally having joint access or control for most purposes," with assumptions of risk that another "might 
permit the common area to be searched") and United States v. Sawyer, 929 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(co-owner of empty rental property, who had “common control,” could agree to search of a backpack 
brought into the property by a trespasser). Compare State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243, 251–52 (Minn. 
2003) (landlord could not consent to search of criminal defendant's rented storage locker, as there was 
no "mutual use" of the locker even if there was joint access), with United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838 
(6th Cir. 2005) (luggage owner retained sufficient expectation of privacy for bag stored in an apartment 
resident’s bedroom closet, and there was no “common authority” with the resident for the bag). 
255. See, e.g., Coolidge v. N. H., 403 U.S. 443, 486–90 (1971) (spouse volunteers guns and 
clothing of her husband) and United States v. Jones, 861 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2017) (girlfriend of the 
criminal defendant consented to a search of the mobile home she shared with him).  There can be 
portions of a residential home or apartment which are not shared, and thus may not be searched 
because where "common authority" over those portions is not shared.  See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 
63 F. Supp. 3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (search of criminal defendant's backpack and attached bag found in 
his son's room in an apartment the defendant shared with his mother was okay as the mother, the child's 
guardian, consented) and United States v. Peyton, 745 F.3d 546, 554 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (criminal 
defendant's great-grandmother, with whom defendant shared an apartment, could not consent to 
police search of defendant's shoebox which was defendant's "personal property" and was stored in an 
area of the apartment where there was only the defendant's property). 
256. See, e.g., U.S. v. King, 604 F.3d 125 (3rd Cir. 2010) (computer owner could consent to 
seizure of her computer containing a defendant's hard drive where she and the defendant shared the 
computer "without any password protection") and U.S. v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230, 1241-1242 (11th Cir. 
2016) (similar, as defendant and his wife - who consented to a forensic search of a shared computer - 
maintained no separate login name and password, and defendant did not encrypt his files). 
257. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1986).  
258. See, e.g., U.S. v. Moore-Bush, 381 F. Supp. 3d 139 (D. Mass. 2019) (search involving eight 
month video log of a criminal defendant’s house [driveway and front door] violates “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test).  
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"common authority" involving the "care, custody and control" of children for whom 
there are two existing legal parents.259 So, actual consent by one existing legal 
parent to a nonparent's shared custody has not generally been deemed to justify a 
finding of custodial parentage in the nonparent over the objection of a second 
existing legal parent who did not give actual consent.  Yet the UPAs and the ALI 
pronouncements support the notion that consent by only one existing legal parent, 
in the absence of apparent consent, is sometimes sufficient for a nonparent to gain 
eligibility for custodial parent status over the objection of a second, nonconsenting 
existing legal parent. Here, norms in the ALI 2019 Intentional Torts Draft on 
“presumed consent” are implicated.  
The "common authority" precedents do not support, however, the UPA and 
ALI pronouncements which effectively recognize the "presumed consent" doctrine 
of the ALI 2019 Intentional Torts Draft operating in parentage by consent settings.  
The "common authority" cases under the Fourth Amendment ask not only whether 
one, like a co-tenant, has actually consented to a search, but also whether the 
absent person whose property is searched has a continuing and reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the property, though it is within the shared premises.  One 
court ruled that "a person has an expectation of privacy in his or her private closed 
containers and does not forfeit that expectation of privacy merely because the 
container is located in a place that is not controlled exclusively by the container's 
owner."260 An absent custodial parent’s child is in the “container,” not in the shared 
space. 
Beyond “common authority” search precedents, Fourth Amendment cases on 
consents to property searches notwithstanding governmental deceptions may 
guide lost Due Process analyses in other constitutional privacy settings, including 
parental “care, custody and control” interests. These rulings recognize that not all 
governmental deceptions will vitiate uninformed consents to warrantless searches. 
Thus, it is generally held that “the Fourth Amendment may be violated when 
consent is obtained through a law enforcement officer’s false claim of authority or 
lies conveying an exigent need for the search.”261 By contrast, an undercover law 
enforcement officer’s deception, as with the purpose behind a requested purchase 
of illegal drugs, will not vitiate the consent by the drug seller to later privacy 
intrusions because “the targeted seller has freely made the choice to expose his 
criminal activity to others.” 262  
Clearly, these Fourth Amendment deceit cases differ in that the (mis)conduct 
 
 
259. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 5/600 (definitions involving parental responsibility allocations between 
two legal parents, where one parent may have both "parenting time and significant decision-making 
responsibilities with respect to a child" while the other parent has "caretaking functions and non-
significant decision-making responsibilities with respect to the child"). 
260. U.S. v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. v. Fultz, 146 F.3d 1102, 1105 
(9th Cir. 1997 while recognizing similar property interests carry privacy expectations, including property 
constituting a gym bag, suitcase, briefcase and cardboard box) [hereinafter Davis]. 
261. Moreno, supra note 247, at 596 ("uniform" judicial recognition); see also United States v. 
Jackson, 149 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1368 (N.D. Ga. 2016)(homeowner was told police officer was a cousin of 
homeowner’s nephew’s girlfriend, and thus her allowing search of her home involved a “deception” 
which cause the homeowner not to truly consent).  
262. Moreno, supra note 247, at 592.  
 
2020 THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CUSTODIAL AND 
SUPPORT PARENTAGE BY CONSENT 
465 
 
is undertaken by governmental agents, not by private parties (often in intimate 
relationships with those whose parental privacy interests are negatively impacted). 
Nevertheless, these cases on governmental deceit suggest the possibility that in the 
childcare context, custodial interests may sometimes be lost or child support duties 
may sometimes arise due to an existing legal parent’s deceit (as with biological 
paternity of a child born of sex) or other (mis)conduct (as with shielding a biological 
parent from contact with his/her child). Lost custodial interests for a putative legal 
father due to an existing legal parent’s (mis)conduct arguably arose in the paternity 
opportunity context in the Lehr case, which follows.  
D. Privacy Interests in Paternity Opportunity  
Constitutionally-protected privacy interests extend beyond property subject 
to governmental searches.  As with property searches, other privacy interests may 
be shared between two (or more) people who possess somewhat similar interests. 
For example, all biological parents of children born of consensual sex to unwed 
mothers have interests in rearing their children with the mothers without 
governmental interference. Yet the interests of the parents differ. For example, 
while most women (i.e., nonsurrogates) clearly have constitutionally-protected 
“care, custody, and control” interests when their children are born,263 most men 
who are not married to the birth mothers possess only paternity opportunity 
interests.264  These opportunity interests, when timely seized, may only then 
prompt comparable "care, custody, and control" authority for the men. When not 
timely seized, the chance for such male parental authority can be permanently lost. 
Losses often occur in formal adoption proceedings where the biological fathers are 
found to be without veto/participation rights. These process rights, as with 
protections against unwanted governmental property searches, can be lost by men 
when the birth mothers, who share similar parental childcare interests, act 
unilaterally, not unlike the consents to searches by one of two who share privacy 
 
 
263. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001) (for birth 
mothers “real, every day ties” to their children arising from pregnancies prompt childcare interests at 
birth; for biological fathers of children born of sex, “real, every day ties” require more than genetic 
connections). 
264. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261–62 (1983). There are those who read Lehr differently.  
One commentator opines that under Lehr an unwed genetic father's childcare interests "depend solely 
on whether he has formed a sufficient relationship with the child," regardless of whether or not he is "at 
fault for the lack of relationship."  Jennifer Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against Genetic 
Entitlement, 91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 481 (2017) [hereinafter Fathers and Feminism].   
Some unwed biological fathers of children born of sex do, however, have coequal "care, custody 
and control" authority at birth, as when they sign (with pregnant women) prebirth Voluntary 
Acknowledgment of Parentage (VAP) forms that are effective upon live birth. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 304(b), (c) (West 2020). But such authority is subject to differing standards for overrides for birth 
mothers and for VAP parents; only the latter may be negated without parental rights termination 
hearings. On VAP challenges, see Reforming VAPs, supra note 81, at 185–203.   
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interests in apartments, houses or hard drives.265 
Easily (and somewhat innocent) lost paternity opportunity interests are 
illustrated by the 1983 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Lehr v. Robertson. The case 
involved a biological father’s rights in an adoption proceeding involving his 
nonmarital daughter. 266 In Lehr, the details surrounding the birth of Jessica via 
nonconsensual sex in November, 1976 to an unmarried couple, Lorraine and 
Jonathan, were “far different” depending on who was the storyteller.267 In Lehr, six 
justices listened mostly to Lorraine while three dissenters chiefly heard Jonathan.268 
A close exploration of Lehr is key to further understanding how parental childcare 
interests, without biological or formal adoptive ties, have expanded dramatically.  
The majority, through Justice Stevens, focused on Jessica, her mother Lorraine 
and Richard Robertson, Lorraine’s current husband who had married Lorraine eight 
months after Jessica’s birth.269  The case involved Richard’s petition to adopt 
Jessica, filed shortly after Jessica’s second birthday.270  Jonathan Lehr, the unwed 
biological father, contested the adoption, arguing that he was entitled to, but not 
given, advance notice of (and a chance to be heard at) the adoption proceeding.271 
New York statutory law entitled a biological father of a child born of sex to an 
unmarried woman to notice (assuming no abandonment)272 of any pending 
adoption only if he had his name listed on “the putative father registry;” he had 
married the mother before the child was six months old; or, he had lived “openly” 
with the child and the child’s mother while holding himself out as the child’s 
father.273 Though conceding he did not meet any of the statutory criteria, Jonathan 
urged that “special circumstances gave him a constitutional right to notice and a 
hearing before Jessica was adopted” by Richard.274 Those circumstances included 
his filing “a visitation and paternity petition” in a second New York court a month 
 
 
265. Unilateral acts by one existing legal parent might also prompt parental interest losses for 
another existing legal parent.  In Michigan, at least, significant Due Process protections are recognized 
for a nonacting parent when another legal parent acts in ways prompting state inquiries into that 
parent's fitness.  In re Sanders, 852 N.W.2d 524, 539, 543 n.8 (Mich. 2014) (state pursuing unfitness 
finding against one legal parent at a dispositional hearing cannot prompt even a temporary deprivation 
of custody for the other legal parent "without any finding that he or she is unfit"). 
266. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249–50. 
267. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 270. 
268. Id. at 249, 268.  (Stevens, J., writing the opinion for the court) (Rehnquist, J., Powell, J., 
Burger, J., Brenner, J., and O’Conner J., concurring) (White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun J., dissenting). 
269. Id. at 250. 
270. Id.  
271. Id. at 248. 
272. Id. at 266–68. 
273. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251. Once recognized in law, a parent, including an unwed biological 
father, has a much greater opportunity to veto a proposed adoption.  Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 
7505-4.2(B) (West 2020) (consent to adoption is not required of a parent who failed to support child for 
12 of last 14 months immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition), with IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
19-9-8(a) (2) (West 2020) (“a parent of a child in the custody of another person” must consent to an 
adoption unless the parent “fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly with the child 
when able to do so” or “knowingly fails to provide support… when able to do so”), and OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3107.07(A) (West 2020) (parent’s consent to formal adoption not required where for last year 
parent “failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact with child or to provide 
for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree”).  
274. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252. 
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after the formal adoption proceeding began.275  It was over a month after his filing 
that Jonathan actually learned of the adoption petition.276  Four days after learning 
of the pending adoption case, Jonathan sought to halt it so that only his paternity 
case would proceed.277  His request was met with a telephone account by the 
adoption court judge indicating that an adoption order had been signed earlier that 
same day, even though the judge had been aware of Jonathan’s pending paternity 
case.278  Seemingly, Lorraine and Richard had learned of the paternity case by 
Jonathan about two weeks earlier.279 The adoption court judge concluded that no 
notice to Jonathan was required because none of the relevant statutory norms 
(including mailing a postcard to the state putative father registry) had been met.280 
Two New York appellate courts sustained the adoption by Richard.281 In the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the legal issues included “whether the New York statutes are 
unconstitutional because they inadequately protect the natural relationship 
between parent and child”, as well as whether these statutes “draw an 
impermissible distinction between the rights of the mother and the rights of the 
father.”282 
Regarding protection of “the natural relationship between parent and child,” 
the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between an unwed biological father who had 
formed a “significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with his child, 
thereby acquiring “substantial” federal constitutional childrearing interests, from 
an unwed biological father who had not yet formed such a relationship, though for 
some time, at least, he possessed a less weighty federal constitutional interest in 
forming such a relationship, at least where the mother was not married to 
another.283 In Lehr, the Court found that Jonathan had formed no such relationship 
with Jessica and that, in fact, he had not sought “to establish a legal tie until after 
she was two years old.”284 The Court then assessed whether New York had 
“adequately protected” Jonathan’s opportunity to form a parent-child relationship 
 
 
275. Id.   
276. Id.  
277. Id. at 252–53. 
278. Id. at 253. 
279. Id. at 252–53. 
280. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 254. 
281. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253.  The New York high court affirmed largely because it found that the 
lack of notice to Jonathan made no difference.  Id. at 253–54 (citing In the Matter of the Adoption of 
Jessica “XX”, 434 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1980)) (holding “that appellant's commencement of a paternity action 
did not give him any right to receive notice of the adoption proceeding, that the notice provisions of the 
statute were constitutional, and that Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) was not retroactive”).  
It said that a notice of an adoption proceeding is intended to afford a genetic father such as Jonathan 
the chance “to provide the [adoption] court with evidence concerning the best interest of the child.”  
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 254.  Here, the New York high court concluded that Jonathan had “made no tender 
indicating any ability to provide any particular or special information relevant to Jessica’s best interest.”  
Id. at 254. 
282. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 255 n.10. 
283. Id. at 271. 
284. Id. at 262. 
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with Jessica.285  It found adequate protection.286 
The U.S. Supreme Court thus deemed sufficient the New York statutory 
conditions on advance notice of formal adoption proceedings to unwed biological 
fathers.287 It observed that in the case, “the right to receive notice was completely 
within” Jonathan’s control; he simply needed to mail a postcard to the putative 
father registry.288 Jonathan’s ignorance of this requirement was no defense.289 The 
Court rejected Jonathan’s plea that his case was “special” because both the 
adoption court and the mother knew of his pending paternity case before the 
adoption order was entered.290 The U.S. Supreme Court noted that requiring strict 
compliance with state statutes served the public interest in facilitating expeditious 
formal adoptions of young children and was fair here because Jonathan was 
“presumptively capable of asserting and protecting” his own rights.291  The Court 
effectively reasoned that Jonathan could not sleep on his parental rights after he 
slept with Lorraine.292 
Regarding the distinction that New York drew between maternal and paternal 
rights, the Court recognized the need for there to be “a legitimate governmental 
objective” in order to sustain a legal distinction between the sexes.293  The state 
adoption procedures distinguished between women and men who were biological 
parents by allowing all birth mothers, but not all biological fathers, “the right to 
veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding.”294  The 
distinctions were said to serve the objectives of promoting the best interests of 
children and of insuring opportunities for all interested parties in securing prompt 
and final adoptions of “illegitimate” (or nonmarital or out-of-wedlock) children by 
allowing veto and participation rights only to those biological parents who had 
established, and had not later abandoned, “custodial, personal, or financial” 
relationships with their children born of sex.295  Birth moms, but not dads, of 
children born of sex always initially had such established relationships.296  The U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the New York statutes sufficiently recognized biological 
 
 
285. Id. at 262–63. 
286. Id. at 264. 
287. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263. 
288. Id. at 264. 
289. Id. at 265. 
290. Id. at 264; cf. T.G.G. v. H.E.S., 932 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019) (biological father 
barred from pursuing paternity action once adoption proceeding begins if he failed to register with 
Department of Health less than 30 days after the birth of the child, per MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.52 subdiv. 
7 (West 2019)).  
291. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265. 
292. Paternal interest in parenthood, in order to have a voice in any later adoption, sometimes 
must be demonstrated during pregnancy, as when state statutes require actions by putative unwed 
fathers before adoptions are pursued by birth mothers and when birth mothers pursue adoptions very 
soon after birth. See, e.g., P.K. v. H.M., 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 7561 (Oct. 22, 2014).  
293. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265.  
294. Id. at 266. 
295. Id. at 266–67. 
296. Id. 
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fathers who came forward to participate in childrearing,297 noting that the statutory 
scheme did not likely “omit many responsible fathers” and did not necessarily estop 
biological fathers who failed to step up for reasons beyond their control.298   
The dissenters in Lehr299 focused more on the story told by Jonathan, resulting 
in a very different approach to the adequacy of protections afforded by New York 
to Jonathan’s “natural relationship” with Jessica.300 According to Jonathan (whose 
account was never subject to an evidentiary hearing), Jonathan and Lorraine 
“cohabited for approximately 2 years, until Jessica’s birth,” during which time 
Lorraine acknowledged to friends and relatives that Jonathan was Jessica’s 
father.301 Lorraine later reported to the New York State Department of Social 
Services that Jonathan was the father of Jessica when she sought public aid.302  
Jonathan “visited Lorraine and Jessica in the hospital every day during Lorraine’s 
confinement.”303 Upon discharge of Lorraine and Jessica from the birth hospital (in 
November, 1976), until August, 1977, Lorraine largely concealed her whereabouts 
from Jonathan, though he sporadically located her and visited with Lorraine and 
Jessica (and Lorraine’s other child) “to the extent” Lorraine was willing to permit 
it.304  From August, 1977 until August, 1978, Jonathan was unable to locate Lorraine 
and Jessica, though he never ceased looking for them.305 Jonathan did locate them 
again in August, 1978, “with the aid of a detective agency.”306 He then first learned 
of Lorraine’s marriage to Richard.307  Jonathan offered financial assistance and a 
 
 
297. Id. at 266–68.  Adoption statutes sometimes distinguish the adoption participation rights 
of legal fathers, as when the state seeks to facilitate only certain adoptions (like stepparent adoptions).  
See, e.g., Adoption of I.M., 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding no consent needed in 
stepparent adoption, pursued by custodial parent, from noncustodial parent who willfully failed to 
communicate with and support child for over one year; otherwise, termination of noncustodial parent’s 
rights require intent to abandon child, applying CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7822, 8604(b)).  
298. In a footnote in Lehr, the U.S. Supreme Court noted: “There is no suggestion in the record 
that [the birth mother] engaged in fraudulent practices that led [the unwed biological father] not to 
protect his rights.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265 n.23.  
For a very different reading of Lehr, see Fathers and Feminism, supra note 264, at 485–86, 536 
(“all of the states give more substantive rights to genetic fathers than Supreme Court precedents 
require…at the expense of mothers’ parental rights;” “genetic essentialism” flowing from Lehr allows a 
“male-centered definition of parenthood” leading to acquiescence to “patriarchal demands for authority 
over women and children”). 
As for what is within the control of unwed biological fathers of children born of consensual sex, 
see, e.g., In re Adoption of A.A.T., 196 P.3d 1180 (Kan. 2008) (adoption process was fair to natural father 
as it was reasonable for him to have discovered the birth mother’s lies about having undergone an 
abortion).  
299. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268–76 (White, J., dissenting). 
300. Id. at 269. 
301. Id. at 268–69. 
302. Id. at 269. 
303. Id.  
304. Id. 
305. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269. 
306. Id.  
307. Id. 
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trust fund for Jessica, but that aid was refused by Lorraine.308 Lorraine also rejected 
Jonathan’s request to visit Jessica and “threatened” him “with arrest unless he 
stayed away.”309  Thereupon, Jonathan retained counsel who wrote to Lorraine 
early in December, 1978, requesting visitation for Jonathan and threatening legal 
action.310  This was closely followed by Richard’s adoption petition, filed on 
December 21, 1978, and Jonathan’s visitation and paternity case, filed early in 
1979.311 
With this “far different picture,” the dissenters concluded “that but for the 
actions” of Lorraine, Jonathan would have stepped up to fatherhood and gained 
veto and participation rights in any adoption proceeding.312 They looked to a 1980 
statutory amendment in New York, too late for Jonathan, requiring that consent to 
adoption be obtained from a biological father who was “prevented” from 
establishing a significant parent-child relationship by the birth mother or another 
“having lawful custody of the child.”313 They concluded that blood ties, together 
with interference with an inquiring biological father who actually parented for some 
time, were sufficient to prompt adoption notice and participation rights for 
Jonathan.314  
The dissenters went further by suggesting that adoption proceeding rights 
might arise for most biological fathers (i.e., nonrapists) even without maternal 
interference.315 They hinted that the “mere biological relationship” between a child 
born of sex to an unwed mother and a man might itself be sufficient to prompt “a 
protected interest” under federal constitutional law for the biological father.316 
As well, the dissenters reasoned that Jonathan’s paternity case was so 
comparable to a few of the explicit New York statutory factors prompting notice 
and veto rights that any judicial failure to recognize Jonathan’s effective compliance 
with the statute amounted to the “sheerest formalism,” serving no legitimate 
governmental interests in Jessica’s best interests or in an expeditious and final 
adoption.317   
The dissent further hinted that there could be Equal Protection difficulties 
with statutory distinctions between varying biological fathers “who have made 




309. Id.  
310. Id.  
311. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 
312. Id. at 271. 
313. Id. at 271, n. 3.  Compare, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07(A) (parent's consent to 
adoption not needed if parent "failed without justifiable cause" to provide for or have contact with 
child), applied in In Matter of: P.L.B. Adoption, No. 18CA19, 2019 WL 1349794, at ¶¶ 24-34 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 14, 2019). 
314. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 272–73. 
315. Id. at 274. 
316. Id. at 271–72. 
317. Id. at 274.  Sheer formalism can foreclose the voices of birth mothers as well, as when, after 
the state moves to end parental rights, they fail to file a written motion within a designated time period 
although they did object to parental rights losses in other ways, as by visiting the court clerk’s offices 
and telephoning the courts.  B.M. vs. J.R. (In re Adoption of K.M.), 31 N.E.3d 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). 
318. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 274. 
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fathers who have formally acknowledged paternity under some, but not other, 
governmental schemes, since all schemes serve the same legislative purpose of 
designating fathers under law.  Here, while Jonathan had not listed his name on the 
state’s putative father registry, his name was known to a state social service agency, 
his efforts to locate his daughter were significant, and he petitioned for paternity 
before there was an adoption. The dissent focused more on what Jonathan did in 
order to parent Jessica rather than on what Jonathan did not do, that is, not enlist 
his name with some bureaucrat. 
Finally, the dissenters observed that states could better insure participation 
by biological fathers in formal adoption proceedings by requiring unwed birth 
mothers “to divulge,” if they know, the names of (actual or possible) biological 
fathers.319 They remarked that states could even do so when it is the spouse of the 
birth mother like Richard who seeks adoption, at least when the marriage followed 
long after birth so that there was no marital presumption favoring a husband like 
Richard.320 The dissenters noted that U.S. governments already require such 
identifications in other settings, as when public aid is sought by mothers on behalf 
of their children.321 There, a “good faith” cooperation duty is owed by the mother 
in naming the biological father of the child born of sex for whom the mother seeks 
federal Social Security Act aid (now TANF).322 In Lehr, Lorraine had, in fact, told a 
New York social services agency that Jonathan was Jessica’s biological father when 
she sought public assistance.323  
The Lehr opinions address difficult childcare parentage issues. While unwed 
biological fathers like Jonathan Lehr seemingly have some “opportunity for a 
meaningful relationship” with their children who are born to unwed mothers, at 
least where there are as yet no second parents via marriages, adoptions, or 
otherwise, the Jonathan Lehrs of the world may be left under state law to their own 
devices. They may need to seize rather quickly their parental opportunities.   
Seizures of parental opportunity interests by Jonathan Lehrs are made more 
difficult with certain maternal acts, which may or may not involve concealment or 
deception. Unwed mothers like Lorraine generally have no obligation to inform 
their Jonathans of their pregnancies, of their prebirth and postbirth whereabouts, 
or of their parental actions in initiating formal adoptions even after they learned 
that the Jonathans were definitely interested in childcare.324 Maternal conduct can 
 
 
319. Id. at 271. Surely, this information should be maintained confidentially, to be used only in 
assessing formal adoption requests. 
320. Id. at 273 n.5 (“Likewise, there is no reason not to require such identification when it is the 
spouse of the custodial parent who seeks to adopt the child.”) 
321. Id. (per “Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program,” now TANF). 
322. 42 U.S.C. § 654. 
323. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269 (J. White, dissenting). 
324. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Saldivar (In Matter of Parentage of A.M.C.), 182 Wash. App. 1048 
(2014) (while no duty to inform, in absence of “fiduciary relationship”, mother commits fraud when 
making an affirmative misrepresentation about paternity); In re Adoption of B.Y., 356 P.3d 1215 (Utah 
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sometimes thwart the Jonathan Lehrs.325 Can these Jonathans reasonably complain 
about maternal acts foreclosing or inhibiting their privacy interests, or have they 
assumed the risks of such acts by voluntarily associating with the birth mothers, 
even when the Lorraines deceived the Jonathons regarding birth control usage?326 
Of course, here there arguably is no state action, or perhaps less state action (the 
state does provide the formal adoption process), than in the Fourth Amendment 
"common authority" search cases.  
As well, the Lehr majority suggests that an unwed biological father might be 
foreclosed from legal paternity in a formal adoption setting if he fails to comply with 
technical statutory challenge requirements encompassing parental acts (like 
enlisting in the putative father registry), even if he undertook quite similar parental 
acts (like providing prebirth support) that were not statutorily recognized. Form can 
prevail over substance. The “sheerest formalism”327 can negate childcare paternity 
for a biological father early in a child’s life. To date, there are some, but no 
significant, precedents on the irrationality of such distinctions under Equal 
Protection.328 
The Lehr rationale suggests that legal paternity for childcare purposes may 
also be unavailable to an unwed biological father even where no other person 
beyond the birth mother is expected to be designated a legal parent, as through a 
 
 
2015) (biological father cannot intervene in his child’s adoption proceeding as he did not sue in paternity 
before adoption placement, though he and mother had agreed during pregnancy that she would not 
place any child for adoption, he would not sue in paternity, and they would jointly raise the child). See 
also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-110.5 (for certain children placed for adoption by an unwed mother, the 
mother shall make specific declarations (e.g., name, address, knowledge and/or support of 
pregnancy/child) about “each potential birth father”), enacted in 2014 after Utah was found to be a 
magnet state for fraudulent adoptions); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.002 (only when child is over one year 
of age does a would-be adopter have to undertake “due diligence” to find a biological father who “has 
not registered with the paternity registry”).  
The U.S. Supreme Court in Lehr had no occasion to address what, if any, differing analysis would 
be used if the Lorraines deceived the Jonathans. 463 U.S. at 265 n.23. 
325. Laura E. Oren, Thwarted or Pop-Up Pops? How to Determine When Putative Fathers Can 
Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 159–171 (2006). 
326. The so-called "third-party doctrine" in Fourth Amendment warrantless search cases, like 
Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2213–18 (2018), demonstrates the difficulties in the question of 
assumption of risk.  There, the court held that the voluntary sharing of information with a third-party 
sometimes permits governmental access to the information with the cooperation of the third-party 
because the initial information holder voluntarily conveyed the information to the third-party, thereby 
assuming the risk of third-party divulgence.  Yet there are limits to governmental reliance on inferred 
consent, especially where the "privacies of life" are involved, as was recognized in U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) and later affirmed in Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2216.  The 
application of Carpenter to cases involving government access via third-parties to direct-to-consumer 
genetic testing information. See Ayesha Rasheed, Personal Genetic Testing and the Fourth Amendment, 
2020 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1249 (2020). 
327. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275 (White, J., dissenting). 
328. See, e.g., David C. v. Alexis S., 375 P.3d 945, 949 (Ariz. 2016) (under ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
8-111, timely paternity action prompts role for alleged biological father in adoption proceeding). Some 
cases avoid findings of noncompliance with technical statutory requirements and of any Due Process 
violations by recognizing alternative challenge forms under state law which negate possible Due Process 
problems. See, e.g., Brummond v. Lucio, 407 P.3d 553 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (VAP challenge via 
“independent action”). 
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formal adoption.329 Under Lehr, an unwed birth mother, who knows the unwed 
biological father’s whereabouts and interests in parenting, can nevertheless, with 
accommodating state laws, become the sole legal parent by shielding the child from 
the expecting legal father.330 Because such accommodating laws are not 
constitutionally required federally, they should be more limited by state lawmakers 
in order to afford expecting legal parents greater opportunities to exercise their 
custodial interests.331 Innocent losses of Due Process custodial interests should be 
discouraged. Public policy generally should not place significant blame, for example, 
on an unwed biological father for not knowing about putative father registries 
before his child, who he was assured would be in his life, is placed for adoption,332 
or on an intended nonbirth parent, whose genetic material helped prompt 
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction birth, for not anticipating that the expectant 
birth mother would flee and take up residence, or cosign a VAP, with a different 
romantic partner.  
The ruling in Lehr further suggests that an unwed biological father like 
Jonathan may be afforded very little time to step up to fatherhood in order to 
secure a childcare order through a paternity case.333 In Lehr, Richard sought to 
adopt Jessica more than two years after her birth (and only after Jonathan 
threatened, but had not yet taken, legal action).334 The New York statute, however, 
also would have foreclosed for Jonathan any notice and a chance to be heard in the 
adoption proceeding even where the adoption petition had been pursued only days 
after Jessica’s birth. Though Jonathan had visited Lorraine in the hospital and may 
 
 
329. See, e.g., In re D.S., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 348 (Ct. App. 2014) (employing a Lehr approach to a 
putative father’s participation rights in a dependency proceeding). 
330. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 274 (J. White, dissenting). 
331. Comparably, parents should not easily be able to thwart recognized nonparental childcare 
interests, for example, by shielding their children.  See, e.g., D.G. v. W.M., 118 N.E.3d 26 (Ind. App. 2019) 
(mother held in contempt for systematically depriving paternal grandparents of their grandchild 
visitation interests earlier awarded by the court). 
332. Even if unwed biological fathers like Jonathan Lehr knew of such registries, should public 
policies harshly blame them simply for noncompliance? Consider that such registries invite men to 
inform the state of the often very private conduct of women who, quite frequently, would usually deem 
such conduct to be none of the government’s business. Further, consider that men could protect their 
interests in other ways, as by filing paternity suits.  
333. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 274 (White, J., dissenting).A more recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling opens 
the door to thwarting legal childcare parentage for unwed biological fathers like Jonathan Lehr solely, 
or perhaps predominantly, due to prebirth abandonment. In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 
653–56 (2013), the court recognized the significance, in a formal adoption notice setting, of the unwed 
biological father’s prenatal abandonment of his later-born child born of sex; it thus recognized the 
participatory rights of unwed biological fathers in formal adoptions can depend on providing pregnancy 
support.  See, e.g., Mary M. Beck, Prenatal Abandonment: ‘Horton Hatches the Egg” in the Supreme 
Court and Thirt-Four States, 24 Mich J. Gender & L. 53, 79–81 (the case supports the conclusion that 
unwed biological fathers of children born of sex to unwed mothers “should have the right to protect 
their parental rights if they can prove they provided consistent and meaningful prenatal support 
commensurate to their ability to pay”).  Such dependence is recognized in Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 
P.3d at 1238 (unwed fit father can veto proposed adoption where he promptly came forward and 
demonstrated “a full commitment to his parental responsibilities”).  
334. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250. 
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have been recognized as the potential father in the community by Lorraine during 
her pregnancy,335 Jonathan seemingly would have had no role in an adoption 
proceeding two days after birth.  Under the prevailing New York statute, his name 
was not listed on the putative father registry and his “cohabiting” with Lorraine 
during her pregnancy is not the same, under the New York statute, as living 
“openly” later with Lorraine and her child, conduct which Jonathan obviously could 
not undertake on his own.336 
While the Lehr decision generally recognizes that U.S. state lawmakers are 
free to afford very little opportunity for "care, custody, and control" to unwed 
biological fathers of children born of sex, it does not foreclose to state lawmakers 
who choose to do so the ability to impose child support obligations on those same 
unwed fathers whose child custody interests were lost and will continue to be lost.  
State child support laws can act retroactively to the child’s date of birth.337 Support 
orders sometimes are not barred even where the birth mothers concealed the 
child’s existence from the unwed biological father for a significant time.338 
The New York statutory scheme in Lehr not only presents barriers to paternity 
for certain biological fathers, but also invites others to achieve parental status for 
children born to unwed mothers.  The New York statute recognized legal paternity, 
in the adoption notice and participation setting, for a man who lived “openly” with 
Lorraine and her child while holding himself out in the community as the biological 
father.339 A man can hold himself out as a father even though he is not the biological 
father. There can be a residency/hold out, or a de facto nonbiological parent (father 
or mother), invited into the birth mother’s family by her without any governmental 
oversight, meaning that there may never be an inquiry into the child’s best 
interests.  Imagine how the Lehr case would have been decided had Lorraine and 
Richard established a home together a few days after Jessica’s birth. If Lorraine later 
wished to place Jessica for adoption, Richard would likely be entitled to notice. But 
there would be no required notice to Jonathan, even though Jonathan, the 
biological father, continued to search for Jessica with a private detective and even 
though Jonathan’s whereabouts were known all along by Lorraine.340 This approach 
 
 
335. Id. at 252. 
336. For a more sympathetic view of a biological father’s federal constitutional childcare 
opportunity, even when there is no de facto parentage, see, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy W., 232 Cal. App. 
4th 438 (Ct. App. 2014) (relying on Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 450–53).  
337. See, e.g., In re Paternity of Brad Michael L., 564 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (father did 
not learn of child’s birth for 15 years). 
338. See, e.g., N.M. ex rel. Salazar v. Roybal, 963 P.2d 548 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (retroactive child 
support to 20-year-old son from biological father who was not informed of pregnancy or birth from 
1975-1976 to 1994).  But, see also Clark v. Clark, 335 P.3d 1254 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) (mother can be 
barred from seeking child support arrearages by laches or equitable estoppel, as when she unilaterally 
denied father visitation and unreasonably disputed his paternity). 
339. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251. See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a(2)(e) (McKinney 2013). 
340. The Lehr court, and comparable state law, analyses depriving biological fathers like 
Jonathan of any possible childcare orders for their children born of consensual sex are employed outside 
of formal adoption and paternity proceedings. See, e.g., In re D.S., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 
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Biological ties do not always yield paternity recognition to biological fathers 
under formal adoption laws, however, even when a child is born to an unwed 
mother as a result of consensual sex and even when the child otherwise has as yet 
no second parent under law, and perhaps even when the biological father 
expressed interest, and acted on that interest, in childrearing immediately upon 
learning of pregnancy or birth.342 Children can be denied loving, family relationships 
with their biological fathers where the children’s best interests are not well served 
and where they are not even considered.343 By not allowing biological fathers like 
Jonathan Lehr even to participate in an adoption case of a child like Jessica, 
notwithstanding their federal constitutional paternity opportunity interests, it will 
never be known whether children like Jessica would have benefitted from a 
relationship with their biological fathers, who clearly now wish to rear their 
children. The ruling in Lehr surely is relevant to the constitutional limits on 
parentage by consent laws, for here too possible parentage opportunity and "care, 
 
 
Ct. App. June 30, 2015) (no right to child reunification services). Significant public policy debates over 
the appropriateness of these analyses focus on the individual rights of the biological parents, the best 
interests of their children, and the social science studies on “fragile families” and “relationship 
dynamics.” See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Family Policy After the Fragile Families and Relationship 
Dynamics Studies, 35 L. & INEQ. 223 (2017) (taking issue with Clare Huntington, Family Law and 
Nonmarital Families, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 233 (2015), who supports laws recognizing unmarried biological 
parents of children born of sex as “co-parents”).  
341. Some state adoption notice statutes are more sympathetic to unwed biological fathers 
whose children are placed for adoption. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-9(a)(1) (2020) (implied consent or 
relinquishment by father in adoption proceeding "with reasonable knowledge of the pregnancy" who 
fails to offer financial and/or emotional support for a period of six months prior to birth); FLA. STAT. § 
39.806(1)(b) (2019) (grounds for termination of parental rights include child abandonment "when the 
identity of the parent . . . is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search within 60 days"); IND. 
CODE § 31-19-9-15(a)(1) (2020) (putative father's consent to adoption is "irrevocably implied" if he fails 
to file a paternity action not more than 30 days after receiving "actual notice . . . of the mother's intent 
to proceed with an adoptive placement of the child"); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2511(a)(6) (2018) (with 
adoption of newborn, rights of parent may be terminated if "the parent knows or has reason to know of 
the child's birth" and fails to provide "substantial financial support"). 
342. Not all unmarried biological fathers whose children born of sex are placed for formal 
adoption face the results encountered by Jonathan Lehr. See, e.g., In re Baby R.P.S., 942 So.2d 906 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (pending paternity action by putative father must be ruled on before addressing his 
parental rights termination and then a formal adoption, though he had not registered with the Florida 
Putative Father Registry); David C. v. Alexis S., 375 P.3d 945 (Ariz. 2016) (timely filing of paternity action 
prompts role for biological father in adoption proceeding though he did not register as putative father); 
and In re Adoption of K.P.M.A., 341 P.3d 38 (Okla. 2014) (biological fathers had due process right to 
notice of child’s existence, to be effected by both birth mother and adoption agency). As well, compare 
state adoption laws that require, as in In re Adoption of H.N.R., 47 N.E.3d 803, 808 (Ohio 2015) (per OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.01(H) (West 2020)), or do not always require, as in In re I.J., 39 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (per IND. CODE § 31-19-5-12 (2007)), putative father registration within 30 days after 
birth).  
343. Children are also harmed in other ways when their biological fathers fail to step up to legal 
parentage in timely fashions. See, e.g., Stennett v. Miller, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) 
(nonmarital biological child of absentee father has no standing to sue for the father’s wrongful death if 
no court order declaring paternity was entered during the father’s lifetime).  
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custody, and control" interests can be negatively impacted, if not wholly 
eliminated, for one person by the actions of another person.  
Further relevant to new parentage by consent laws are the ways that formal 
adoption notice laws today can bar interested biological fathers, with paternity 
opportunity interests, from childrearing for reasons beyond putative father registry 
failures. For example, strict time limits can foreclose paternal challenges to finalized 
adoptions even when the reason the challengers failed to challenge earlier was due 
to maternal fraud. Thus in Oklahoma, no adoption can be challenged after three 
years, “regardless of whether the decree is void or voidable,” not an unreasonable 
limit.344 By contrast, there is less time to challenge a pending adoption case in 
Arizona; there, a putative registry filing must be made within 30 days of "prompt 
discovery of birth," even where the biological father promptly petitioned for 
custody as soon as he knew of his child's birth. 345 
Notwithstanding Lehr, U.S. state laws on parentage by consent should not 
permit many of the losses of parental opportunity interests that are currently 
allowed. New laws can originate in independent state constitutional precedents, as 
well as through the discretion on child custody interests afforded by the U.S. 
Supreme Court (and Congress) to U.S. state legislators and judges. 
The requirements in formal adoption cases regarding notices to biological 
fathers of children born of assisted reproduction sensibly operate quite differently. 
Here, sperm donors typically waive future parental childcare interests 
preimplantation, with these donors deemed outside any adoption notice 
requirements and participation rights.346 Where sperm donors undertake no such 
waivers, and, in fact, always intended to rear their biological offspring, more 
pertinent to their possible childcare interests are any agreements on future 
 
 
344. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7505-2.1 (2020), applied in Gee v. Belair, 403 P.3d 1 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2017) (deeming the statute of repose time limit could not be tolled even if the father was misled).  
345. The Arizona statute requiring putative father registration within 30 days of "prompt 
discovery" of birth, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(B) (2014), was applied to bar a putative father’s 
challenge to an ongoing adoption proceeding where he seemingly timely filed a paternity action in 
California and did not know of the birth mother’s relocation to Arizona. Frank R. v. Mother Goose 
Adoptions, 402 P.3d 996, 998 (Ariz. 2017). The bar was recognized as prompting “a harsh result” for the 
putative father, as the conduct of both the birth mother and adoption agency were deplored. The high 
court deemed a contrary ruling would prompt “a harsh result” in “separating the child from adoptive 
parents,” then in Tennessee. Yet these parents were “prospective” only since further proceedings were 
contemplated in Tennessee. Id. at 999 and 1003. The rationale for the bar included “the child’s need for 
a ‘loving, permanent and continuous home and family life during his childhood with the only parents” 
the “child has ever known,” as well as a need to promote the “legislative intent” regarding the “finality” 
of adoptions. Id. at 1003.  The harshness of disallowing opportunities for participation in adoption 
proceedings by biological fathers who filed timely paternity suits has been recognized, though it was not 
enough to stop an Indiana appeals court from strictly following the paternity registration deadline. In re 
K.A.W., 99 N.E.3d 724, 727 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) ("no true reason" for deeming lack of registration bars 
participation in adoption proceeding; while a bar feels "not only nonsensical, but unjust," court imposes 
bar). 
346. See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E. 3d 830 (Mass. 2015).  
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childcare rather than any putative father registrations.347 Here, there is much sense 
in laws that focus on preconception agreements/promises/contracts anticipating 
future legal parentage.  
As noted, while Lehr can be read to allow "the sheerest formalism" to deny 
biological fathers their paternity opportunity interests, there is often no good 
reason for U.S. state lawmakers to do so.348  A birth mother, who is automatically 
deemed to have a substantial and enduring parent-child relationship (assuming she 
is not a surrogate), typically faces less sheer formalism.  For example, she often is 
given a long period before she loses her parental rights by neglect or by failure to 
communicate.349  And, when she is neglectful, required parental reunification 
 
 
347. Consider, e.g., sperm donors anticipating future childcare interests in children born of 
assisted reproduction to surrogates. See, e.g., 2017 UPA, at § 802(b) (eligible intended parents). As with 
sperm donors, agreements can protect egg donors anticipating future childcare interests in children 
born of assisted reproduction to other women. See, e.g., D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So.3d 320, 337-38 (Fla. 
2013) (utilizing Lehr to find “a biological connection gives rise to an inchoate right to be a parent that 
may develop into a protected fundamental constitutional right based on the actions of the parent”). 
348. The Supreme Court itself suggested that unwed biological fathers could be protected (and 
may need to be protected constitutionally) when their failure to seize parentage in a timely fashion was 
due to "fraudulent practices."  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265, n.23 (1983). Compare In re Baby Girl 
T., 298 P.3d 1251, 1257 (Utah 2012) (different result if there are shown “failures of state-controlled 
processes” where the biological father did all he could do to comply with the statutory requirements), 
with In re Adoption of B.Y., 356 P.3d 1215 (Utah 2015) (relying on UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-106(1) and 
(2) (West 2020), unwed biological father who relied on mother's promises not to place the child for 
adoption is not excused from following the statute, though the court did recognize the birth mother may 
be subject to suit for fraud). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(2)(a) (2020) (for a child placed with 
prospective adoptive parents more than 6 months after birth, unwed biological father’s failure to 
develop a parent-child relationship is excused when he “was prevented…by the person or authorized 
agency having lawful custody of the child”). See also In re Adoption of J.Q.P., 903 N.W. 2d 736 (S.D. 2017) 
(no six month abandonment by unwed biological father as birth mother stymied his efforts to contact 
the child; father has continued to pay child support); In re Baby R.P.S., 942 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006) (pending paternity action by putative father must be ruled on before addressing his parental 
rights termination and then a formal adoption, though he had not registered with the Florida Putative 
Father Registry), aff’d., J.C.J. v. Heart of Adoptions, Inc., 989 So.2d 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (stipulation 
on father’s paternity, but termination of paternal rights due to abandonment); David C. v. Alexis S., 375 
P.3d 945 (Ariz. 2016) (timely filing of paternity action prompts role for biological father in adoption 
proceeding though he did not register as putative father); and In re Adoption of K.P.M.A., 341 P.3d 380 
(Okla. 2014) (biological fathers had due process right to notice of child’s existence, to be effected by 
both birth mother and adoption agency).  See Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How to 
Determine When Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L. Q. 153 
(2006). And consider Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998) (biological father who was kept in 
the dark while his child was adopted receives $8 million award against birth mother’s brother and 
parents, and an adoption attorney, though he could not sue the birth mother) and OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 
7505-2.1 (2020), applied in Gee, 403 P.3d at ¶13 (deeming the statute of repose time limit could not be 
tolled even if the father was misled). 
349. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Rodgers, 519 S.W.3d 324 (Ark. 2017) (failure to “communicate” with 
child for one year prompts a lack of need for a birth mother’s consent to a stepparent adoption; neglect 
by birth mother can lead to her exclusion from adoption proceeding).  
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proceedings may need to precede any termination of parental rights.350 Paternity 
opportunity interests merit greater constitutional protections, even though it is 
reasonable to afford those interests fewer protections than are afforded parental 
childcare interests subject to terminations on grounds of unfitness. 
E. As Applied and Facial Due Process Challenges to Governmental Actions 
Federal constitutional Due Process interests can be lost, sometimes only by 
truly intentional conduct and sometimes inadvertently.  The guidelines on such 
losses, appearing in written laws allowing "life, liberty or property" deprivations, 
can be challenged on at least two grounds. One involves a governmental policy that 
may be stricken on its face so that the policy will no longer apply to anyone. Facial 
challenges to written laws have succeeded where there are losses of Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests.351 Recall that even for the Lehr majority, questions 
can be raised regarding formal adoption schemes that likely omit "many 
responsible" unwed biological fathers who failed to grasp paternity for reasons 
beyond their control.  
Yet the U.S. Supreme Court favors limiting its statutory strikes to particular 
governmental actions causing deprivations, so that the relevant underlying policies 
remain, though narrowed. Such a disposition means that many laws on parentage 
by consent, when properly challenged, will be narrowed judicially rather than 
wholly stricken.   
The U.S. Supreme Court disposition for finding only particular governmental 
actions are invalidated, without striking entirely the policies on which they were 
grounded, is demonstrated in the 1987 case of U.S. v. Salerno.352 There, the 
majority expressed its preferences for as applied challenges as follows:  
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult 
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish 
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. 
The fact that the… Act might operate unconstitutionally under some 
conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly 
 
 
350. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22, § 4041 (2020) ("responsibility for reunification and 
rehabilitation of the family" where a child is placed in foster care); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(a) 
(West 2018) ("family reunification services"); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-202(a) ("reasonable efforts . . . to 
preserve or reunify families"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.419 (West 2014) (“reasonable efforts” to 
prevent or discontinue a child’s removal from the child’s home); and MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(1)(f) 
(West 2019) (before termination of parental rights, “clear and convincing evidence” that “an appropriate 
court-approved treatment plan” was not followed), employed In re R.J.F., 443 P.3d 387, 394-5 (Mont. 
2019).  
351. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015) (successful facial challenge to city 
ordinance requiring hotel operators to provide police with certain information about hotel guests since 
the ordinance did not sufficiently constrain police discretion).  
 
352. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
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invalid, since we have not recognized an “overbreadth” doctrine 
outside the limited context of the First Amendment.353 
While the Salerno description has been deemed by some as “draconian,” so 
that it should be treated as “unwise dictum” that is to be “ignored,”354 judicial 
disposition for as applied strikes of governmental policies continues.355 This 
disposition should operate in Due Process challenges to governmental policies on 
parentage by consent.356 
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS OF EXPECTING LEGAL PARENTS, EXISTING 
LEGAL PARENTS, AND PUTATIVE PARENTS IN PARENTAGE BY CONSENT 
SETTINGS 
The foregoing review of proposed norms and laws on parentage by consent 
reveals how putative parents can assert child custody/visitation/parental 
responsibility allocation [herein custody] interests over the current objections of 
expecting or existing legal parents who earlier consented, as well as how expecting 
or existing legal parents can seek financial child support from currently objecting 
putative parents who earlier consented. The objections can be constitutionally 
based, as when existing legal parents urge there are undue intrusions on, though 
not complete elimination of, their custodial decisionmaking interests, like with 
certain forms of residency/hold out parentage. Expecting legal parents, as with 
unwed biological fathers, can argue against the complete elimination of their 
custodial decisionmaking interests, as with certain VAPs signed by others. Alleged 
putative parents by consent can object to undue deprivations of their property 
interests, as with certain child support duties.  Questions linger. What protections 
are warranted for expecting or existing legal parents in custody disputes? What 
protections are warranted for putative parents in support disputes? Do current UPA 
norms, ALI pronouncements, and current U.S. state laws, provide adequate 
 
 
353. Id. at 745. The court, in conclusion, disposed of the facial challenge before it by saying that 
challenged legislation need only be “adequate” with respect to “at least some” who the government 
pursue. Id. at 751.  
354. Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175-76 (1996) ( Stevens, 
J., dissenting to a denial of a petition for certiorari).  
355. A recent U.S. Supreme Court case utilizing an "as applied" analysis is Bucklew v. Precythe, 
139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (rejecting as applied Eighth Amendment challenge to Missouri's single-drug lethal-
injection protocol in death penalty cases). Unsettled, however, is whether the “overbreadth” doctrine 
ever operates for facial challenges beyond the First Amendment. See, e.g., Janklow, 517 U.S. at 1176–81 
(Scalia, J., dissenting to the certiorari denial while noting a circuit split on the application of Salerno in 
the abortion context); Sheesley v. Wyoming, 437 P.3d 830, ¶¶ 7–11 (Wyo. 2019) (reviewing 
“overbreadth doctrine’s ostensible confinement to First Amendment challenges”).  
356. Here, as elsewhere, vagueness challenges can also be mounted where the constitutional 
standards for definiteness and clarity are not met. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999). On 
vagueness challenges generally, see, e.g., Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Vagueness as Impossibility, 98 
TEX. L. REV. 1049 (2020) (reviewing how vagueness doctrine has been called into question and suggesting 
its replacement with an analysis involving “impossibility of compliance”).  
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protection? How germane to these questions are the litigation process and privacy 
precedents on losses of nonparental constitutional Due Process interests?   
There is no need, of course, to consider these precedents if the federal 
constitutional interests in custodial decisionmaking and in avoiding support may 
only be lost by actual consent at the times that petitions for custody or for support 
are first pursued. While it is true, as noted earlier, that certain federal constitutional 
interests, like the right to a criminal jury trial357 (unlike the right to civil jury trial358), 
may only be waived in on-the-record court proceedings, federal constitutional 
interests involving child custody and child support have long been limited, as noted 
earlier, by presuit pacts later enforced in on-the-record court proceedings. Certain 
agreements entered presuit (and even preconception) especially have been 
afforded legal significance if they involve promised support for future children.359  
For children born of sex who are subject to formal adoption proceedings, 
earlier parental consents, undertaken either before or after proceedings are filed, 
have been recognized.360 For children born of assisted reproduction, with and 
without surrogates, again earlier presuit and postsuit consents by birth mothers to 
joint parentage in others have been recognized,361 as have earlier consents to 
parentage by husbands362 or to nonparentage by sperm donors.363 
Protections are significantly afforded when expecting, existing and putative 
parents expressly, directly and clearly consented earlier to the disputed parentage 
by consent. Such consent is most easily proven when it is declared in a written, 
 
 
357. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (codifying ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402(a), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238 (1969)). 
358. Consider, e.g., civil jury trial waivers under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
16 (2012), and varying American state Uniform Arbitration Acts, as with 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1–23 
(2020) (though state statutory exceptions can be called into question under Marmet Health Care Ctr., 
Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (finding FAA preemption of West Virginia policy barring compelled 
arbitration agreements for wrongful death claims against nursing homes)). See also, FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) 
(stipulating requisites for timely demand for civil jury trial); Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 F.3d 
1061, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2005) ("failure to make a timely jury trial request in federal court would 
ordinarily mean that she waived her right to trial by jury," though the court will "indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver,” quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 
393 (1937)). 
359. Child support promises can be enforced even where there was no consideration exchanged 
for the promises. See, e.g., Parentage Prenups, supra note 189, at n.32.  
360. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.080(3) (2020) (written consent to adoption may be filed 
before the child's birth, but not if the child is an Indian child). See also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 161.103(a) 
(2015) ("affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of parental rights" can only be signed 48 hours after birth, 
though before formal adoption proceedings have begun).  
 
361. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a)(1) (2020) (woman conceives through assisted 
reproduction "with the consent of another intended parent" who is then treated in law as a natural 
parent), and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(b) (2005) ("gestational surrogacy contract . . . shall be executed 
prior to the commencement of any medical procedures (other than . . . evaluations . . .")). 
362. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.703 (2001).  
363. See, e.g., id. at § 160.702 ("A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted 
reproduction"). 
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state-recognized form, which may or may not be required to be effective364 and 
which may or may not be filed with the state.365 Proof is more challenging when 
express, direct and clear consents are recognized though only given in a less formal 
writing, or orally. Even more challenging are proofs of earlier implicit consents on 
parentage, as through conduct or words that only circumstantially suggest consent. 
Implicit parentage consents occurring before litigation pose significant 
constitutional difficulties, as when expecting or existing parents object to custody 
pursuits by putative parents, or when putative parents object to child support 
pursuits by expecting or existing parents.  
Beyond the difficulties with issues involving proving consents to parentage, 
there are other Due Process issues, including the appropriate burdens of proof. 
Should the custody interests of expecting or existing parents be diminished, but not 
ended, by allowing custody for putative parents when there is only a 
preponderance of evidence on parentage consents?366 In cases involving the total 
termination of existing parental custody rights, the burdens of proof are higher, as 
there is a need for at least clear and convincing evidence.367 And what of cases 
involving possible child support from a putative parent by consent? Here, if not in 
custody settings, perhaps preponderance of the evidence should be sufficient.  
Further, with putative parents by consent in support cases, there are 
sometimes issues involving unidentified biological parents, usually men who 
 
 
364. A written voluntary acknowledgment by an expecting or existing parent of new parentage 
in another, to be effective, usually must be undertaken in a writing conforming to a state recognized 
form. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7574 (2020). Parentage arising from the birth to a surrogate, at least in 
California, may, but need not, flow from the use of a state-recognized form. Id. at § 7613.5.  
365. Written voluntary parentage acknowledgments typically are filed with the state. See, e.g., 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573 (2020). Effective surrogacy pacts need not be filed with the state. Id. at § 
7613(a)(1).  
366. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 14, at 841, wherein U.S. Supreme Court cases are found to 
suggest that lesser protections are needed when parental custody interests are diminished but not 
ended, as with the appointments of child guardians. Professor Meyer, id., concludes:  
So, while a parent’s interest in custody plainly falls within the scope of family 
privacy, the protection afforded by the Constitution to parents’ rights appears 
to take the form of a sliding scale, requiring aggressive scrutiny of action that 
would destroy the relationship but applying more deferential forms of review 
to action that imposes lesser burdens on parental child-rearing authority. 
Certainly, the court has yet to apply true strict scrutiny to state action that 
merely interferes with parental authority or custody without threatening the 
continuity of the parent-child relationship itself.  
Compare id., with Matter of Visitation of A. A. L., 927 N.W.2d 486, ¶ 42 (Wis. 2019) (“a fit parent 
has a fundamental liberty interest in the care and upbringing of his or her child and therefore to be 
applied constitutionally, the Grandparent Visitation Decision must withstand strict scrutiny. . . . We 
conclude that the Grandparent Visitation Statute is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state 
interest because it requires a grandparent to overcome the presumption in favor of a fit parent’s 
visitation decision with clear and convincing evidence that the decision is not in the child’s best 
interest”). A case discussing the distinct attributes of kinship legal guardianships versus formal adoptions 
is New Jersey Div. of Child Protec. and Permanency v. M.M., 209 A.3d 227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). 
367. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–70 (1982). 
482 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 56 
 
fathered children born of consensual sex who could still be pursued for child 
support. Should a reasonable effort to collect child support from a biological parent 
be a necessary condition before a putative parent by consent can be pursued for 
support? 
The following materials explore further some of the heretofore overlooked 
Due Process issues arising in child custody and support settings involving 
governmental policies on parentage by consent adversely affecting the “life, liberty 
or property” interests of expecting legal parents, existing legal parents, and/or 
putative parents.  
A. Expecting Legal Parents 
The custody interests of expecting legal parents, that is, those who have “care, 
custody, and control” interests that will arise at the time of birth,368 or that can (or 
will likely) arise sometime shortly after birth (as with anticipated adoptions), are 
negatively impacted, though perhaps not entirely lost, when parents by consent are 
afforded child custody interests postbirth due to their prebirth interactions with the 
expecting legal parents who later, as existing legal parents, object. Here, expecting 
parents include those anticipating future parentage with or without current 
pregnancies, so that actions can be undertaken either preconception or 
postconception but prebirth. Such prebirth actions involving expecting parents 
usually are (or at times must be) undertaken in writing, as with nonsurrogacy or 
surrogacy assisted reproduction pacts. On occasion they can be effective through 
oral agreements. They may be effective through express, implied, or presumed 
consents. They may be judicially recognized prebirth via court orders on future 
parentage by consent, or postbirth via court orders on current parentage due to 
prebirth consents to parentage. Prebirth consents may be revocable. When 
parentage by consent is sustained, the earlier desires of then expecting parents on 
"care, custody, and control" of their future children are often respected even 
though their desires on childcare have changed. When parentage by consent is 
founded on “presumed consent,” as described in the ALI Intentional Torts Draft, 
there is no current or earlier express or apparent consent to infringements on 
custodial interests.  
i. Illustrative Case 
Arrangements on future childcare between a person and an expecting legal 
parent (who could be a prospective pregnant woman, a prospective adoptive 
parent, or a pregnant woman and/or her spouse), when sustained, illustrate how 
the Due Process interests of an expecting legal parent can be lost via the parentage 
 
 
368. There is both commentary and precedent on how prebirth neglect of developing fetuses 
can prompt losses of parental custody interests at birth for those who would otherwise be legal parents 
at birth. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children, 13 U. OF ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 165 (1991) (reviewing prebirth duties of both prospective mothers and fathers), and Jeffrey A. 
Parness, Arming the Pregnancy Police: More Outlandish Concoctions?, 53 LA. L. REV. 427 (1992) 
(describing appropriate governmental efforts to promote live and healthy births of children where 
voluntary pregnancy terminations are not chosen). 
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by consent doctrine. Such application would recognize postbirth a second (or third) 
legal parentage in the other person(s). Consider the 2013 Florida Supreme Court 
ruling in the D.M.T. case.369  
T.M.H. and D.M.T. were involved in a committed same sex female relationship 
from 1995 until 2006.370 They lived together and owned real property as joint 
tenants.371 Additionally, both women deposited their income into a joint bank 
account which they used to pay their bills.372 
The couple decided to have a baby that they would raise together.373 When 
they sought reproductive medical assistance, they learned that D.M.T. was 
infertile.374 The couple, using common funds, paid a reproductive doctor to 
withdraw ova from T.M.H., have them fertilized with the sperm of an anonymous 
donor, and have the fertilized ova implanted into D.M.T.375 The two women told 
the reproductive doctor that they intended to raise the child together.376 They also 
went for counseling with a mental health professional to prepare themselves for 
parenthood.377  
A child was born in Florida in January, 2004.378 The couple gave the child a 
hyphenation of their last names.379 Although the birth certificate lists only D.M.T. 
as the mother and does not list a father, a maternity test revealed a 99.99% 
certainty that T.M.H. was the biological mother.380 The couple sent out birth 
announcements with both their names, declaring, “We Proudly Announce the Birth 
of Our Beautiful Daughter.”381 Both women participated at their child’s baptism and 
took active roles in the child’s early education.382  
The women separated in May 2006.383 The child lived with D.M.T. Initially, 
T.M.H. made regular child support payments, which D.M.T. accepted.384 T.M.H. 
ended certain support payments when she and D.M.T. agreed to divide the child’s 
time evenly between them.385 They continued to divide the costs of education.386  
After the couple’s relationship deteriorated, D.M.T. severed T.M.H.’s contact 
with the girl.387 The child had not distinguished between the biological parent and 
 
 
369. D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320 (Fla. 2013). 
370. Id. at 329 (quoting appellate court review of “undisputed facts”). 
371. Id. 
372. Id.  
373. Id. 
374. Id. 






381. D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 329. 
382. Id.  
383. Id. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. at 329–30. 
386. Id. at 330.  
387. D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 330. 
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the birth parent.388 Each woman was simply a parent until D.M.T. absconded with 
the girl to an undisclosed location after the adult relationship soured.389 
Upon locating D.M.T. in Australia, T.M.H. sought to establish parental rights 
in Florida under Florida laws.390 One Florida statute recognized parentage in a 
“commissioning couple,” defined as an intended mother and father of a child who 
will be conceived through assisted reproductive technology using the biological 
material of at least one of the intended parents, as well as in a father who executed 
a preplanned adoption agreement.391 Otherwise, an egg or sperm donor was said 
to relinquish any claim to parental childcare and lost any support obligation.392  
In response, D.M.T. alleged that T.M.H. lacked parental rights as a matter of 
law regardless of the couple’s earlier intentions.393 The trial court granted D.M.T.’s 
summary judgment motion, explaining that it felt constrained by the written law 
while expressing hope that a higher court would reverse since D.M.T.’s actions were 
"morally reprehensible."394 The trial court determined that the birth mother and 
the biological mother, as a same-sex couple, were not a “commissioning couple.”395  
The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court’s application 
of the statute violated T.M.H.’s constitutional rights.396 It reasoned that T.M.H.’s 
protected parental rights could not, consistent with the Florida and U.S. 
Constitutions, be extinguished through the application of the statute.397 The court 
also found T.M.H. was not a “donor” under the statute so as to be deprived of 
parental rights "because she did not intend to give her ova away,” as “she always 
intended to be a mother to the child born from her ova."398    
The appeals court also rejected the contention that the T.M.H. had 
relinquished her rights by signing an informed consent form in the reproductive 
doctor’s office, concluding that the preprinted form did not constitute a waiver.399 
The court found that both women had agreed to raise any future child as equal 
parental partners and that both had complied with that agreement for several 
years.400 The court found it “very revealing” that the birth mother never attempted 
to assert a waiver claim until she relocated the child to Australia in order to deprive 




389. Id.  
390. Id. 
391. Id. 
392. Id. at 333 (FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2016).  
393. D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 330. 
394. Id. 
395. Id.  
396. Id. at 331 (citing T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) rev’d, 129 
So.3d 320 (Fla. 2013)). 
397. Id. 
398. Id.  
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A concurring opinion found that the statute did not apply to T.M.H. because 
the statute “was not designed to resolve the problem of how to treat children born 
through in vitro fertilization to a same-sex couple.”402  
The Florida Supreme Court deemed the statute did apply to deny parentage 
to T.M.H.403 But it went on to find the statute “unconstitutional” as applied to 
T.M.H.404 Further, it found that T.M.H. had not waived any parental childcare 
interest by signing the consent form.405  
In finding the Florida statute, as written, covered the case so that T.M.H. was 
a donor who relinquished all maternal rights and obligations, the high court found 
the legislature intended to limit the exceptions to the general waiver norm for 
sperm, eggs, and preembryo donors. The policy rationale was to protect those 
utilizing assisted reproduction technology who were outside the statute.406   
But the court found the statute to be unconstitutional as applied to T.M.H. 
The court relied on “long-standing constitutional law that an unwed biological 
father has an inchoate interest that develops into a fundamental right to be a 
parent protected by the Florida and United States Constitutions when he 
demonstrates a commitment to raising the child by assuming parental 
responsibilities.”407 This inchoate interest was said to be possessed by all biological 
parents, regardless of sex or of the method of conception. But, to be clear, a 
“biological relationship per se” would not have “constitutional significance” for an 
unwed biological father, for T.M.H.,408 or for any other person whose genetic 
material prompted a birth. 
In determining there was no waiver of rights by T.M.H., the high court deemed 
the single form before it that was signed by T.M.H. simply served to inform her of 
“the procedures that would be undertaken, the goals of the procedures and the 
risks related thereto.”409 The form was characterized as “not tailored to 
characterize the relationship” of D.M.T. and T.M.H.410 
The Supreme Court was not unanimous in its ruling, as it was a 4-3 vote.411 In 
dissent, Justice Polston found that T.M.H. had, in fact, waived any parental rights 
via her signature on the two forms provided at the time of donation.412 One form, 
an "informed consent donor form," had been found by the majority as not in the 
court record.413  Justice Polston characterized the majority's analysis as having "no 
seeming or logical end point," opening the door to varying avenues for parentage 
 
 
402. Id. at 331–32 (citing 79 So.3d at 803 (Monaco, J., concurring)). 
403. Id. at 332. 
404. Id. at 334. 
405. D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 341, 347.  
406. Id. at 345–47.  
407. Id. at 327–28 (relying upon Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983)).  
408. Id. at 328 (quoting In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 748 (Fla. 1989)).  
409. Id. at 347. 
410. Id. 
411. See D.M.T., 129 So. 3d. at 347. 
412. Id. at 351–53.  
413. Id. at 345. 
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by consent for future childcare.414  Illustrative of problematic arrangements were 
those anticipating two mothers and a father, or two fathers and a mother.415 Justice 
Polston was also worried about the impact of the majority's analysis in other 
settings where expecting parents arrange for parentage by consent, as with 
"voluntary waivers leading to adoption."416 
Even if there was no waiver by T.M.H., Justice Polston opined the case would 
require remand as “D.M.T. never conceded that she and T.M.H. had jointly agreed 
to co-parent.”417 Further, he found the statute not only applicable, but also capable 
of constitutional application to T.M.H. because her claims were not “so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience” of U.S. citizenry “as to be ranked as fundamental.”418 
ii. As Applied Concerns 
The earlier reviews of UPAs and current state laws on the custody interests of 
parents by consent, as well as the D.M.T. case, demonstrate how there can be 
negative impacts on the custodial interests of expecting legal parents deemed to 
have consented prebirth to postbirth custodial parentage in others.  Such impacts 
on the custodial interests of those who, as expecting legal parents, entered into 
preconception custodial agreements should arise infrequently when children are 
born of sex. Any prebirth promises by pregnant women, also then expecting legal 
parents, to share custody of later-born children, whether made to biological fathers 
or to others, are seemingly more likely to be used by the promisees in postbirth 
attempts to secure custodial interests over the objection of those who by then have 
become legal parents. 
Much more likely, there will be disputes about the breadth of the custodial 
interests of existing parents who object to enforcing their preconception childcare 
agreements involving children to be born of assisted reproduction. Requests for 
postpregnancy but prebirth judicial declarations of parentage by consent leading to 
postbirth custodial interests are even imaginable.419 Cases like D.M.T. are more 
difficult where prebirth consent by the birth mother alone, that is, without the use 
of the nonbirth mother’s ova, is employed to justify future custodial parentage 
interests in the nonbirth mother. Here there is no Lehr-related biological parentage 
opportunity interest. 
Comparably, there can be disputes about the breadth of the custodial 
interests of existing parents in formal adoptions who then object to enforcing their 
preadoption agreements on future shared custody, as well as disputes about the 
obligations of those who agreed with prospective adopting parents to future shared 
 
 
414. Id. at 356. 
415. Id. 
416. Id. 
417. D.M.T., 129 So. 3d at 350.  
418. Id. at 355 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).  
419. It is possible that some agreements on future parentage will be sustained when entered 
into by people who were not then expecting parents.  Consider when to be a potential grandparent 
agrees with an offspring who is a potential parent to assume, if there is no later judicial bar, parental (or 
parental-like) caretaking should the offspring die or otherwise be unable to fully childcare for his or her 
later conceived and born child. 
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support. Here, the enforcement of such agreements420 may depend on whether or 
not the agreements embodied specific children who had been designated for 
adoption.421 
As for the UPAs on an expecting legal parent who consents to future custodial 
parentage in another for a child to be born of sex, seemingly the 1970, 2000, and 
2017 UPAs, and their state law counterparts, on the marital parentage presumption 
(explicitly expanded in 2017 to include female spouses of birth mothers) are 
relevant. Here, at the time of marriage, seemingly inferred consents arise under law 
by a future birth mother and her spouse to automatic, shared custodial 
parentage.422 Though such parentage by consent is rebuttable, it is not necessarily 
disestablished when the spouse has no biological ties, where rebuttal is sought by 
the birth mother, the spouse, or a biological parent other than the birth mother.  
Relevant as well for children born of sex are the few state laws allowing VAPs 
to be undertaken by expecting birth mothers and those with whom she signs as 
second expecting parents.423 Again, even while such VAPs may be subject to 
postbirth challenges, as by unwed biological fathers with parentage opportunity 
interests under Lehr, the challengers may not always succeed even though there 
are no biological ties in the signing nonbirth parents. So, a VAP signed and filed by 
a female spouse of an expecting birth mother, per the 2017 UPA, becomes effective 
“on the birth of the child” and is not void as of the time of the signing where the 
unwed biological father is not an expecting presumed parent (i.e., not wed to the 
expecting birth mother), an acknowledged parent, or an adjudicated parent.424 
As for the UPAs on an expecting parent who consents to future custodial 
parentage in another for a child to be born of nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction, 
 
 
420. Possible enforcement of agreements on future shared custody with prospective adopters, 
of course, depends on laws allowing formal adoptions without the termination (by waiver or otherwise) 
of the parental interests of all existing or expecting legal parents.   
Where such agreements are enforceable, U.S. State laws differ on the circumstances allowing 
revocations of earlier consents by expecting or existing legal parents to later formal adoptions by others.  
For example, consents to adoptions are irrevocable upon execution unless there was fraud or duress in 
Illinois.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/11(a) (West 2020). Revocations within 30 days are recognized in 
Pennsylvania, 23 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c)(1) (West 2020), while there is a 10 day 
revocation period in Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-9-209(b)(1) (West 2020). In Kentucky, a consent to an 
adoption must come at least 72 hours after birth; once done, it is irrevocable 72 hours after it is signed. 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (West 2020). 
421. See, e.g., K.G. v. C.H., 79 N.Y.S.3d 166 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) (agreement needs to be in effect 
at the time a certain child is identified for a potential adoption). Where such agreements are 
unenforceable, nonadoptive parentage may be established through such doctrines as equitable estoppel 
or de facto parentage which are dependent upon postadoption childcare and not on express childcare 
agreements.  
422. In some states the spousal parentage presumption arises at the time of conception, while 
elsewhere it arises at the time of birth.  See, e.g., GA.CODE ANN. § 19-7-20(a) (West 2020) (child “born in 
wedlock or within the usual period of gestation thereafter”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(a)(1) (2020) 
(marriage “at any time in the ten months preceding the birth”); and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1433(e) 
(West 2020) (marriage at time of conception or birth).  
423. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C § 304(b)–(c) (West 2018) (an acknowledgment of parentage 
may be signed and filed before the birth of a child, but then takes effect on the date of the child’s birth).  
424. 2017 UPA, supra note 29, at §§ 304(b)–(c),302(b)(1)–(2). 
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the 1973 UPA is silent as to nonmarital births.425 The 2000 UPA, updated in the 2017 
UPA only in its application to same-sex as well as opposite sex couples,426 recognizes 
that a unwed gamete donor is a parent if there is consent.427 A spouse of a birth 
mother, even if a gamete donor, may attain nonparental status under the 2017 UPA 
by showing a lack of consent.428 
As for the UPAs on an expecting parent, like a gamete donor who consents 
with another to shared future custodial parentage for a child to be born to a 
surrogate via assisted reproduction, the 1973 UPA is silent.429 The latter two UPAs 
speak to preconception surrogacy pacts. The 2017 UPA-like the 2000 UPA as 
amended in 2002-distinguishes between genetic (“traditional") and gestational 
surrogacy.430 Unlike its 2000 predecessor, the 2017 UPA imposes differing 
requirements for the two surrogacy forms, with "additional safeguards or 
requirements on genetic surrogacy agreements,"431 as only they involve a woman 
giving birth while "using her own gamete."432 
State statutes, as with the UPAs, generally recognize the implicit consents of 
future birth mothers as expecting parents, and their spouses, to custodial 
parentage in the spouses, whether the marriages preceded or postdated 
pregnancies.  Spousal parentage is generally presumed. State laws, however, differ 
on the rebuttal norms attending spousal parentage.433 Thus, some consents and 
presumptions are more enduring than others. For example, rebuttals are easier in 
Mississippi and Iowa.434 Rebuttals are more difficult in Pennsylvania and 
Louisiana.435 Marital parentage presumption laws that limit, or disallow altogether, 
 
 
425. 1973 UPA, supra note 29, at § 5. Even as to marital births, it only speaks to assisted 
reproduction employed by a married woman “under the supervision of a licensed physician,” with the 
consent of her husband and where the semen is provided by a man who is not the projected birth 
mother’s husband. Id.  
426. 2017 UPA, supra note 29, at Comment preceding § 701. 
427. Id. at §§ 702-03. 
428. Id. at § 705. 
429. See 1973 UPA, supra note 29. 
430. 2017 UPA, supra note 29, at Comment preceding § 801. 
431. Id..  The common safeguards or requirements for all surrogacy pacts are found in id. at §§ 
802–07.  See also id., at §§ 808-812 (special requirements for gestational surrogacy agreements) and §§ 
813-818 (special requirements for genetic surrogacy agreements).  
432. Id. § 801(1).  Gestational surrogacy covers births to a woman who uses "gametes that are 
not her own."  Id. § 801(2).  The special rules for gestational surrogacy pacts are found in id. §§ 808–12, 
while the special rules for genetic surrogacy pacts are found in id. §§ 813–18. 
433. See, e.g., Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II.  Questioning the Paternity of 
Marital Children, 37 Fam. L.Q. 55, app. F at 94–95 (2003). 
434. See In re Waites, 152 So.3d 306, 314 (Miss. 2014) ("natural-parent presumption" of 
biological father in a child born to a woman married to another can only be overcome by "clear and 
convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral conduct detrimental to the child, [or] 
unfitness;" child was born in 2004 and biological father first sued for custody in 2011); Callender v. Skiles, 
591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999) (state due process interest of alleged biological father in challenging 
marital paternity presumption). 
435. See Strausser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053–55 (Pa. 1999) (unwed biological father cannot 
rebut marital paternity presumption if marriage continues unless he can prove the husband's lack of 
access to his wife during the period of conception or the husband's sterility); L.J.D. v. M.V.S., 212 So.3d 
581, 584 (La. Ct. App. 2017) (biological father has no more than one year to seek to rebut a marital 
paternity presumption). 
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rebuttal petitions by biological fathers can prompt state constitutional challenges 
where they operate to preclude the biological fathers' custodial interests.  Paternity 
opportunity interests, recognized in Lehr, though not necessarily available to 
adulterers per the U.S. Supreme Court's Michael H. ruling, have been recognized 
under state constitutional Due Process liberty interests.436 
Paternity opportunity interests, which can prompt custodial interests, for 
unwed biological fathers in children born of sex to either wed or unwed birth 
mothers can also be thwarted by the prebirth utilization of VAP processes by the 
prospective birth mothers and intended parents without genetic ties.  The prebirth 
thwarting of such Due Process paternity opportunity interests should be 
discouraged by the VAP processes, as otherwise one expecting parent (like a 
pregnant woman) can foreclose the parentage interests of another expecting 
parent (like an actual biological father who is a prospective legal parent).437 In Lehr, 
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that U.S. state parentage schemes were suspect 
when they were "likely to omit many responsible" interested putative biological 
fathers,438 especially where the schemes facilitated the "fraudulent practices" by 
birth mothers causing such fathers "not to protect" their potential interests.439 
Prebirth VAP laws that do not allow many, if any, challenges by actual biological 
fathers of children born of sex to the parentage of the VAP signing nonbirth mothers 
would be such a scheme, warranting a label the Court called "procedurally 
inadequate."440 Here, as applied constitutional challenges seem viable. Consider, 
for example, the unfairness of a very short repose period for any VAP challenge by 
an actual biological father who did not know of a prebirth VAP that took effect at 
birth, and who was informed repeatedly prebirth and postbirth that he was not to 
be, or was not, the biological parent.  
Comparable thwarting via VAPs of the parentage opportunity interests of 
nonbirth biological parents can arise for children born of assisted reproduction. As 
with actual biological fathers of children born of consensual sex, a woman whose 
ova was used to prompt a pregnancy for and birth to another woman has, per Lehr 
according to the D.M.T. ruling, parentage opportunity interests. Such interests 
should be recognized, for example, when the donor's understanding with the 
projected birth mother of her intended second parentage is shown, together with 
a showing of no intended parentage in the sperm donor (thus avoiding any no three 
parent bar). Similarly, a sperm donor may have an understanding with the projected 
 
 
436. See, e.g., Callender, 591 N.W. 2d at 188–92 (following Justice Brennan’s dissent in Michael 
H. in ruling on Iowa Due Process claim of putative biological father of a child born into an intact 
marriage).  
437. See, e.g., Unnatural VAPs, supra note 67, at 30–31.  
438. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263–64 (1983). 
439. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265 n.2. Fraudulent practices are to be distinguished from nonfraudulent 
actions by birth mothers, like failure to notify the biological fathers of the pending adoption proceedings 
involving their children. See, e.g., Purvis, supra note 14, at 558 (reading Lehr to regard as “irrelevant” 
the birth mother’s prevention of the biological father having time to establish a parent-child 
relationship).  
440. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264 n.3. 
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birth mother of his later second parentage by consent.  In each setting, under the 
2017 UPA and some current U.S. state laws, the birth mother's spouse at the time 
of the birth can pursue a VAP,441 which would then be difficult for the donor of 
genetic material, an alleged parent by consent, to override.442 In some instances at 
least, such thwarting of intended parents’ child custody interests should prompt 
significant Due Process concerns.  
Some U.S. state statutes, like the UPAs, further address agreements on future 
custodial parentage for children to be born of assisted reproduction, both in 
nonsurrogacy and surrogacy settings. In nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction birth 
settings in California, there is a writing requirement by an intended parent beyond 
the birth mother. Compliance is greatly facilitated by statutory forms, which are 
discretionary, but which, if used, constitute the necessary writing.443 The availability 
of such forms is quite useful in assuring actual understanding of, and consent, to 
postbirth custodial arrangements. Alternately, state lawmakers can help assure 
actual understanding of the custodial consequences of earlier agreements upon 
nonsurrogacy births, as well as reduce the numbers of postbirth parentage 
disputes, by requiring certain forms to be used in such agreements. In such 
agreements there would be made declarations as to future intended parentage.444 
The consequences of failing to employ the required forms should lead to equitable 
common law decisionmaking on a case-by-case basis, best done with some explicit 
statutory guidelines. 
In surrogacy assisted reproduction birth settings, some U.S. state statutes, like 
the recent UPAs, recognize both genetic (“traditional”) and gestational surrogacy. 
Where each is recognized, there may be different standards regarding informed 
consents.445 Elsewhere, as in Illinois, there are only statutorily recognized 
gestational surrogacy pacts.446 In Illinois, significant eligibility and contract terms 
are mandated, as are certain requirements insuring informed consents by all 
contracting parties.447 As with nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction, state-
recognized forms providing avenues for intended parentage declarations would 
 
 
441. 2017 UPA, supra note 29, §§ 204(a)(1), 301 (a "presumed parent," i.e., a spouse of the birth 
mother at the time of birth  can sign a VAP). 
442. Under the 2017 UPA, § 602(4), an individual whose parentage of a child is to be adjudicated 
can challenge a VAP, under § 610(b), but must only do so within 2 years of the VAP and only "if the court 
finds permitting the proceeding is in the best interest of the child." 
 
443. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a), 7613.5(a) Form 1 (2020). 
444. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Formal Declarations of Intended Childcare Parentage, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 87 (2017). 
445. For example, there are both genetic and gestational surrogacy pacts in Washington state.  
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.700 (2018).  While births to gestational carriers prompt legal parentage at 
birth for intended parents, id. § 26.26A.740, genetic surrogates can withdraw their consents to intended 
parentage in others any time within 48 hours after birth, id. § 26.26A.765. 
446. See, e.g., Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 47/1 -75 (2005)(per section 20(b)(1) 
and (2), a single intended parent, or one of two intended parents, need to be a “gametes” contributor 
and needs to have “a medical need for the gestational surrogacy”).  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17–61 
(West 2018) (gestational carriers only); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1 (West 2015) (gestational carriers 
only). 
447. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT 47/25 (two witnesses, information transfers, and a writing).  
 
2020 THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CUSTODIAL AND 
SUPPORT PARENTAGE BY CONSENT 
491 
 
reduce litigation and prompt more certainty regarding the effects of conduct 
involving future parentage by consent. 
B. Existing Legal Parents 
The custody interests of existing legal parents, that is, those whose “care, 
custody, and control” interests arose or were established at birth or thereafter, are 
negatively impacted, though not entirely lost, when parents by consent are 
awarded custodial interests due to the earlier actions by the existing (i.e., postbirth) 
parents who now object. Such postbirth actions prompting parentage by consent 
can (or at times must) be written. They may be oral. They may constitute express, 
implied, or presumed consents. They may be revocable. Relevant actions can be 
undertaken in the very judicial proceedings wherein parentage by consent is 
sought, or they can occur before any judicial proceedings are commenced. 
i. Illustrative Case 
The 2004 California Supreme Court decision in In re Jesusa V.448 illustrates how 
a state law on parentage by consent can prompt shared "care, custody, and control" 
interests in a child born of sex to a birth mother, an existing legal parent, and her 
spouse, himself a presumed parent and thus an existing legal parent.  Jesusa V. was 
born in 1999 to Jesusa, who was married to Paul at the time.449  Jesusa had five 
other children by Paul.450  The couple had separated before Jesusa V.’s birth.451  
Heriberto was Jesusa V.’s biological father.452  An unusual living arrangement 
ensued whereby Jesusa V. and her mother lived with Heriberto during the week and 
with Paul and Jesusa’s other children on weekends.453 
Jesusa and Heriberto had a tempestuous relationship.454 Before Jesusa V.’s 
second birthday, Heriberto was arrested for raping Jesusa.455  Jesusa V. was taken 
into protective custody on April 1, 2001; the Los Angeles County Department of 
Children and Family Services then petitioned the juvenile court to declare Jesusa V. 
a dependent of the court.456 The court appointed counsel to represent Heriberto, 
 
 
448. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004) (the mother’s sometime live-in boyfriend is also a 
presumed parent, via a statute on residency/ hold parentage. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2020)). 
Later cases include In re Danny M., A138844, 2014 WL 2465116 (Cal. Ct. App.  June 3, 2014) and  In re 
L.L., 220 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904 (Cal. Ct. App.  2017). 






455. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 27 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
456. Id. at 6 (majority opinion). 
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who denied the rape allegations and asserted that he, not Paul, was Jesusa V.’s legal 
father.457 Heriberto was later pleaded no contest to the charge of rape.458  
A paternity hearing established Paul was a sergeant in the Air Force in San 
Diego.459 Paul and Jesusa had been married for nearly 18 years, though they often 
lived apart for the last 3 years.460 Jesusa had recently lived with Paul, however, 
“when her mother came to San Diego to visit her other children.”461  The most 
recent visit occurred in March, 2001.462 As to parenting, Heriberto was not only 
Jesusa V.’s biological father, but also held himself out as her father and received her 
into his home.463 Paul also held himself out as Jesusa V.’s father, received her into 
his home, and treated her as his own.464  As well, Paul lived with Jesusa V. “for a 
significant period of time in her young life.”465 
At the hearing on July 17, 2001, none of the parties were personally 
present.466 Jesusa, distraught over the paternity proceedings, had walked out of the 
courtroom, followed by Paul.467 With Heriberto’s lawyer present, the court ruled 
that because Heriberto was not Jesusa V.’s legal father but a “mere biological 
father,” he was “not even entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard.”468 
Because the attorneys representing Paul and the mother did not challenge the 
allegations of biological ties in the dependency petition, the court found them to 
be true.469 There were no blood tests entered into evidence.470 The court ordered 
the child placed with Paul; allowed Jesusa unmonitored visits; and forbade 
Heriberto from having any contact with Jesusa V.471 
In a 4-3 ruling, the California Supreme Court affirmed the custody order 
favoring Paul.472 All seven justices examined the varying California statutes on 
paternity preferences, categorical and otherwise.  They all agreed that both Paul 
and Heriberto were “presumed” natural fathers under the California Family 
Code.473  Paul qualified because Jesusa V. was born to his wife.474 Both Paul and 
Heriberto qualified because each had received Jesusa V.  into his home and openly 
held her out as his natural child.475 Thus, the residency/ hold out parentage by 
 
 
457. Id. at 27 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
458. Id. at 6–7 (majority opinion). 
459. Id. at 7. 
460. Id. 





466. Id. at 28 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
467.  In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 28 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
468. Id. 
469. Id. 
470. Id. at 20 (majority opinion). 
471. Id. at 7. 
472. Id. at 27. 
473. Id. at 11 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (2020)). 
474. Id. at 11. 
475. Id. But see  Greer ex rel. Farbo v. Greer, 324 P.3d 310 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (employing KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(a)(5) and (c) to a similar paternity showdown in Kansas involving a marital child, 
where the unwed biological father was a presumed parent because of positive genetic tests).  
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consent doctrine, initially at least, applied to the two men, even if neither man was 
the biological father of the child born of sex. Because eventually there could be 
“only one presumed father,”476 another Code provision became operative. It said 
that the choice between two competing presumed fathers must be determined on 
“the weightier considerations of policy and logic.”477 These vague statutory norms 
on choosing between two fathers led to a split in the court. Four justices chose 
Paul,478 while three chose Heriberto, though at least two of them recognized “the 
juvenile court may well have been right that Paul rather than Heriberto was likely 
to be a better parent to Jesusa.”479 The choice of Heriberto over Paul by the three 
dissenters was grounded on the view that the relevant statutes pointed to 
determining paternity by biological ties.480 
The majority agreed with the juvenile court judge that the prevailing policy 
involved the preservation and protection of the “family unit” and of “parent/child 
relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and stability” 
rather than the recognition of “biological ties.”481 It found that the man who 
provides the stability and permanence is more important to a child than the man 
who has mere biological ties,” especially since Heriberto had taken no “legal steps 
to formalize his relationship” to Jesusa V. until after the alleged rape and the filing 
of the dependency petition.482 The failure of Heriberto to take formal action earlier 
was important to the four justices as a Family Code section declared that “a 
completed voluntary declaration of paternity . . . that has been filed with the 
Department of Child Support Services shall establish the paternity of a child and 
shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for paternity issued by a 
court.”483 The section also said that this voluntary declaration “shall be recognized 
as a basis for the establishment of an order for child custody, visitation and child 
support.”484 Voluntary paternity declarations in California, technically at least, can 
only be pursued by men with actual or alleged biological ties. Heriberto may have 
 
 
476. Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 11 (quoting In re Kiana A.., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 675 (Ct. App. 2001). 
477. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (2020); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (2020) (opening the door 
by the California legislature to three possible parents by indicating that in a showdown between two 
presumed parents where there is also a birth mother, no choice between the two presumed parents 
need be made where “recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child”); see Melanie B. 
Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize 
Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309 (2007) for a discussion on why lawmakers should recognize at 
times more than 2 parents at any one time. 
478. Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 12. 
479. Id. at 29 (Kennard, J., dissenting, concurred in by Werdegar, J.). 
480. Id. at 30; Id. at 32 (Chin, J., dissenting).  
481. Id. at 15 (majority opinion). 
482. Id. at 16. But see S.M. v. E.C., F065817, 2014 WL 2921905, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 
2014)  (Poochigian, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting federal constitutional superior parental 
rights might demand male biological parents always prevail over presumed parents when the biological 
parents have established “sufficiently profound” actual relationships with their biological offspring born 
of sex). 
483. Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 17 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573 (2011)). 
484. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573 (2011). 
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won by a 7-0 vote if he had signed a voluntary paternity declaration, regardless of 
the best interests of Jesusa V.485 
The Jesusa V. ruling demonstrates how Paul, an existing legal parent, may lose 
- or need to further share if three legal parents are recognized - "care, custody and 
control" of Jesusa V. because of the actions of Jesusa and Heriberto that may have 
been largely beyond his control.486 Seemingly, there was no actual, informed and 
wholly voluntary consent by Paul to share, along with Jesusa, custodial interests in 
Jesusa V. with Heriberto. But by not halting, or not trying to halt,487 the partial 
common residence of Jesusa V., Jesusa and Heriberto, assuming he was aware of it, 
did Paul inferentially agree to Heriberto's later possible parentage of Jesusa V., as 
did Jonathan Lehr to Richard's possible parentage when he failed to register his 
sexual encounter with Lorraine with the state? Is it not likely that many existing 
legal parents like Paul, and potential legal fathers like Jonathan, have no knowledge, 
or even suspicions, of the laws that can negatively impact their constitutional 
childcare interests/opportunities?  Without an ability to infer from the facts Paul's 
actual consent to Heriberto's possible parentage, and with no reasonable basis for 
Heriberto to believe Paul consented to Heriberto's later possible parentage, is there 
justification to presume consent by Paul to the intentional residency/hold out acts 
of Jesusa and Heriberto that prompted, under state law, "presumed" parentage in 
Heriberto?488 
Regardless of the relevant laws, some birth mothers, like Jesusa, may 
subjectively believe that their intimate partners, like Heriberto, are simply helping 
 
 
485. Comparable showdowns between a husband and a person other than the birth mother 
involving marital children occur elsewhere. See, e.g., Greer ex rel. Farbo v. Greer, 324 P.3d 310, 321 (Kan. 
App. 2014)  (biological father and husband). And comparably, there are no showdowns when one of the 
two men seeking parentage under law took formal action, not only via a voluntary declaration, but also 
via a secured court judgment as to parentage, like in In re Mia G., 2014 WL 3510747 (Cal. Ct. App. July 
16, 2014). 
486. One precedent would find Paul could not ever lose his custodial parentage to Heriberto 
since the recognition of a third custodial parent would always violate the parental rights of two existing 
and fit legal parents. Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010). See also T.H. v. J.R., 84 
N.Y.S.3d 676 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018) ("psychological parent" petitioner has no standing to seek custody as 
biological father, who shared custody with birth mother, never consented to a possible third parent). 
But see Schnedler v. Lee, 445 P.3d 238 (Okla. 2019) (in assisted reproduction setting, a sperm donor 
need not acquiesce or encourage the development of “in loco parentis” status invited by the birth 
mother, even though there was no record that the sperm donor waived his parental interests; in the 
case, the sperm donor had maintained “some relationship- albeit minimal and covert” with his 
daughter). 
487. Had Paul tried to halt, via court proceedings, any prospective custodial parentage in 
Heriberto arising from common residency/hold out, he may have lacked standing. See CAL.FAM. CODE § 
7611(d) (home residence and hold out, which need not start at birth, can prompt presumed parentage) 
and 7630(a)(2) (no explicit recognition of standing to seek declaration of nonexistence of parent-child 
relationship though there is common residence).  
488. Without Paul’s consent, and even without any residency/ hold out by Heriberto, would Paul 
still lose the paternity battle to Heriberto should the Lehr ruling on seizure of the parental opportunity 
interests by unwed biological fathers be found met by Heriberto, as seemingly was done by one 
dissenter?  
In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 54 (J. Chin, dissenting) (majority’s reading of statutes is 
“unconstitutional”).  
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around the house, as Professor Wilson has observed.489 Those subjective beliefs will 
not, however, bar custodial parentage by consent at times for the partners, as again 
there is recognized presumed consent by the existing legal parents should there be 
found residency/hold out by their romantic partners or others.490 Assuming Paul 
disestablished his marital parentage and did not urge residency/ hold out 
parentage, Jesusa-by opening her doors to Heriberto-effectively opened the door 
to his shared or exclusive custody of Jesusa V., assuming-of course-the alleged rape 
was never proven.  
ii. As Applied Concerns 
Beyond the Jesusa V. ruling, the earlier reviews of UPAs and current U.S. state 
laws on establishing custodial interests in parents by consent demonstrate how 
there can be further negative impacts on the custodial interests of existing parents 
who then object to their earlier consents, or who object to the consents given by 
other legal parents (as with Paul’s childcare interests impacted by Jesusa’s consent 
to reside with Heriberto).   
As for the UPAs, they all recognize that unwed mothers who gave birth to 
children born of sex effectively can consent, as existing legal parents, to shared 
custodial parentage with some who they marry after birth. The circumstances 
include that the marriages occur within certain times after the births. The 1973 UPA 
expressly recognizes a marital parent presumption in a man who marries a birth 
mother and who recognizes her child in some writing, which need not be filed with 
the state.491 The 2000 UPA recognizes a marital parent presumption in a man who 
marries a birth mother, with a similar writing necessary.492 The 2017 UPA recognizes 
a marital parent presumption, but in either a man or woman who marries a birth 
mother, again with a similar writing requirement.493 The writing requirements invite 
unintended custodial consequences for existing legal parents unaware of the 
parentage presumption. An existing legal parent may well view a new spouse as a 
stepparent, not a coequal parent even when the new spouse has promised child 
support in a writing.   
When marriages are undertaken by soon-to-be spouses with minor children, 
U.S. state laws should prompt awareness in the existing parents of any parentage 
(presumption) upon marriage. For example, notices of the laws on (presumptive) 
spousal parentage should accompany issuances of marriage certificates to couples 
 
 
489. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute's 
Treatment of De Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1158 (2010) (critical of childcare parentage laws 
that lead to "full-blown parental rights based only on a bare showing of time-in residence and chores 
performed for a child"). 
490. See FAM. § 7611(d) (home residence and hold out, which need not start at birth, can prompt 
presumed parentage). 
491. 1973 UPA, supra note 29, at § 4(a)(3) (writing may be a paternity acknowledgment, a birth 
certificate recognition, or a written voluntary child support promise). 
492. 2002 UPA, supra note 31, at § 204(a)(4). 
493. 2017 UPA, supra note 29, at § 204(a)(1)(C). 
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expecting the birth of a child. Laws should also prompt more significant awareness 
by existing legal parents of any residency/hold out and/or de facto parentage 
doctrines.494  Such reforms more reasonably allow state lawmakers to utilize actual 
inferred consent, apparent consent and/or presumed consent principles in parent 
by consent norms. 
All three UPAs, though varied in their requirements, recognize a form of 
residency/hold out parentage. Unlike postbirth marriages, there are no writing 
requirements, resulting often in parentage arising from the presumed consents of 
existing legal parents. But, as with Jesusa, does residence with one's child, and with 
an intimate partner (or even a nonintimate family member) who holds out the child 
as his/her own for such purposes as school pickups, medical appointments, daycare 
drop-offs, and swimming lesson registrations, mean an existing legal parent, like 
Jesusa, has welcomed the establishment of the partner (or family member) as a co-
parent? Any best interest analysis serving to limit residency/hold out parentage 
establishments would focus on the child's needs, not on the loss of custodial 
interests for the existing legal parent. In the absence of significant rebuttal 
opportunities for existing legal parents involving such (presumed) parentage once 
initially established, are losses of an existing legal parent's Due Process interests in 
the "care, custody and control" of a child adequately justified through a "presumed 
consent" analysis? Even if justification is sometimes warranted, should the burden 
of proof on residency/ hold out be more than preponderance of the evidence 
because existing parental Due Process interests are at stake?495 
All three UPAs recognize some form of VAPs available to existing legal parents 
and others who will effectively become, upon signing, parents by consent to 
children born of sex. As with prebirth VAPs, postbirth VAPs at times thwart the 
paternity opportunity interests of unwed biological fathers. Again such VAPs are 
especially problematic when undertaken with "fraudulent practices."496 
C. Putative Parents by Consent 
The financial interests of putative parents by consent are negatively impacted 
when expecting or existing legal parents are awarded support for prebirth 
pregnancy expenses and/or postbirth childcare expenses due to earlier actions by 
those now deemed financially responsible parents by consent. Actions prompting 
child support from nonparents newly deemed parents by consent can (or at times 
must) be written. They may be oral. They may constitute express, implied, or 
 
 
494. Thanks to Professor Marc D. Falkoff for the phrase, and the thoughtful discussion thereon.  
495. While preponderance of the evidence is the standard used in some common law marriage 
cases where it is “unlikely that an express agreement to be married will exist,” In Re Marriage of Hogsett 
and Neale, No. 17CA1484, 2018 WL 6564880, at ¶¶ 13–14, (Col. App. VI. Dec. 13, 2018), there is no 
comparable infringement on an existing “life, liberty, or property” interest as there is with a residency/ 
hold out parentage by consent finding and as a marriage can more easily be undone that can a coparent’s 
custodial interests.  
496. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265 (1983). Problematic, as well, are VAPs signed by 
nonbirth mothers “without informed consent.” See, e.g., Tianna N. Gibbs, Paper Courts and Parental 
Rights: Balancing Access, Agency, and Due Process, 54 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 549, 556 (2019). See also 
Caroline Rogus, Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural Reform of Our Paternity Laws, 21 
Mich. J. Gender & L. 67, 115–17 (2014). 
 
2020 THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CUSTODIAL AND 
SUPPORT PARENTAGE BY CONSENT 
497 
 
presumed consents. They may be revocable. Relevant actions can be undertaken 
by some parents by consent in the very judicial proceedings wherein parentage for 
support purposes is sought (as via written agreements), or they can be undertaken 
long before any childcare proceedings have been commenced. 
i. Illustrative Case 
The 2000 North Dakota case of Johnson v. Johnson497 illustrates how a state 
parentage by consent law can prompt child support obligations for one with no 
biological or formal adoptive ties.  In the case the Johnsons, Antonyio and 
Madonna, had married in September 1986.498 No child was born during this 
marriage.499 In August 1988, the Johnsons, then living in New Jersey, took custody 
of Jessica in Pennsylvania, then three months old and the natural granddaughter of 
Madonna.500 While Jessica was scheduled to remain with the Johnsons for only a 
month, ten years later Jessica was still living with the Johnsons.501 Until she was 
nine Jessica believed that Madonna and Antonyio were her biological parents.502 
During this first decade, Jessica was raised as the Johnsons’ child, residing with 
them as they regularly changed residences due to Antonyio’s Air Force 
deployments.503 The Johnsons did initiate two separate formal adoption 
proceedings, one in New Jersey and one in Kentucky (where Jessica’s natural 
parents lived).504  But neither proceeding was completed.505  From August 1988 to 
May 1997, the Johnsons resided primarily in New Jersey and Florida, with Antonyio 
occasionally deployed overseas.506 
In 1997 Antonyio was deployed to Korea while Madonna and Jessica resided 
in Florida.  Antonyio requested Madonna file for divorce in Florida while he was 
 
 
497. Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000).  
498. Id. at 100. 
499. Brief for Appellant at ¶ 1, Johnson v. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000) (No. 990353). 
500. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 100.  (Jessica’s biological mother is Michelle Clayton, who was 
married to Madonna’s son David Clayton. In August 1988, David was incarcerated in Vermont.  Michelle 
called the Johnson’s requesting help and the Johnson’s housed Michelle for about a week at which point 
Michelle went back to Kentucky, and left Jessica with the Johnsons. Madonna obtained a temporary 
custody order for 30 days, but Michelle never returned to retake custody of Jessica. Jessica has no 
biological ties to Antonyio). 
501. Id. 
502. Brief for Appellant, supra note 499 at ¶ 4, (Antonyio did not believe Jessica should have 
been told “until later in her life” but “Antonyio testified that he did not see even the – eventual – 
disclosure of her biological parentage being a factor that ‘was going to change [his] relationship with 
[Jessica]”). 
503. See id. at ¶ 3-4. 
504. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 100. 
505. Id.(due to the Johnsons’ military work transfers). 
506. See Id. at 100–01. 
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away; she never did. 507 In June1998, Antonyio was sent to Grand Forks, North 
Dakota.508 By then, Madonna and Jessica were living in Kentucky.509      
Antonyio filed for divorce in North Dakota in July 1998.510 There, Madonna 
sought child support for Jessica, whom she urged had been equitably adopted by 
herself and Antonyio.511 From 1997 to some time in 1998, Antonyio voluntarily sent 
Madonna $500.00 per month for support; the North Dakota trial court ordered 
support to continue from July 1998 until the beginning of the divorce trial in April 
1999, at which point Antonyio stopped making support payments.512 
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that “North Dakota law clearly 
recognizes the doctrine of equitable adoption” founded on “contract to adopt” 
principles.513 The court cited North Dakota cases on “contract to adopt” in 
inheritance settings.514 Yet, it recognized that the contract principles in the two 
settings should differ, with a more significant commitment to continuing parent-
like care necessary in the child support setting.515   
Without any North Dakota cases directly on point, the North Dakota high 
court referenced three out-of-state cases imposing a child support duty upon an 
equitable adoption parent.  In one, the obligor was a stepfather who supported the 
child during his marriage to the woman who primarily cared for the child; claimed 
the child as dependent for tax purposes; and promised to adopt the child.516 In 
another, the obligor was a stepfather who agreed with his wife to adopt her child 
from a previous marriage; treated the child as his own; began the adoption process; 
 
 
507. Id. See generally Brief for Appellant, supra note 499 at ¶ 4. (at this time Antonyio asked 
Madonna to move to Kentucky, and subsequently for her to file for divorce there while he was stationed 
overseas; however, Madonna never initiated divorce proceedings). 
508. Brief for Appellant, supra note 499 at ¶ 4. 
509. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101. 
510. Id. 
511. Id.   
512. Johnson v. Johnson, 652 N.W.2d 315, 318 (N.D. 2002).  
513. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 101. 
514. Id. at 102–03 (cases cited to include Klein v. Klein, 286 N.W. 898 (N.D. 1939); Borner v. 
Larson, 293 N.W. 836 (N.D. 1940); Mulhauser v. Becker, 20 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1945); Fish v. Berzel, 101 
N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1960); and Geiger v. Estate of Connelly, 271 N.W.2d 570 (N.D. 1978)).  It also cited 
Ceglowski v. Zachor, 102 F. Supp. 513 (D.N.D. 1951) (enforcing a 40 year old contract to adopt made by 
a North Dakota childless couple who brought a child over from Germany as a result, where child sued 
after husband died in 1949 and his widow died intestate in 1950). 
515. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d at 109,  
Application of the doctrine of equitable adoption in the domestic context, 
unlike its application in inheritance cases, contemplates an ongoing 
relationship between living parties, and, therefore, something more than the 
agreement to adopt is required. The inquiry includes whether there exist 
indicia of a true parent-child relationship between the child and the alleged 
equitable parent.  Some of the facts and circumstances considered by courts 
include representations . . . that she was their natural child . . . that she had 
been adopted; holding the child out to the community . . . incomplete efforts 
to adopt . . . and the natural parents’ consent to the adoption. 
516. Id. at 104 (finding “instructive” Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S. 2d 815, 817–18 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1970)). 
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and, acted to terminate the parental rights of the child’s natural father.517 In a third, 
a soon-to-be ex-husband was the obligor because he brought the child to Maryland 
from Iran; made adoption promises to his wife and to the Republic of Iran;  and 
lived with the child for four months.518 While employing these cases, the Johnson 
court recognized that there were differing approaches elsewhere.519 
The Johnson court determined that North Dakota public policy supported 
application of an equitable adoption doctrine “to impose a child support obligation 
under certain circumstances.”520 It found that no North Dakota statutes forbade 
it.521 All high court members failed to address in great detail, however, the 
distinctions between Antonyio’s legal parenthood in child support and inheritance 
settings,522 as only in the latter was there a “contract to adopt” approach. 
Seemingly, the court deemed it more important for children to access support than 
to access inheritance from those who acted as parents though without any plans to 
adopt. The Court remanded for resolution of the factual issues germane to the 
North Dakota equitable adoption doctrine on child support.523   
Upon remand, the lower court found that Antonyio and Madonna had 
equitably adopted Jessica. It then set child support for Antonyio under North 
Dakota law.524 The case returned again to the Supreme Court on the issue of the 
amount of support owed by Antonyio.525 The North Dakota high court held that 
 
 
517. Id. (finding “instructive” Frye v. Frye, 738 P.2d 505, 505 (Nev. 1987)). 
518. Id. (finding “instructive” Geramifer v. Geramifer, 688 A.2d 475 (Md. 1997)). 
519. Id. at 104 n.2. 
520. Id. at 109. 
521. Johnson, 617 N.W.2d 97, 109 (N.D. 2000). Such an application of the equitable adoption 
doctrine, however, was “limited” as the court expressed “preference for adherence to statutory 
procedures” on adoptions. Id. at 106 n.3.   
522. Id. at 101. Antonyio never sought child custody or visitation; the request from Madonna 
was solely for monetary support for herself—which was denied—and child support for Jessica. As 
Antonyio had not sought sole or shared custody of Jessica, or visitation, pursuant to a North Dakota 
court order, the North Dakota courts did not need to consider how “contract to adopt” principles would 
apply in custody settings. 
523. Id. at 109–10. In applying North Dakota law, the majority did not inquire into the 
governmental interests of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida or Kentucky, though a dissenting justice 
opined "that if an equitable adoption took place, it took place in New Jersey or Kentucky," so that "the 
law of one of those states" should have been used.  Id. at 112 (not recognizing that any adoption might 
be governed by Pennsylvania or Kentucky law).  On principles that should guide choice of law in 
interstate parentage by consent cases, see Faithful Parents, at 373–79.  Similar principles on choice of 
law would seemingly operate in cases involving marriage, or cohabitation for palimony purposes, with 
multistate connections. See, e.g., Winebrenner v. Godwin, 2019 WL 1856471 (Tenn. App. 2019 Apr. 25, 
2019) (choosing between California and Tennessee laws on palimony).    
524. Brief for Appellant at ¶ 6, Johnson v. Johnson, 652 N.W.2d 315 (N.D. 2002) (No. 20010288) 
(the trial court applied the child support calculation standard of North Dakota, but held the payments to 
begin at October 1, 2001, after the court ruled that the equitable adoption occurred; the court also ruled 
that Antonyio was eligible for interim support of $500 for August and September, 2001).   
525. The Supreme Court recognized in 2002 that Antonyio had been paying Madonna $500 a 
month in “interim spousal support” from May 1997 (and thus before he moved to North Dakota) until 
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since the trial court had correctly found Antonyio equitably adopted Jessica, the 
original $500.00 order should apply retroactively for the time between the start of 
the first trial in April 1999 and the end of the second trial in October 2001.526 It also 
ruled the $669.00 support order should operate after the end of the second trial, in 
October 2001.527 The decision clearly rested on an equitable adoption finding that 
Antonyio was Jessica’s legal parent before he moved to North Dakota and before 
his divorce case was filed.528 Although Antonyio never sought a childcare order, he 
was still liable for child support to Madonna, who had custody of Jessica in 
Kentucky.529 
ii. As Applied Concerns 
The earlier reviews of the UPAs and the current U.S. state laws on parental 
child support duties demonstrate the negative impacts on those who earlier 
consented in some express, apparent or presumed way to support parentage 
though they were without biological or formal adoptive ties. Such parents by 
consent at times cannot object later though they no longer wish to be recognized 
as parents and no longer wish to provide child support. The Johnson case illustrates 
how Antonyio Johnson’s inability to escape North Dakota equitable adoption law 
prompted Due Process property losses without his express consent, and arguably, 
without, his apparent consent, as supported by his failure to follow through with a 
formal adoption of Jessica. Per the 2019 ALI Intentional Torts Draft, Antonyio could 
be “presumed” to consent to child support parentage due to the acts of Madonna, 
not unlike, one roommate’s consent to a search authorized by another 
roommate.530 
Objections to child support duties are not particularly compelling when the 
putative parents by consent earlier benefitted, or sought to benefit, from their 
alleged parent-child relationships, as by undertaking voluntarily, and enjoying, a 
parent-child or parental-like relationship for some time or by pursuing child custody 
 
 
April 1999, which was “intended to be child support.” Johnson, 652 N.W. 2d. at 318–19. While Antonyio 
was ordered to pay child support to Madonna in the amount of $500.00 through August 1998, the last 
payment was made on March 3, 1999, before the commencement of the first trial in April 1999; from 
April 1999 until July 2001, Antonyio was not ordered to pay, and did not pay, anything to Madonna for 
child support. Id. 
526. Id.  
527. Id. at 320 (explaining that the July 2001 ruling on Antonyio’s equitable adoption of Jessica 
applied the interim child support order to more than two years of back child support from the 
commencement of the first trial in April 1999). 
528. Id. (Antonyio moved to North Dakota in May 1998 and filed for divorce there in July 1998. 
His only connection with Jessica during that time was the $500 in child support he (voluntarily) paid to 
Madonna in those few months. At least some of the equitable adoption precedents in inheritance cases 
cited in Johnson I were grounded on parental-like acts in North Dakota that went well beyond a few 
months of voluntary child support. See, e.g., Fish, 101 N.W.2d at 550–51 (decedent acted as a father 
from 1917 to 1956, when he died) and Ceglowski, 102 F. Supp. at 514–15 (decedent acted as mother for 
at least 27 years).) 
529. Id. 
530. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 12(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2019)  
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over the objections of existing legal parents.531 Comparably, objections to support 
duties by putative parents (or others, like grandparents) should be easy to sustain 
where support parentage (or nonparentage support) arises from explicit promises 
of future child support, as in a premarital or midmarriage pact,532 regardless of the 
present or future nature of the promisors’ relationships with the children. 533 
 Parentage by consent for support purposes can arise due to residency/hold 
out conduct, as well as due to equitable adoption. Consider a man who for some 
time believed in his biological ties to the child, even if it is later proven erroneous 
(and perhaps where maternal deceit caused the error). At times, guided by the 1970 
UPA, parentage by inferred consent can arise due to residency/hold out conduct 
occurring when an intimate partner moves in (whether wed or unwed) with one 
then a nonparent who then cares in the household for a child born to the partner 
before the couple met. Here, consent to parentage for support purposes at least 
arises due to earlier actual assent to shared childcare.  
Somewhat differently, support parentage by inferred consent can arise, as 
shown earlier, due to marriage to a birth mother sometime before a then 
anticipated childbirth, which is not coupled with a writing acknowledging the 
forthcoming marital parentage presumption; with a different writing (as with one 
declaring likely biological ties, as in a VAP); or with a writing promising child support 
(as with a future stepparent’s pledge of aid in a premarital agreement even though 
there are or may be no acknowledged biological ties). The most problematic 
inference involves a postbirth marriage establishing parentage where neither the 
newly-established parent nor the existing legal parent knew of the consequences 
of marriage on legal parentage.534 Here, the consent to parentage arises due to an 
earlier marriage, though in many instances each newlywed at least knew of the 
pregnancy and expected, later birth. 
Somewhat differently, as well, from such marital support parentage is marital 
support parentage arising where imminent childbirth is not anticipated because 
one spouse is then not carrying a prospective child. Consider a married woman who 
conceives and bears a child in a U.S. state via adultery or via assisted reproduction 
technology where her spouse was unaware of the pregnancy until after live birth 
and could not reasonably have been aware of or agreed to the pregnancy-related 
 
 
531. See generally In re A.C.H., 440 P.3d 1266 (Col. App. 2019) (finding “psychological parent” 
who fought for and obtained parenting time with his ex-girlfriend’s child could be held responsible for 
child support; similar cases in other states are reviewed).  
532. The Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, for example, recognizes agreements 
on “custodial responsibility” can be enforced. Parentage Prenups, supra note 189 at 344–46. State laws 
also recognize certain child support promises arising from parental-like relationships are enforceable. 
See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7614(a)(2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-22(a) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
126.900(1)(2013); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-58(a)(2020).  
533. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE § 7614(a)(2014) (promise in writing to furnish support for a child 
by “alleged” parent “does not require consideration”); HAW. REV STAT. § 584-22(a) (2020).  
534. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C § 6(3)(ii) (2020) (man is presumed father if he marries 
the birth mother after the child’s birth and “engaged in any… conduct which can be construed as an 
acknowledgment of paternity”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(3)(c) (man is a presumed biological father if 
he marries birth mother with a child and “openly holds out the child as his natural child”).  
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acts, as when he/she is deployed or employed overseas. Such a spouse is usually, 
as shown earlier, a presumed spousal parent, where a presumed consent 
justification seemingly operates and where the spousal parent presumption may 
not be able to be rebutted.535 Here, the marital parent presumption prompts not 
only Due Process property losses for the nonbirth spouse who is later deemed 
obliged to provide child support, but also Due Process liberty losses for the birth 
mother who may later need to share child custody. 
Certain applications of child support parentage by inferred consent are 
troublesome, even if not unconstitutional. Fairness to those responsible for child 
support would be advanced if the forms of support parentage by consent (and of 
nonparentage support by consent) were better understood within society.  
Understandings would need to vary interstate because, as shown earlier, there are 
major interstate variations.  Better understandings would also be advanced if, upon 
obtaining a marriage certificate, for example, parties were informed of the child 
support effects of the marriage where one or both parties have prospective or 
actual children when the marriage will take effect. Fairness to those responsible for 
child support would also be advanced if U.S. state laws more effectively deterred 
deceits/ mistakes involving biological ties of those later responsible for support.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Parentage by consent is quickly expanding across U.S. states, with no sign of 
letup. All three UPAs and recent ALI pronouncements recognize childcare 
parentage forms that are dependent upon neither (real or presumed) biological ties 
nor formal adoptions. Increasingly, there are new forms of parentage by consent 
for children born of sex and for children born of assisted reproduction. Childcare 
parentage can prompt nonfinancial interests, as with custody, visitation and 
parental responsibility allocations, and/or financial obligations, as with support 
duties. 
The emerging childcare parentage laws independent of biology and formal 
adoption utilize varying forms of consent. Consents can involve actions by those 
who are then nonparents, as well as actions by those who are then either expecting 
or existing legal parents. Expecting legal parents include those who will very likely 
be vested with “care, custody, and control” interests in later-born children whose 
births are then reasonably anticipated, or in living children who have been placed 
with them for formal adoption. Existing legal parents include those who have 
already been vested with “care, custody, and control” interests in living children.  
Avenues to parentage by consent include certain forms of spousal parentage; 
certain forms of voluntary acknowledgment parentage; residency/hold out 




535. See, e.g., LC v. MG, 430 P.3d at 424–25 (female spouse of birth mother could not 
disestablish her legal (marital) parentage though the child was unborn of assisted reproduction to her 
spouse without her consent), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 234 (2019) (Fourteenth Amendment infringement 
urged).  
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Expansions of parentage by consent prompt significant federal (and state) 
constitutional Due Process concerns. Some new forms of parentage by consent 
cause undue infringements on the rights of expecting or existing legal parents in 
the “care, custody, and control” of their children. Such infringements often do not 
fully eliminate custodial interests, but only diminish them by recognizing that these 
legal parents must now share child custody.  
Some new forms of parentage by consent cause undue infringements on the 
substantive Due Process rights of newly-named parents who can then be pursued 
for child support. Such rights are less constitutionally protected, however, than the 
custodial rights of expecting or existing legal parents.  
The parameters of the Due Process limits on childcare parentage by consent 
are, however, uncertain. Assessments of such limits are difficult since the Due 
Process limits on “life, liberty and property” infringements outside of parentage are 
not uniform. In fact, they are quite varied, as illustrated by the criminal and civil jury 
trial right cases. 
Reforms are needed to protect better the rights of expecting legal parents, 
existing legal parents, and putative parents by consent. In particular, there needs 
to be a reassessment of employing what the ALI Torts Draft has called a “presumed 
consent” concept in order to diminish or eliminate the custodial interests of 
expecting and existing legal parents, as well as to validate child support obligations 
of putative parents. Such reassessments should be made when there are challenges 
to statutes or precedents on parentage by consent, with refinements made through 
“as applied” analyses.  
Further, there needs to be a better understanding of the revolutionary 
changes occurring in U.S. state parentage laws.536 Increased knowledge should be 
facilitated by new federal and state legislation, including laws on expanded 
informational requirements when VAPs are signed and when marriage licenses are 
secured by those with current or expected minor children (e.g., “marital 
Miranda”537), as well as new laws on promoting understanding of the legal 
ramifications of employing assisted human reproduction technology, especially for 
the do-it-yourselfers.   
Innocent losses of custodial interests by expecting and existing legal parents 
should be diminished-even if they cannot be wholly eliminated-so that parental 
opportunity interests and superior parental rights are not lost to those who did all, 
or most of what, they could to preserve their custodial interests. Agent waivers 
prompting losses of custodial interests for expecting and existing parents should be 
more significantly foreclosed, especially where the agent’s actions are contrary to 
 
 
536. As Professor Meyer observed regarding the tragedies arising when earlier-adopted 
children are torn from their current families due to adoption process flaws involving unwed biological 
fathers, where all concerned “mostly struggled . . . within the confines of an unwieldy legal regime they 
only dimly comprehended.” Meyer, supra note 14, at 845.  
537. Again, thanks to Professor Marc D. Falkoff for his suggestion and advice.  
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the principal’s desires and earlier conduct. Thus, one existing custodial parent, 
without the acquiescence (or even the knowledge) of a second custodial parent, 
should not always be able to allow a nonparent to secure custodial interests via 
residency/ hold out, de facto, or VAP parentage that negatively impacts that second 
parent’s custody interests, especially when that second parent has, in the past, 
strongly exercised those interests.  Fourth Amendment "common authority" 
consent to search cases are dissimilar, as mutual responsibilities for rearing a child 
do not prompt "assumptions of risk" by one parent that the other parent "might 
permit" another person to become a parent.538 And these shared responsibilities 
cannot be deemed to constitute a basis for eliminating a parent's reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding yielding childcare authority to a third person.539 
As well, U.S. state laws on support parentage by consent should promote a 
general awareness about possible child support obligations on the part of 
nonparents who are then prospective parents by consent. Thus, romantic partners 
and family members (like grandparents or stepparents), especially those who reside 
with custodial parents while helping to childrear, need to understand better that 
child support obligations can later arise even when common residence, or and 
perhaps familial relationships, end. Further, those who marry women who may 
later bear children born of adultery or of assisted reproduction on their own need 
to understand better that unknown (and to them objectionable) spousal acts 
leading to births within marriages may not relieve them of financial obligations to 
children born into their marriages.  
 
 
538. See, e.g., Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (one mutual property user assumes the risk that the 
other user "might permit" the common property area to be searched). 
539. See, e.g., Davis, 332 F.3d at 1167-68 (recognizing that while sharing a residence, one does 
not forfeit the reasonable expectation of privacy in many personal property items (like a purse, gym bag, 
suitcase, or other closed container) within the residence). 
 
